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Introduction
This thesis consists of three research papers motivated by policy questions in develop-
ment economics. These questions are addressed from a behavioral economics perspective,
building on insights from economics as well as psychology and other behavioral sciences.
Each paper employs a different experimental methodology. The first uses a lab-in-the-
field experiment, where Tanzanian couples are invited to the lab to make decisions about
intra-household resource allocation. The second conducts a large-scale field experiment
that surveys corruption beliefs and behaviorally measures willingness to engage in corrupt
behavior in Tanzania. The third conducts an experiment where American participants
make allocation and punishment decisions.
While the questions asked and the practical implementations of the three studies are
very different, they all rely on the principle of randomization to identify causal effects.
Random assignment of participants to different experimental groups ensures that there
are no systematic differences between these groups other than the experimentally con-
trolled variation in the decision environment between them. Thus, an observed group
difference in attitudes or behavior can be interpreted as a causal effect of the experi-
mental variation. In the three studies, the environment in which the participants make
their decisions and express their attitudes is carefully controlled in a way that is difficult
to do using observational data: the experimental treatments turn on and off different
institutional features, types of motivation and information, making it possible to identify
the separate effects of different factors influencing attitudes and behavior. In this way,
the experimental methods employed in this thesis allow me to both identify causal effects
and investigate their underlying mechanisms. When seen in combination with observa-
tional data, this type of research can provide a better understanding of the phenomena in
question by addressing the “how” and “why” questions that are often difficult to answer
using observational data alone.
The first paper is coauthored with Charlotte Ringdal and addresses the research ques-
tion: Does money in the hands of women lead to better outcomes for children than money
in the hands of men? It is frequently assumed that increasing women’s intra-household
bargaining power increases spending on goods and services that benefit children, and most
cash transfer programs therefore target women rather than men. However, the empirical
and theoretical evidence for the positive effect of female empowerment are mixed. In this
paper, we conduct a novel between-subject lab-in-the-field experiment where couples in
an urban area in Tanzania are invited to the lab to make decisions about intra-household
resource allocation. We exogenously increase the wife’s control over a household en-
dowment and study whether this causes couples to allocate more to their child. The
results provide no evidence that it does. Increasing the wife’s control over resources does,
however, lead to more gender-equal allocations to children. We also find that the effect
of increasing the wife’s bargaining power depends on the difference in time-preferences
between spouses. It is better for the child that the most patient spouse has more rela-
tive bargaining power. Our results challenge the general view among policy makers that
female empowerment leads to higher household spending on children, and suggest that
what matters are the attributes of the main decision-maker (time preferences and gender
preferences), not gender itself.
The second paper is coauthored with Alexander W. Cappelen, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad,
Donald Mmari and Bertil Tungodden and considers the research question: Do expecta-
tions about future gas revenues affect expectations about corruption and willingness to
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engage in corrupt behavior? A comprehensive economic and political economy litera-
ture shows that countries rich in natural resources often perform worse in terms of social
and economic development compared with countries that have less abundant natural re-
sources, and corruption appears to be an important driver behind this relationship. In
this paper, we conduct a large-scale field experiment with a sample largely representative
of Tanzanian society. We use different versions of an informational video to create exoge-
nous variation in expectations about future gas revenues and investigate how these affect
expectations about future corruption and willingness to engage in corrupt behavior. Our
main finding is that providing information about the discovery of natural gas in Tan-
zania and estimates of total revenues that might accrue to the government significantly
increases people’s expectations about future corruption. Although we find this relation-
ship across subgroups, the effect is particularly pronounced among older respondents. We
do not find any effect of this information on the willingness to engage in corrupt behavior.
We believe that our results may shed some light on the underlying mechanisms of the
resource curse.
The third paper investigates the question Does taxation cause citizens to have a greater
demand for accountability in government spending? The so-called Rentier State Hypoth-
esis in the political economy literature claims that taxation promotes government ac-
countability. The argument is that citizens demand more accountability for spending
of tax than of windfall revenue (such as natural resource revenue or aid). This higher
demand for accountability is in turn argued to make governments more accountable. In
this paper, I conduct a between-subject experiment to causally test how taxation affects
the demand for accountability and the underlying mechanisms that might explain this
relationship. The design focuses on two main features distinguishing tax from windfall
revenue: tax revenue is produced by citizens’ work and was in their possession before be-
ing collected. I theorize that these features increase the salience of fairness considerations
in government spending, because they entail active contribution to government revenue.
Higher salience is, in turn, hypothesized to increase citizens’ demand for accountability
in government spending. The main finding is that taxation causes a greater demand
for accountability when both features of taxation are present. This result is evidence in
support of the Rentier State Hypothesis.
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Household bargaining and spending on children:
Experimental evidence from Tanzania∗
Charlotte Ringdal & Ingrid Hoem Sjursen†
Abstract
It is frequently assumed that money in the hands of women leads to better out-
comes for their children than money in the hands of men. However, empirical and
theoretical evidence are mixed. We conduct a novel between-subject lab-in-the-field
experiment to study whether increasing the wife’s control over resources causes a
couple to allocate more to their child. The paper provides two main insights. First,
increasing the wife’s bargaining power does not increase the share allocated to the
child, but leads to more gender-equal allocations to children. Second, time prefer-
ences are important in explaining household decision-making; it is better for the
child that the most patient spouse has more relative bargaining power. Our re-
sults highlight the importance of taking a broader set of preferences into account
when studying household decision-making, and suggest that policy aimed to in-
crease spending on children should target the spouse with preferences most aligned
with such spending.
Keywords: Intra-household allocation, Female bargaining power, Tanzania
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1 Introduction
Since the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were launched in year 2000, there
has been an increased focus on female empowerment in international development aid
strategies. Female empowerment is undoubtedly a goal of great intrinsic importance,
but the policy debate has also focused on other reasons for empowering women. In
particular, it has been argued that increasing women’s intra-household bargaining power
increases spending on goods and services that benefit children.1 The assumed positive
externalities of female empowerment are also reflected in implemented policies; most
conditional cash transfer programs that aim to improve living conditions for children
target women (Fiszbein and Schady 2009).
The empirical and theoretical evidence for the positive effect of female empowerment
on spending on children are, however, mixed. In this paper, we present evidence from a
novel between-subject lab experiment where we exogenously vary the relative bargaining
power between the husband and the wife. The design allows us to causally identify
whether an increase in the wife’s bargaining power affects how much a couple allocates
to their child. We also investigate the role of time, risk, and gender preferences, factors
that have previously received little attention in the household decision-making literature.
The experiment was conducted with married couples in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
The main outcome of interest is how the couples distribute a fixed endowment between
the wife, the husband, and one of their children. The amount allocated to the child is an
investment in his or her education in the form of tutoring. In the experiment, we change
the wife’s bargaining power by exogenously varying her control over the allocation of the
endowment in four treatments. The first treatment is a dictator game where the husband
is the dictator and makes the allocation decision. The second and third treatments are
Rubinstein shrinking-pie bargaining games; the husband makes the first proposal for the
allocation decision in the second treatment, and the wife makes the first proposal in the
third treatment (Rubinstein 1982). Finally, the fourth treatment is a dictator game where
the wife is the dictator and makes the allocation decision. The treatments are designed
to capture a gradual increase in the wife’s bargaining power. In the first treatment,
the husband has complete bargaining power. In the second and third treatments, the
bargaining power is shared between the spouses, where the first proposer has the upper
hand through a first-mover advantage. Thus, the wife has less bargaining power in the
second than in the third treatment. In the fourth treatment, the wife has complete
bargaining power.
The paper offers two main insights. First, we find no evidence that increasing the
wife’s bargaining power causes a larger allocation to the child. To the contrary, we observe
a significant reduction (≈ 10 percentage points from a base of 35%) in the allocation to the
child in the bargaining treatment where the wife has the first-mover advantage compared
to the treatment where the husband is the dictator. This result challenges the common
assumption that targeting the wife is beneficial to children. On the other hand, increasing
the wife’s bargaining power benefits gender equality among children; girls receive as much
as boys when the wife has some bargaining power (treatments 2 - 4). This finding suggests
that increasing the wife’s bargaining power may lead to a more gender-equal society over
time. Second, we find that the effect of an increase in bargaining power depends on
1See, e.g. Thomas (1990; 1993), Phipps and Burton (1998), Attanasio and Lechene (2002), Brown
(2003), Duflo (2003), Duflo and Udry (2004), Khandker (2005), Doss (2006), Gitter and Barham (2008),
Rubalcava et al. (2009), and Browning et al. (2014).
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the difference in time preferences between spouses. When the wife is less patient than
the husband, giving her full bargaining power decreases the allocation to the child by
13.7 percentage points (from 38% when the husband is the dictator to 24.3% when the
wife is the dictator). This result illustrates the importance of time preferences in the
decision-making process in the household.
Our study relates to the growing literature on household decision-making in developing
countries. Earlier empirical studies such as Thomas (1990; 1993), Kennedy and Peters
(1992), Lundberg et al. (1997), and Case and Deaton (1998) are typically based on survey
data, and suggest that wives allocate more resources towards children’s human capital
and clothing than men do. In the last two decades, a large strand of the household
decision-making literature has focused on studying cash transfer programs. Attanasio
and Lechene (2002; 2010) and Rubalcava et al. (2009) find that conditional cash transfers
to women in Mexico (Oportunidades) increase the families’ budget share spent on food
and children’s clothing, and decrease the share spent on alcohol compared to households
that did not receive a transfer. However, because the transfers were given to women only,
these studies do not shed light on the importance of the receiver’s gender for spending
on children. Yoong et al. (2012) find that when transfers are unconditional, targeting
women does not guarantee positive outcomes for the family’s welfare.2 This finding is
also supported by more recent randomized controlled trials that exogenously vary the
gender of the receiver (Benhassine et al. 2015; Akresh et al. 2016; Haushofer and Shapiro
2016).3
Another strand of the household decision-making literature uses lab experiments to
test household models, including efficiency and cooperation within the household. This
literature suggests that women do not always make choices that are in the best interest
of the household. Iversen et al. (2011), Kebede et al. (2014), and Munro et al. (2014)
use public good games and find that the wife contributes less to the common pool than
the husband does. In this context the wife’s decision reduces the household income more
than the husband’s decision does. Similarly, Jakiela and Ozier (2016) find that women are
willing to conceal their initial endowment, even though it reduces their potential earnings
in the experiment. Finally, Castilla and Walker (2013) and Hoel (2015) find evidence of
inefficiencies and hiding of income when the wife is the decision-maker. We contribute
to the household decision-making literature by (i) providing a clean causal test of the
effect of an increase in female bargaining power on real investments in children, and (ii)
shedding light on the effect of time, risk, and gender preferences.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents a conceptual framework. Section
2 describes the experimental design. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy and Section
4 provides the results. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes.
2 Conceptual framework
This section introduces a simple conceptual framework to guide our empirical analysis.
The framework is based on the collective household model, as developed by Chiappori
(1992). We first address the question of bargaining power. Second, we consider underlying
2Welfare is broadly defined and includes “material standards of living as well as human capital and
social relationships” (Yoong et al. 2012, 2).
3An exception is a recent study by Armand et al. (2016) who find that female recipients spend
significantly more on food (especially meat, fish, and dairy products) compared to male recipients.
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mechanisms (time, risk, and gender preferences) that may explain how bargaining power
affects household decisions.
Assume that each spouse cares about his or her own consumption and spending on
the child. Let w = wife and h = husband, then spouse s = w,h’s utility function can be
expressed as:
us = lnqs +αs lnQ (1)
where qs is spending on private goods, Q is spending on the child, and αs≥ 0 is the weight
assigned to the child by spouse s.
First, we consider intra-household bargaining power. In this framework, a spouse’s
bargaining power is defined as how much weight is assigned to his or her utility in the
household utility function (Browning et al. 2014).
max
qw,qh,Q
µuw +(1−µ)uh (2)
where µ ∈ (0,1) denotes the wife’s bargaining power. When prices are normalized to 1,
and household income is denoted by Y =Q+qw+qh, we obtain the following relationship
between the wife’s bargaining power and spending on the child:
dQ
dµ
=
αw−αh
(αwµ +αh(1−µ)+1)2Y (3)
From Equation (3), we observe that if the husband and the wife assign the same weight to
the child in their utility function, a change in bargaining power does not affect spending
on the child. If, however, the wife assigns a higher weight to the child than the husband
(αw > αh), an increase in the wife’s bargaining power increases spending on the child.
To address the underlying mechanisms, we consider the factors determining the weight
assigned to the child by spouse s, αs. Previous literature has mainly thought of αs as
capturing how much the spouse cares about the child, where the common assumption
is that the wife cares more about the child than the husband does. This assumption
has support in evolutionary biology theory through the fact that women’s fertility is
constrained, whereas men’s fertility is not (Eswaran and Kotwal 2004). We argue that a
broader set of factors may shape αs, including time, risk, and gender preferences.4
Time preferences may be important in determining the weight assigned to the child
because spending on children (particulary on children’s education, which is the focus of
this paper) requires a long-term perspective as it involves delayed benefits (such as higher
wages for the child and security in old age for the parents). Thus, we hypothesize that
spouses that are more patient assign a higher weight to the child in their utility function
than less patient spouses.
The weight assigned to the child can also be affected by the risk preferences of the
spouse. A priori, the effect of risk preferences is unclear. On the one hand, as the future is
uncertain, a more risk-averse spouse may be more likely to have a lower weight assigned
to the child than a less risk-averse spouse. On the other hand, a child may represent
4In this paper we have chosen to focus on the spouse’s preferences. Another important factor is
knowledge. The better knowledge the spouse has of the value of education, the more likely he or she
is to assign a higher weight to the child. A proxy for knowledge is level of education, and it has been
shown that children with parents with a high level of education are more likely to receive a high level
of education themselves (Black et al. 2005). Other factors influencing the weight could include social
norms and social networks.
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an insurance mechanism and education can therefore be more valuable to a risk-averse
spouse than to a less risk-averse spouse (Wo¨lfel and Heineck 2012).
Finally, gender preferences may influence the weight assigned to the child. In Asia,
there is a clear preference for sons (Qian 2008; Guilmoto 2012), but this is not common
elsewhere (Norling 2016). Some studies from Africa and the US show that parents favor
children of their own gender (Raley and Bianchi 2006; Dahl and Moretti 2008; Dizon-
Ross and Jayachandran 2015), whereas others do not find any gender-biasedness (Norling
2016). If the spouse is gender-biased, he or she will assign a higher weight to a child of
one gender than to a child of the other gender.
To summarize, our conceptual framework shows that bargaining power only matters
if the husband and the wife assign different weights to the child in their utility function.
The weight assigned to the child depends on several factors, including caring preferences,
time preferences, risk preferences, and gender preferences.
3 Sample and experimental design
3.1 Sample and setting
The experiment was conducted with 287 couples in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The couples
were recruited by distribution of invitation letters (see Appendix B.1) to pupils in four
different primary schools in a relatively poor ward. The couples signed up for participation
in the study by returning a slip with their name and contact information to their child’s
teacher. They were then called by one of the research assistants to schedule a session.
Each spouse received a TZS5,000 show-up fee (approx. USD2.3 at the time of the
study), and had the opportunity to earn more during the experiment. All sessions took
place in the afternoon between 1 pm and 5 pm, and each session consisted of between
15 and 30 couples. On average, each household earned TZS40,000 (approx. USD18.6),
including the show-up fee. This corresponded to more than two days’ worth of wages for
low-paying jobs.5 In addition, we provided one child in each household with an average
of 3.4 weeks of tutoring (worth TSZ17,000/USD7.8).
Table 1 provides background characteristics for participants by gender. The average
participant is close to 39 years old, and the men are on average eight years older than
the women. The couples care for an average of 3.2 children of whom 1.4 are in primary
school. Comparing our sample to the Tanzania Demographic Household Survey (DHS),
our households are larger than the average in urban Tanzania (5.2 members vs. 4.3
members) (TNBS and ICF Macro 2016, p. 37). Most of the respondents have completed
primary school or a higher level of education. Men are more educated than women, which
reflects the gender gap in educational attainment in Tanzania (TNBS and ICF Macro
2016, p. 42–43). In addition, there are large gender differences in employment status.
While 41% of women report being unemployed, only 5% of men do the same. This is
comparable to the DHS data (TNBS and ICF Macro 2016, p. 69–72).
[Table 1 about here.]
5The minimum daily wage for trade, communications, and domestic services was around TZS5,000,
and for construction around TZS10,000 (http://www.africapay.org/tanzania/home/salary/minimum-
wages).
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3.2 Experimental set-up and conditions
The sequence of events is described in Figure 1. At arrival, we conduct a background
survey with both spouses present. Couples are subsequently randomized to one of the
four treatments, and the husband and the wife are placed in separate rooms according to
their treatment. They then face three incentivized tasks. All the tasks are choices of how
to allocate a monetary endowment. To illustrate their choice, the participants receive
laminated pictures of TZS500 and TZS1,000 notes. They are asked to place the money
in different cups illustrating their choice and the research assistants record the answers.
By simplifying the tasks in this manner, we ensure that literacy is not a requirement to
participate in the study.
To understand the underlying mechanisms behind the couple’s decision, we elicit
time and risk preferences using two separate tasks. In both tasks the participants are
explicitly told that their spouse will not be informed about their decision.6 We base the
time-preference task on Angerer et al. (2015), and the risk-preference task on Gneezy and
Potters (1997) because of their simplicity.7 In the time-preference task, the participants
allocate TZS3,000 between the day of the experiment and three weeks later.8 Any amount
they choose to receive after three weeks is doubled. Earnings from the time-preference
task are paid out as transfers to mobile phones through M-Pesa.9,10
In the risk-preference task, the participants decide how much of TZS3,000 they want to
keep and how much they want to invest in a risky option. After their decision, the partic-
ipants draw a card from a bag to determine whether the invested money is tripled (green
card) or reduced to nothing (red card). They are informed that the probability of winning
and losing is the same. Note that risk-neutral (and risk-seeking) individuals should invest
the entire TZS3,000 endowment in the risky option. Thus, the risk-preference task can
be thought of as a measure of the degree of risk aversion. Earnings from this task are
paid out in cash at the end of the experiment.
In the third task, the couples allocate a TZS15,000 endowment between the wife, the
husband, and their child. If a couple has more than one child in primary school, one is
randomly selected. The name of the chosen child is communicated to the parents before
they make the allocation decision. For every TZS1,500 allocated to the child, the child
receives one week of tutoring. The couples can allocate amounts of TZS0, TZS1,500,
TZS3,000, ..., or TZS15,000, and the maximum possible amount of tutoring is ten weeks.
The husband and wife’s earnings from the distributive task are paid out in cash. The
allocation to the child is paid out as a certificate for tuition.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The structure of the distributive task is determined by the treatment to which the
couples were allocated:
6Instructions for the tasks are provided in Appendix B.2.
7The time-preference task is a simplification of the task used by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012).
8The participants can allocate TZS0, TZS500, TZS1,500,..., or TZS3,000 to the future (this also
applies to the risk-preference task described below).
9M-Pesa is an SMS-based money-transferring system allowing individuals to deposit, withdraw, and
transfer money with their phone. The receiver could easily liquidate this money, or use it to pay bills
such as phone and electricity bills.
10To ensure that allocations to the day of the experiment do not reflect a preference for cash over
mobile money, both payments in the time-preference task are made using M-Pesa.
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Husband Dictator: dictator game with the husband as dictator.
Husband Bargaining: Rubinstein shrinking-pie bargaining with the husband as first
proposer.
Wife Bargaining: Rubinstein shrinking-pie bargaining with the wife as first proposer.
Wife Dictator: dictator game with the wife as dictator.
In Husband Dictator, the husband decides how to allocate the endowment. He in-
dicates his allocation by dividing the total endowment between three cups: one with a
picture of a woman, one with a picture of a man, and one with a picture of a child. He
knows that his wife will be informed about his decision. In Husband Bargaining and Wife
Bargaining, the first proposer makes a proposal of how to allocate the endowment. The
proposal is then shown to the spouse, who can either agree or disagree. If the spouse
agrees, the proposal is implemented. Otherwise, the endowment is reduced by TZS500,
and he or she makes a counter-proposal. The couples can go back and forth until an
agreement is reached or there is no money left. Wife Dictator is similar to Husband
Dictator, but the wife has the role of dictator.
The treatments are designed to exogenously increase the wife’s bargaining power in
the experiment. When the husband is the dictator, the wife has no bargaining power. In
the two bargaining treatments, the bargaining power is shared between the spouses, but
the first proposer has the upper hand through a first-mover advantage. Finally, in the
fourth treatment, the wife has complete bargaining power. We will refer to the increase
in the wife’s bargaining power as “small” when comparing Husband Dictator to Husband
Bargaining, as “intermediate” when comparing Husband Dictator to Wife Bargaining,
and as “large” when comparing Husband Dictator to Wife Dictator.
Theoretically, the comparison of Husband Dictator to Wife Dictator yields information
about whether the weights assigned to the child are different in the husband’s and the
wife’s utility function, respectively.11
4 Empirical strategy
A pre-analysis plan was registered at the American Economic Association Randomized
Controlled Trials Registry before we collected the data.12 This plan specifies the em-
pirical strategy, including the hypotheses to be tested, the regression approach, and the
dimensions to be studied in the heterogeneity analysis.
4.1 Main analysis
We first investigate whether an increase in the wife’s bargaining power increases the share
allocated to the child by estimating the following regression:
yc = α + βHBHusband Bargainingc
+ βWBWife Bargainingc +βWDWife Dictatorc +δSS+δXXc + εc, (4)
11When comparing Husband Dictator with any of the bargaining treatments, confounding factors
make it difficult to disentangle the spouses’ preferences from bargaining effects.
12https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/770.
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where yc is the share of the endowment allocated to the child for couple c, α is a constant,
Husband Bargainingc, Wife Bargainingc, and Wife Dictatorc are treatment dummies tak-
ing the value 1 if couple c is in Husband Bargaining, Wife Bargaining, and Wife Dictator,
respectively, S is a set of indicator variables for each session, Xc is a vector of background
variables, and εc is the error-term. Xc consists of child and parent background variables
as well as intra-household differences in education and time and risk preferences (the vari-
ables are defined in Table 2 for definition of these variables). The inclusion of Xc allows us
to control for initial (observable) differences between couples in the different treatments,
and for any imbalance between treatments (see Table A.1 in Appendix A). We first es-
timate the regression with no controls. Then, we sequentially add session fixed effects,
child background variables, parent background variables and intra-household difference
variables. All regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. When discussing
the results, we focus on the full specification.
Husband Dictator is the reference category in Equation (4), and we interpret the
estimated treatment effects relative to a situation where the husband has complete bar-
gaining power. From Equation (4), we obtain estimates of the causal effect of a small
(βHB), intermediate (βWB), and large (βWD) increase in the wife’s bargaining power on yc.
We also estimate Equation (4) for yHc, the share allocated to the husband, and for
yWc, the share allocated to the wife, respectively.13
4.2 Heterogeneity analysis
To shed light on the underlying mechanisms affecting the allocation to the child, we study
heterogeneity in the treatment effect. To do this, we use the elicited preferences and
background data collected in the survey. We focus on time, risk and gender preferences.
In particular, we test whether the treatment effect is different for couples where (i) the
husband is more patient, (ii) the husband is less risk averse, and (iii) the chosen child is
a boy. These differences may shed light on differences in the weight spouses assign to the
child in the utility function.14
We estimate the following regression for each of the three respective preference vari-
ables and the three treatments, separately:
yc = α +βTTreatmentc +βVarVarc +θTTreatment×Varc +δSS+δXXc + εc. (5)
Treatmentc is an indicator variable for each of the three treatments, Husband Bargaining,
Wife Bargaining, and Wife Dictator, Varc is an indicator variable for couples where the
husband is more patient or less risk averse, and couples where the chosen child is a boy, and
Treatment∗Varc is an interaction term between the background indicator variables and
the treatment indicator variables.15 In all heterogeneity regressions, Husband Dictator is
the reference category.
On the basis of these regressions, we study whether there are significant differences
in treatment effects between subgroups. The estimated subgroup difference in the causal
effect of increasing female bargaining power is given by θT . As an illustration, if Varc is
an indicator variable for the husband being more patient than the wife, then the estimate
13As these regressions were not specified in the pre-analysis plan, they should be considered ex-
ploratory.
14The analysis of the pre-specified heterogeneity dimensions not reported in the main analysis is
reported in Table A.7 in Appendix A.
15In this regression, Xc includes all background variables except the variable captured by Varc.
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θT , shows whether the effect of an increase in female bargaining power is different for
couples where the husband is more patient than the wife and couples where he is not.
4.3 Robustness checks
We focus on the first proposal in the main analysis. As we do not know if the share
allocated to the child is constant with income, it may be problematic to use the final
proposal.16 Furthermore, the receiver’s decision to accept the proposal or not may be
influenced by the presence of other participants in the room waiting for everyone to
finish. It is therefore cleaner to consider the first proposal. As a robustness check, we
run Equations (4) and (5) with the final proposal in the two bargaining treatments.
We also conduct the heterogeneity analysis of time and risk preferences differences
using a stricter definition where we exclude all couples where the spouses have the same
time or risk preferences. This analysis can be considered as a robustness check for whether
the heterogenous treatment effects hold for different definitions of the preference variables.
The robustness checks are reported in Tables A.2 - A.6 in Appendix A.
5 Results
We first provide an overview of the couples’ allocation decisions in the experiment, and
descriptive statistics on time and risk preferences. We then turn to the main analysis
of the treatment effects on the share allocated to the child, and on the share allocated
to the wife and the husband, respectively. Finally, we discuss heterogeneous treatment
effects.
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the share allocated to the child, the wife, and the
husband, for the whole sample. The majority of couples allocate shares between 0.20 and
0.40 of the endowment to their child (mean share allocated is 0.34), but there is significant
heterogeneity in the distributive behavior. There is also substantial heterogeneity in the
distributions of shares allocated to the wife and the husband. The mean share allocated
to the husband, 0.29, is significantly smaller than the mean share allocated to the wife,
0.37 (p< 0.000).
[Figure 2 about here.]
Next, we consider time and risk preferences. We measure patience as the share of
TZS3,000 allocated to the future (the higher the share allocated to the future, the more
patient the spouse), and risk aversion as the share of TZS3,000 allocated to the risky
option (the higher the share, the lower the risk aversion). On average, the husbands in
our sample are significantly less risk averse (p < 0.000) and significantly more patient
(p< 0.094) than the wives.17
In Figure 3 we display intra-household differences in patience and risk aversion. Cou-
ples are sorted into three categories: husband most patient/least risk averse, husband
16Only 8 of 97 receivers rejected the first proposal.
17See Figure A.1, Appendix A, for a graphical illustration of the distribution of time and risk prefer-
ences.
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and wife equally patient/risk averse, and wife most patient/least risk averse. The fig-
ure illustrates that there is large variation in the differences in time and risk preferences
between spouses. In about 84% of the couples, the husband and the wife have different
time preferences, and about 80% have different risk preferences.18
[Figures 3 and 4 about here.]
Figure 4 reports the average share allocated to the child, the wife, and the husband in
each of the four treatments. The upper panel illustrates our first finding; an increase in the
wife’s bargaining power does not cause higher allocations to the child. More specifically,
a small or large increase in the wife’s bargaining power does not cause significant changes
in the allocation to the child. An intermediate increase in the wife’s bargaining power,
however, causes a significant reduction in the allocation to the child from 36% to 26%.
To obtain a more complete picture of the couples’ decisions, we investigate the allocation
to the wife and the husband in the middle and lower panels of Figure 4. First, the
middle panel shows that an intermediate or large increase in the wife’s bargaining power
gives her a higher allocation. Second, the lower panel shows that a large increase in
the wife’s bargaining power reduces the husband’s allocation. Third, comparing the
middle and lower panels we find that in Wife Bargaining and Wife Dictator, the wife
proposes/allocates equally much to herself. However, looking at the upper and lower
panels, we find that when the husband has the opportunity to reject the wife’s proposal
in Wife Bargaining, she proposes a higher allocation to him and a smaller allocation to
the child than when she has full bargaining power in Wife Dictator. The overall picture
from Figure 4 is that a small increase in the wife’s bargaining power does not affect
allocations to child, wife, or husband and the endowment is split approximately equally
between the three. An intermediate increase in the wife’s bargaining power increases the
allocation to the wife and reduces the share allocated to the child. A large increase in the
wife’s bargaining power increases the share allocated to the wife and reduces the share
allocated to the husband.
5.2 Main analysis
We now turn to a regression analysis of how the share allocated to the child is affected
by the treatments. We also provide regressions for the share allocated to the wife and
the husband, respectively.
Table 2 reports regressions for comparisons of Husband Dictator with the three other
treatments.19 In Column (1) we only include the treatment indicator variables Husband
Bargaining, Wife Bargaining, and Wife Dictator. In Columns (2) to (5), we sequentially
add session fixed effects and background variables.
We focus on the full specification in Column (5) and, consistent with the descriptive
analysis, do not find a significant effect of a small or a large increase in the wife’s bargain-
ing power. However, an intermediate increase in the wife’s bargaining power significantly
reduces the share allocated to the child.20
18If there is assortative matching in the marriage market, the correlation in preferences between
spouses should be high. In our sample, we find no evidence of assortative matching (the correlation
coefficient is -0.050 for time preferences and 0.031 for risk preferences).
19See Tables A.8 - A.11 in Appendix A for extended regression tables.
20These results hold when we run the same regression with the final share allocated to the child in
the two bargaining treatments. This regression is reported in Table A.2 in Appendix A. Note that only
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In terms of background variables, we find a positive effect of the husband’s age and
a negative effect of the wife’s age. Furthermore, couples where the husband is less risk
averse than the wife allocate less to the child. The last finding may be an indication that
the husbands consider investments in children’s education as non-risky.
[Table 2 about here.]
Based on this regression, we formulate the following main result:
Result 1: Increasing the wife’s bargaining power relative to Husband Dictator does not
increase the allocation to the child (βHB = 0.022, p = 0.576, βWB = −0.079, p = 0.044,
βWD = 0.003, p = 0.933, see Column (5), Table 2). If anything, we find evidence of the
opposite; an intermediate increase in the wife’s bargaining power causally decreases the
allocation to the child (βWB =−0.079, p = 0.044, see Column (5), Table 2).
Result 1 suggests that increasing the wife’s bargaining power does not causally increase
the allocation to the child. In fact, an intermediate increase in the wife’s bargaining
power causally reduces the allocation. As there is no significant difference between Hus-
band Dictator and Wife Dictator, this is likely not a consequence of differences in the
weight assigned to the child between the husband and the wife, but rather due to some
other aspects of the bargaining situation (see Section 6 for a discussion).
Next, we consider the effect of increasing the wife’s bargaining power on the share
allocated to the wife and the husband in Table 3. As in Table 2, both columns show the
full specification where all background variables and the indicator variables are defined.
A large increase in the wife’s bargaining power increases the share allocated to her and
decreases the share allocated to the husband. The share allocated to the husband is not
affected by a small or intermediate increase in the wife’s bargaining power. An interme-
diate increase in the wife’s bargaining power increases the share allocated to her, but the
effect is not robust to the specification using the final share allocated to the wife (see
Table A.3 in Appendix A).
[Table 3 about here.]
Based on these regressions we formulate the following result for the allocation to hus-
band and wife:
Result 2: A large increase in the wife’s bargaining power increases the allocation to
her and reduces the allocation to the husband (βWD = 0.091, p = 0.001, see Column (1),
Table 3, and βWD = −0.102, p = 0.001, see Column (2), Table 3). An intermediate in-
crease in the wife’s bargaining power increases the allocation to her, but does not affect
the allocation to the husband (βWB = 0.066, p = 0.039, see Column (1), Table 3, and
βWB = 0.003, p = 0.922, see Column (2), Table 3).
Result 2 shows that giving the wife full bargaining power benefits her. Together, Re-
sults 1 and 2 indicate, in our study, that female empowerment benefits women, but not
children.
eight of 97 couples rejected the first proposal. All counter-proposals were accepted.
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5.3 Heterogeneity analysis
In this subsection, we investigate whether different types of couples are affected differently
by an increase in the wife’s bargaining power. We focus on difference in time and risk
preferences between the husband and the wife, and on the gender of the child.21
Columns (1) to (3) in Table 4 consider whether the effect of increasing the wife’s
bargaining power on the allocation to the child is different between couples where the
husband is more patient than the wife and couples where the wife is at least as patient
as the husband. Columns (1), (2) and (3) report the difference in effect for a small,
intermediate and large increase in the wife’s bargaining power, respectively. We find that
when the husband is more patient than the wife, an intermediate or large increase in the
wife’s bargaining power causally decreases the allocation to the child. Similarly, when the
wife is at least as patient as the husband, a large increase in bargaining power increases
the share allocated to the child.22 Based on these regressions, we formulate the following
result for differences in time preferences between the husband and the wife:
Result 3: The effect of an increase in the wife’s bargaining power is dependent on
the intra-household difference in time preferences. When the husband is more patient
than the wife, increasing the wife’s bargaining power reduces the allocation to the child
(θWB +βWB = −0.133, p = 0.053, see Column (2), and θWD +βWD = −0.137, p = 0.007,
see Column (3), Table 4).
[Table 4 about here.]
We next consider difference in risk preferences between the husband and the wife in
Columns (4) to (6). As above, Columns (4) to (6) respectively investigate a small, an
intermediate, and a large increase in the wife’s bargaining power. We find that when the
husband is less risk averse than the wife, a small increase in the wife’s bargaining power
increases the share allocated to the child, but the difference in risk preference between
the husband and the wife is generally found to be of little importance for the effect of an
increase in the wife’s bargaining power.23 The findings on differences in risk preferences
can be summed up as follows:
Result 4: The intra-household difference in risk preferences makes no difference to the
effect of an intermediate or large increase in the wife’s bargaining power (θWB +βWB =
−0.064, p = 0.245, and θWD +βWD =−0.013, p = 0.758, see Columns (5) and (6), Table
4). For a small increase in the wife’s bargaining power, the share allocated to the child
21Table A.7 in Appendix A reports the heterogeneity analysis for education level differences and
number of children in the household.
22In the above discussion, we have used a definition where “H most patient” is equal to 1 when the
husband is more patient than the wife, and 0 otherwise. Thus, in 0, we include couples where the
husband and the wife are equally patient. To check if these results are sensitive to the definition of the
time-preference difference, we estimate regressions where we restrict the sample to couples where one of
the spouses is more patient than the other in Table A.6 in Appendix A. We find that the negative effects
of increasing the wife’s bargaining power when the husband is more patient than his wife are robust to
the stricter definition, but that the positive effect when the wife is more patient is not.
23Table A.6 in Appendix A reports the results when we restrict the sample to couples where one
spouse is less risk averse than the other and find that the positive effect of an increase in the wife’s
bargaining power is not robust to the stricter definition of risk-preference difference. Table A.4 and A.5
in Appendix A reports the results for the final share allocated to the child.
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increases if the husband is less risk averse than the wife (θHB +βHB = 0.097, p = 0.075,
see Column (4), Table 4). However, this finding is not robust to the use of final share
allocated to the child.
In Columns (1) to (4) in Table 5 we consider the gender of the child. First, we find
that when the wife has no bargaining power, significantly more is allocated to boys than
to girls. Second, in all situations where the wife has some bargaining power, at least
as much is allocated to girls as to boys. This latter finding is illustrated in Column (4)
where we compare the situation where the husband has complete bargaining power to all
three situations where the wife has some bargaining power. Based on these regressions,
we formulate the following result about the spouses’ gender preferences:
Result 5: An increase in the wife’s bargaining power leads to more equal allocations to
boys and girls. When the husband has complete bargaining power, he allocates signifi-
cantly more to boys (βvar = 0.120, p = 0.009, see Column (4), Table 5). When the wife
has some bargaining power, at least as much is allocated to girls as to boys (βHB = 0.157,
p = 0.003, see Column (1), βWB = 0.006, p = 0.916, see Column (2), and βWD = 0.032,
p = 0.470, see Column (3), Table 5).
[Table 5 about here.]
Result 3 provides evidence that the time preferences of the spouse with the upper
hand in the bargaining situation are important, whereas Result 1 showed that gender is
less so. Result 4 shows that risk preferences are not an important attribute in determining
the allocation to the child. Finally, Result 5 shows that increasing the wife’s bargaining
power makes allocations to boys and girls more equal.
6 Discussion and conclusion
Our paper studies the effect of an increase in the wife’s bargaining power on couples’
spending on children. We do not find any evidence that such a change in relative bar-
gaining power increases the share allocated to the child. This finding challenges not only
earlier studies such as Thomas (1990; 1993), but also the general view among policy-
makers that female empowerment leads to higher household spending on children. Our
results further suggest that it is the attributes of the main decision-maker (time prefer-
ences and gender preferences), not the gender itself, that matter.
Result 1 indicates that increasing the wife’s bargaining power does not increase spend-
ing on children and might even reduce it: an intermediate increase in the wife’s bargaining
power causally reduces the allocation to the child. The share allocated to the child is not
significantly different between the two dictator treatments, suggesting that, on average,
the husband and the wife assign the same total weight to the child in their utility func-
tion. Thus, the effect of an intermediate increase in the wife’s bargaining power cannot
be explained by a difference in weights assigned to the child.
To further understand how the change in bargaining power affects household decisions,
we investigate the couples’ allocations to the husband and the wife. An intermediate and a
large increase in the wife’s bargaining power leads to larger allocations to the wife (Result
2). Comparing the allocations in Wife Dictator to the allocations in Wife Bargaining, we
observe changes in the child’s and the husband’s share, but not in the share to the wife’s.
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Assuming that the outcome in Wife Dictator reflects her preferences, the wife seems
unwilling to forego money in order to keep the allocation to the child constant in Wife
Bargaining.24 Rather, she increases the husband’s allocation. A possible explanation
for this is that she wants to avoid that the husband rejects her proposal, and that she
underestimates his preferences for allocation to the child. Thus she gives more to the
husband and less to the child than in Wife Dictator. This explanation is in line with
previous studies showing that the wives tend to underestimate the husbands’ preferences
for a public good (Kebede et al. 2014).
Result 3 suggests that time preferences play an important role in household decision-
making.25 In particular, when one spouse has complete bargaining power, it is better
for the child that it is the most patient spouse. This finding is in line with previous
studies; Ahiakpor and Swaray (2015) find a positive association between male household
head’s patience and investments in children’s education in rural Ghana. Tanaka and
Yamano (2015) also find that the more patient the household head is, the higher are the
educational expenditures in Uganda. In our sample, men tend to be more patient than
women, implying that, on average, it is more beneficial for the child if the husband is the
main decision-maker.26
Result 5 indicates that husbands have stronger preferences for allocating money to
boys than to girls. Wives, on the other hand, do not display any gender preferences and
allocate the same amount to boys and girls. The result is partly consistent with previous
studies; Dizon-Ross and Jayachandran (2015) find that, in rural Uganda, men favor boys,
but also that women favor girls, and Raley and Bianchi (2006) find that, in the US, men
spend more time with boys than with girls, whereas women spend as much time with boys
as they spend with girls. Including women in the decision-making process by increasing
their bargaining power gives a more gender-equal allocation to the children in our study
and, in the long run, female empowerment may consequently lead to societies becoming
more gender-equal.
To summarize the result for the underlying mechanisms, our study suggests that the
weight assigned to the child depends on the parents’ time preferences, but not on their
risk preferences. Furthermore, the husband’s weight assigned to the child also depends
on the gender of the child. In particular, the husband displays a stronger preference
for boys. Even though the equal allocations to the child in Husband Dictator and Wife
Dictator suggest that the husband and the wife on average assign the same total weight
to the child, the underlying mechanisms suggest that these weights consist of different
elements. These elements differ systematically between women and men in our sample.
The results presented in this paper point to several avenues for future research. First,
studying the spouses’ preferences, such as time preferences and risk preferences, seems
to be important in future research in order to increase our understanding of the under-
24We do not know how the spouses planned to spend the amount they allocated to themselves, and
cannot rule out that either of them prefers to spend their money on other goods for their children
such as clothing and food. Furthermore, we do not know what happens in the interaction between the
spouses after the experiment. We do not have reason to believe that any behavior after the experiment
is correlated with treatment, and thus this cannot explain any of the results discussed.
25This is in line with Schaner (2015) who finds that couples who have similar time preferences are
more likely to choose the most efficient savings account than couples who have different time preferences.
26Carlsson et al. (2012) and Yang and Carlsson (2012) find that women are more patient than men in
China. Our finding is in line with the general finding in Falk et al. (2015), who study time preferences in
75 countries. Overall, they find that men are slightly more patient than women, even though this gender
difference is not found in Tanzania (mail correspondence with Armin Falk and Benjamin Enke).
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lying mechanisms determining household behavior. Second, considering other types of
spending on children, such as nutrition and health, is important in order to understand
the generalizability of our study. Finally, while random assignment of couples to different
treatments ensures internal validity, the sample is not necessarily representative. Newer
randomized controlled trials have taken a step in the right direction towards testing the
generalizability of our and other experimental results, but have, to our knowledge, not
studied the role of time and gender preferences.
Our study suggests that increased spending on children is not an instrumental reason
for targeting women with cash transfers, but gender equality (among both children and
adults) is. Thus, if the aim of a policy is to increase spending on children, targeted cash
transfers to women are not necessarily the most efficient instrument.
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Figures and tables
Figure 1: Diagram of Experimental design
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Figure 2: Share allocated to the child, the wife, and the husband
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Note: The figure displays the distribution of the share allocated to the child, the wife, and the husband,
respectively. The left panel shows the share allocated to the child in the dictator treatments (Husband
Dictator and Wife Dictator) and the share proposed to the child in the first proposal in the bargaining
treatments (Husband Bargaining and Wife Bargaining). The middle panel shows the share allocated to
the wife by herself in Wife Dictator and by the husband in Husband Dictator, and the share proposed
to herself in Wife Bargaining and the share proposed to be allocated to her by the husband in Husband
Bargaining. The right panel shows the share allocated to the husband by himself in Husband Dictator
and by the wife in Wife Dictator, and the share proposed to himself in Husband Bargaining and the
share proposed to be allocated to him by the wife in Wife Bargaining.
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Figure 3: Time and risk preferences between husband and wife
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Note: The figure provides a simplified illustration of differences in time and risk preferences between
the husband and the wife. Couples are divided into three categories: husband most patient/least risk
averse, husband and wife equally patient/risk averse, and wife most patient/least risk averse. Time
preferences are measured by the share allocated to the future and the fraction of couples in each of the
three categories is illustrated in the upper panel. Risk preferences are measured by the share allocated
to the risky option and the fraction of couples in each of the three categories is illustrated in the lower
panel.
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Figure 4: Share allocated to the child, the wife, and the husband, by treatment
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Note: The figure reports mean share allocated to the child (upper panel), the wife (middle panel), and the
husband (lower panel) and standard error for Husband Dictator, Husband Bargaining, Wife Bargaining,
and Wife Dictator.
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Table 1: Background characteristics by gender
Wife Husband Total P-value, t-test
A. Background
Age 34.95 42.66 38.80 0.000∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.59) (0.41)
Number of children - - 3.17
(0.07)
Children in primary - - 1.40
(0.03)
B. Education
No/some/completed primary 0.38 0.35 0.36 0.244
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Some secondary 0.50 0.39 0.44 0.005∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Completed secondary or more 0.13 0.26 0.19 0.000∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
C. Employment status
Unemployed 0.41 0.05 0.23 0.000∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Self-employed 0.52 0.67 0.60 0.000∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Individuals 287 287 574
Mean coefficients; standard error of mean in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports descriptive statistics for parents (age, education, em-
ployment status) and households (number of children, number of children in
primary school). Column (1) reports means for wives, Column (2) reports
means for husbands, Column (3) reports means for the total sample, and Col-
umn (4) reports p-values for two-sided t-test of difference in means between
husband and wife. In panel A, we report background variables for the house-
hold. “Age”: participant’s reported age. “Number of children”: total number
of children the couple cares for. “Children in primary”: total number of chil-
dren the couple is caring for that are currently attending primary school in Dar
es Salaam. In panel B, we report education variables. “No/some/completed
primary”: share of participants who have no formal schooling, some primary
school, or completed primary school as their highest obtained level of educa-
tion. “Some secondary”: share of participants with some secondary school
as their highest obtained level of education. “Secondary completed or more”:
share of participants with completed secondary school or higher as their high-
est obtained level of education. In panel C, we report occupation variables.
“Unemployed”: share of unemployed participants. “Self-employed”: share of
self-employed participants. Remaining participants are employed in the formal
sector (public or private).
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Table 2: Effect of increasing the wife’s bargaining power on the allocation to the child
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Husband Bargaining 0.012 0.016 0.021 0.026 0.022
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039)
Wife Bargaining −0.103∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗ −0.079∗∗
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.039)
Wife Dictator −0.019 −0.019 −0.015 0.001 0.003
(0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032)
Male child 0.020 0.038 0.037
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Chosen child’s standard 0.001 0.006 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Age husband 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Age wife −0.004∗ −0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002)
H most patient 0.050
(0.045)
H least risk averse −0.069∗
(0.042)
Session FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child background No No Yes Yes Yes
Parent background No No No Yes Yes
Parent difference No No No No Yes
Couples 287 287 287 286 286
R2 0.031 0.115 0.123 0.196 0.208
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of the share allocated to the child (with possible
discrete values of 0,0.1,0.2, ...,0.9,1) on the treatment variables “Husband Bargaining”
(indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining), “Wife Bar-
gaining” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining), “Wife
Dictator” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator), and a set
of explanatory variables. “Session FE”: indicator variables for each of the 11 different
sessions of the experiments. “Child background” is: “Male child”: indicator variable
taking the value 1 if the child is a boy, “Chosen child’s standard”: variable taking values
corresponding to the chosen child’s school standard between 1 and 7 and “Children to-
tal”: indicator variable for couples with two or more children. We also include indicator
variables for which of the four schools the child is attending. “Parent background” is:
“Agei” (i = H,W , H=husband, W=wife): count variable for individual i’s reported age,
“Self-employedi”: indicator variable taking the value 1 if i is self-employed, “Highest
level of educationi”: discrete variable taking the following values: 0 = No formal ed-
ucation, 1 = Some primary school, 2 = Primary school completed, 3 = Some primary
school, 4 = Secondary school completed, 5 = More than secondary school, “Share allo-
cated to futurei”: share allocated to the future by i, and “Share invested in risky option
i”: share allocated to the risky option by i. “Parent difference” variables are: “H most
educated”: indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband is more
educated than the wife, “H most patient”: indicator variable taking the value 1 for
couples where the husband allocates more to the future than the wife, and “H least risk
averse”: indicator variable taking the value 1 if the husband allocates more to the risky
option than the wife.
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Table 3: Effect of increasing the wife’s bargaining power on the allocation to the wife
and the husband
Allocation to wife Allocation to husband
Husband Bargaining −0.017 −0.007
(0.031) (0.035)
Wife Bargaining 0.066∗∗ 0.003
(0.032) (0.035)
Wife Dictator 0.091∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.030)
Male child 0.004 −0.040∗
(0.025) (0.023)
Chosen child’s standard −0.004 −0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
Age husband −0.000 −0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Age wife 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
H most patient 0.038 −0.075∗
(0.037) (0.039)
H least risk averse 0.035 0.038
(0.040) (0.039)
Session FE Yes Yes
Child background Yes Yes
Parent background Yes Yes
Parent difference Yes Yes
Couples 286 286
R2 0.226 0.186
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports a regression of the share allocated to the wife
(with possible discrete values of 0,0.033,0.67,0.1, ...,0.933,0.967,1) in
Column (1), and a regression of the share allocated to the husband (with
possible discrete values of 0,0.033,0.67,0.1, ...,0.933,0.967,1) in Column
(2) on the treatment variables “Husband Bargaining” (indicator variable
taking the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining), “Wife Bargain-
ing” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargain-
ing), “Wife Dictator” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples
in Wife Dictator), and a set of explanatory variables. See Table 2 for
definition of “Session FE”, “Child background”, “Parent background”,
and “Parent difference”.
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Table 4: Heterogeneity in time- and risk-preference difference
Var = H most patient Var = H least risk averse
HB WB WD HB WB WD
Treatment 0.060 −0.039 0.072∗ 0.013 −0.024 −0.016
(0.101) (0.053) (0.043) (0.063) (0.068) (0.053)
Treatment X var 0.014 −0.094 −0.209∗∗∗ 0.084 −0.040 0.003
(0.113) (0.089) (0.064) (0.082) (0.079) (0.067)
Var 0.102∗ 0.095∗ 0.104∗∗ −0.018 −0.005 −0.069
(0.053) (0.050) (0.048) (0.057) (0.053) (0.053)
Treatment (var) 0.073 −0.133∗ −0.137∗∗∗ 0.097∗ −0.064 −0.013
(0.049) (0.068) (0.050) (0.054) (0.055) (0.044)
Session FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child background Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent background Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent difference Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Couples 139 140 189 139 140 189
R2 0.305 0.336 0.321 0.335 0.344 0.288
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: Columns (1) to (3) in the table report regressions of the share allocated
to the child (with possible discrete values of 0,0.1,0.2, ...,0.9,1) on the treatment
variables “Husband Bargaining” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in
Husband Bargaining) in Column (1), “Wife Bargaining” (indicator variable taking
the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining) in Column (2), and “Wife Dictator” (in-
dicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator) in Column (3), the
indicator variable “Husband most patient” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for
couples where the husband allocates more to the future than the wife), “Treatment
X H most patient”, an interaction variable between the treatment indicator variables
and “H most patient”, and a set of explanatory variables. Columns (4) to (6) in the
table report regressions of the share allocated to the child on the treatment variables
“Husband Bargaining”, “Wife Bargaining”, and “Wife Dictator”, respectively, the
indicator variable “H least risk averse” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for cou-
ples where the husband allocates more to the risky option than the wife), interaction
variables between the treatment indicator variable and “H least risk averse”, and
a set of explanatory variables. See Table 2 for definition of “Session FE”, “Child
background”, “Parent background”, and “Parent difference”.
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Table 5: Heterogeneity in gender preference
Var = Male child
HB WB WD WP
Treatment 0.157∗∗∗ 0.006 0.032 0.048
(0.051) (0.054) (0.044) (0.035)
Treatment X var −0.240∗∗∗ −0.126 −0.114∗ −0.131∗∗
(0.083) (0.086) (0.062) (0.056)
Var 0.139∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046)
Treatment (var) −0.083 −0.120∗ −0.083 −0.084∗
(0.067) (0.071) (0.051) (0.045)
Session FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child background Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent background Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent difference Yes Yes Yes Yes
Couples 139 140 189 139
R2 0.305 0.336 0.321 0.335
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of the share allocated to the child on the
treatment variables “Husband Bargaining”, “Wife Bargaining”, “Wife Dicta-
tor”, “Wife some bargaining power” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for
couples in Husband Bargaining, Wife Bargaining or Wife Dictator), respec-
tively, the indicator variable “Male child” (indicator variable taking the value
1 if the child is a boy), interaction terms between the treatment indicator vari-
able and “Male child”, and a set of explanatory variables. “Treatment (H most
patient)”: sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator variable
and “Treatment X H most patient”. “Treatment (H least risk averse)”: sum of
estimated parameters for the treatment indicator variable and “Treatment X
H least risk averse”. “Treatment (Male child)”: sum of estimated parameters
for the treatment indicator variable and “Treatment X Male Child”. See Table
2 for definition of “Session FE”, “Child background”, “Parent background”,
and “Parent difference”.
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Appendix A Additional figures and tables
Figure A.1: Distribution of time and risk preferences
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Note: The upper panel illustrates the distribution of time preferences (measured as share of endowment,
TZS3,000, allocated to the future) for wives (left) and husbands (right), respectively. The lower panel
illustrates the distribution of risk preferences (measured as share of endowment, TZS3,000, allocated to
the risky option) for wives (left) and husbands (right) respectively.
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Table A.1: Balance regressions
Husband Dictator Husband Dictator Husband Dictator
vs. Husband Bargaining vs. Wife Bargaining vs. Wife Dictator
Age husband −0.551 −0.272 −0.451
(1.937) (1.551) (1.494)
Age wife −0.026 −1.958 −0.860
(1.357) (1.254) (1.173)
Some secondary or more H −0.069 0.145∗ 0.029
(0.088) (0.078) (0.067)
Some secondary or more W 0.101 0.144∗ −0.010
(0.084) (0.077) (0.069)
Self-employed H −0.014 −0.132 −0.060
(0.080) (0.084) (0.069)
Self-employed W 0.044 0.095 0.083
(0.085) (0.087) (0.073)
Children not in primary −0.343 −0.158 −0.252
(0.236) (0.278) (0.218)
Children in primary 0.181∗ 0.170 0.155∗
(0.108) (0.108) (0.088)
Male child −0.157∗ 0.033 −0.039
(0.083) (0.084) (0.072)
Standard chosen child −0.092 −0.074 0.120
(0.343) (0.344) (0.287)
Chosen child attends A 0.085∗ 0.042 −0.026
(0.048) (0.057) (0.041)
Chosen child attends B −0.051 −0.105 −0.001
(0.080) (0.075) (0.067)
Chosen child attends C −0.047 0.046 −0.005
(0.033) (0.050) (0.037)
Share invested in future H 0.013 −0.262∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.037) (0.033)
Share invested in future W 0.008 0.136∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.052) (0.037)
Share invested in risky option H −0.085∗ −0.094∗∗ −0.067∗
(0.049) (0.044) (0.039)
Share invested in risky option W 0.131∗∗∗ 0.032 0.104∗∗
(0.040) (0.058) (0.041)
H most patient 0.036 −0.388∗∗∗ −0.403∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.080) (0.066)
H least risk averse −0.237∗∗∗ 0.140 −0.207∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.086) (0.070)
H most educated −0.018 0.005 0.091
(0.070) (0.072) (0.062)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Notes: The table reports coefficients for regressions of each of the background characteristics as dependent
variable on indicator variables for treatments (“Husband Bargaining” in Column (1), “Wife Bargaining”
in Column (2), and “Wife Dictator” in Column (3)). “Age husband”: husband’s reported age. “Some
secondary or more H”: indicator variable taking the value 1 if the husband has completed some secondary
schooling or more. “Self-employed H”: indicator taking the value 1 if the husband is self-employed. “Chil-
dren not in primary”: number of children currently not in primary school. “Children in primary”: number
of children currently in primary school. “Male child”: indicator variable taking the value 1 if the child
randomly chosen for tutoring was a boy. “Standard of chosen child”: Chosen child’s current standard in
school. “Chosen child attends A”: indicator variable taking the value 1 for children in primary school A.
“Chosen child attends B”: indicator variable taking the value 1 for children in primary school B. “Chosen
child attends C”: indicator variable taking the value 1 for children in primary school C. “Share invested in
future H”: share allocated by husband to the future. “Share invested in risky option H”: share allocated by
the husband to the risky option. “Share invested in future W”: share allocated by the wife to the future.
“Share invested in risky option W”: share allocated by the wife to the risky option.“H most patient”: indi-
cator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband allocates more to the future than the wife.
“H least risk averse”: indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband allocates more to
the risky option than the wife. “H most educated”: indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where
the husband is more educated than the wife. The purpose of this is to check if participants in Husband
Dictator and Husband Bargaining, Husband Dictator and Wife Bargaining, and Husband Dictator and
Wife Dictator respectively, are different in terms of socioeconomic characteristics. All regressions include
session fixed effects, indicator variables for each of the 11 different sessions of the experiment.
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Table A.2: Effect of increasing the wife’s bargaining power on the allocation to the child,
with final share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Husband Bargaining −0.001 0.003 0.009 0.013 0.009
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036)
Wife Bargaining −0.088∗∗ −0.085∗∗ −0.081∗∗ −0.066∗ −0.065∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039)
Wife Dictator −0.019 −0.019 −0.017 −0.004 −0.000
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Male child 0.021 0.041 0.039
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Chosen child’s standard 0.004 0.008 0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Age husband 0.003∗ 0.003∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Age wife −0.003 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
H most educated 0.030
(0.042)
H most patient 0.063
(0.044)
H least risk averse −0.067
(0.040)
Session FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child background No No Yes Yes Yes
Parent background No No No Yes Yes
Parent difference (educ, pref) No No No No Yes
Couples 287 287 287 286 286
R2 0.021 0.104 0.114 0.188 0.201
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of the final share allocated to the child (share
allocated to child divided by the final household endowment (TSZ15000 − TSZ500 for
every time a proposal is rejected), with possible discrete values of 0,0.1,0.2, ...,0.9,1) on
the treatment variables “Husband Bargaining” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for
couples in Husband Bargaining), “Wife Bargaining” (indicator variable taking the value
1 for couples in Wife Bargaining), “Wife Dictator” (indicator variable taking the value 1
for couples in Wife Dictator), and a set of explanatory variables. See Table 2 for definition
of “Session FE”, “Child background”, and “Parent background”.
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Table A.3: Effect of increasing the wife’s bargaining power on the allocation to the wife
and the husband, with final share
Allocation to wife Allocation to husband
Husband Bargaining −0.010 −0.002
(0.030) (0.034)
Wife Bargaining 0.045 0.011
(0.029) (0.033)
Wife Dictator 0.092∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.030)
Male child 0.002 −0.039∗
(0.024) (0.023)
Chosen child’s standard −0.005 −0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
Age husband −0.000 −0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Age wife 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
H most educated 0.021 −0.041
(0.036) (0.033)
H most patient 0.030 −0.080∗∗
(0.036) (0.038)
H least risk averse 0.039 0.031
(0.039) (0.038)
Session FE Yes Yes
Child background Yes Yes
Parent background Yes Yes
Parent difference (educ, pref) Yes Yes
Couples 286 286
R2 0.218 0.201
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of the final share allocated to the wife
and the husband (share allocated to the wife or the husband divided by the
final household endowment (TSZ15000 − TSZ500 for every time a proposal is
rejected), with possible discrete values of 0,0.1,0.2, ...,0.9,1) in Column (1) and
a regression of the final share allocated to the husband (with possible discrete
values of 0,0.033,0.67,0.1, ...,0.933,0.967,1) in Column (2) on the treatment
variables “Husband Bargaining” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for cou-
ples in Husband Bargaining), “Wife Bargaining” (indicator variable taking the
value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining), “Wife Dictator” (indicator variable
taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator), and a set of explanatory vari-
ables. See Table 2 for definition of “Session FE”, “Child background”, “Parent
background”, and “Parent difference (educ, pref)”.
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Table A.4: Heterogeneity in time- and risk-preference difference, with final share
Var = H most patient Var = H least risk averse
HB WB WD HB WB WD
Treatment −0.007 −0.018 0.072∗ −0.017 −0.006 −0.016
(0.074) (0.052) (0.043) (0.054) (0.068) (0.053)
Treatment X var 0.085 −0.113 −0.209∗∗∗ 0.119 −0.051 0.003
(0.087) (0.089) (0.064) (0.075) (0.078) (0.067)
var 0.092∗ 0.098∗ 0.104∗∗ −0.027 −0.004 −0.069
(0.051) (0.050) (0.048) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053)
Treatment (var) 0.078∗ −0.131∗ −0.137∗∗∗ 0.102∗ −0.056 −0.013
(0.047) (0.069) (0.050) (0.054) (0.055) (0.044)
Session FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child background Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent background Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent difference Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Couples 139 140 189 139 140 189
R2 0.333 0.319 0.321 0.349 0.327 0.288
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: Columns (1) to (3) in the table report regressions of the final share allo-
cated to the child (share allocated to child divided by the final household endowment
(TSZ15000 − TSZ500 for every time a proposal is rejected), with possible discrete
values of 0,0.1,0.2, ...,0.9,1) on the treatment variables “Husband Bargaining” (indi-
cator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining) in Column (1),
“Wife Bargaining” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargain-
ing) in Column (2), and “Wife Dictator” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for
couples in Wife Dictator) in Column (3), the indicator variable “Husband most pa-
tient” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband allocates
more to the future than the wife), “Treatment X H most patient”, an interaction
variable between the treatment indicator variables and “H most patient”, and a set of
explanatory variables. Columns (4) to (6) in the table report regressions of the final
share allocated to the child on the treatment variables “Husband Bargaining”, “Wife
Bargaining”, and “Wife Dictator”, respectively, the indicator variable “H least risk
averse” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband allocates
more to the risky option than the wife), interaction variables between the treatment
indicator variable and “H least risk averse”, and a set of explanatory variables. See
Table 2 for definition of “Session FE”, “Child background”, “Parent background”,
and “Parent difference”.
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Table A.5: Heterogeneity in gender of child, with final share
Var = Male child
HB WB WD WP
Treatment 0.127∗∗∗ 0.023 0.032 0.042
(0.046) (0.054) (0.044) (0.034)
Treatment X var −0.209∗∗∗ 0.119 −0.051 0.003
(0.079) (0.085) (0.062) (0.055)
var 0.066∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046)
Treatment (var) −0.079 −0.114 −0.083 −0.083
(0.067) (0.071) (0.051) (0.045)
Session FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child background Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent background Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent difference Yes Yes Yes Yes
Couples 139 140 189 286
R2 0.383 0.347 0.304 0.208
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of the final share allocated to the child
on the treatment variables “Husband Bargaining”, “Wife Bargaining”, “Wife
Dictator”, and “Wife some power”, respectively, the indicator variable “Male
child” (indicator variable taking the value 1 if the child is a boy), interaction
terms between the treatment indicator variable and “Male child”, and a set
of explanatory variables. “Treatment (H most patient)”: sum of estimated
parameters for the treatment indicator variable and “Treatment X H most pa-
tient”. “Treatment (H least risk averse)”: sum of estimated parameters for the
treatment indicator variable and “Treatment X H least risk averse”. “Treat-
ment (Male child)”: sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator
variable and “Treatment X Male Child”. See Table 2 for definition of “Session
FE”, “Child background”, “Parent background”, and “Parent difference”.
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Table A.6: Heterogeneity in time- and risk-preference difference, strict definition
Var = H most patient 2 Var = H least risk averse 2
HB WB WD HB WB HD
Treatment −0.114 −0.038 0.101 −0.040 0.029 0.047
(0.102) (0.064) (0.061) (0.096) (0.103) (0.085)
Treatment X var 0.212∗ −0.096 −0.238∗∗∗ 0.122 −0.065 -0.049
(0.113) (0.096) (0.079) (0.110) (0.113) (0.102)
var 0.075 0.091 0.114∗ −0.062 −0.029 −0.069
(0.067) (0.062) (0.062) (0.084) (0.086) (0.086)
Treatment (var) 0.098∗∗∗ −0.133∗ −0.138∗∗ 0.082 −0.036 −0.002
(0.048) (0.067) (0.055) (0.055) (0.059) (0.047)
Session FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child background Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent background Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent difference (educ, pref) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Couples 116 120 152 110 115 146
R2 0.435 0.430 0.369 0.406 0.395 0.333
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: All couples where the husband and wife are equally patient and all couples
where the husband and wife are equally risk averse are dropped. Columns (1) to (3)
in the table report regressions of the share allocated to the child (with possible discrete values of
0,0.1,0.2, ...,0.9,1) on the treatment variables “Husband Bargaining” (indicator variable taking
the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining) in Column (1), “Wife Bargaining” (indicator
variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining) in Column (2), and “Wife Dictator”
(indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator) in Column (3), the indicator
variable “Husband most patient 2” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the
husband allocates more to the future than the wife, and 0 if the wife allocates more to the future
than the husband), “Treatment X H most patient 2”, an interaction variable between the treat-
ment indicator variables and “H most patient 2”, and a set of explanatory variables. Columns
(4) to (6) in the table report regressions of the share allocated to the child on the treatment
variables “Husband Bargaining”, “Wife Bargaining”, and “Wife Dictator”, respectively, the in-
dicator variable “H least risk averse 2” (indicator variable taking the value 1 if the husband
allocates more to the risky option than the wife and 0 if the wife allocates more to the risky
option than the husband), interaction variables between the treatment indicator variable and “H
least risk averse 2”, and a set of explanatory variables. “Treatment (H most patient 2)”: sum of
estimated parameters for the treatment indicator variable and “Treatment X H most patient 2”.
“Treatment (H least risk averse 2)”: sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator
variable and “Treatment X H least risk averse 2”. See Table 2 for definition of “Session FE”,
“Child background”, and “Parent difference”.
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Table A.7: Heterogeneity in education level differences and number of children
Var = H most educated Var = Child total
HB WB WD HB WB WD
Treatment 0.078 −0.048 −0.011 0.063 −0.058 0.021
(0.048) (0.051) (0.038) (0.064) (0.066) (0.043)
Treatment X var −0.031 −0.001 −0.041 0.015 0.016 −0.066
(0.099) (0.088) (0.083) (0.086) (0.074) (0.061)
var 0.044 0.148∗ 0.004 0.028 0.045 0.060
(0.077) (0.081) (0.083) (0.045) (0.044) (0.042)
Treatment (var) 0.047 −0.049 −0.052 0.077 −0.042 −0.046
(0.091) (0.081) (0.078) (0.059) (0.053) (0.049)
Session FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child background Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent background Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent difference (educ, pref) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Couples 139 140 189 139 140 189
R2 0.349 0.346 0.272 0.348 0.346 0.295
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: Columns (1) to (3) in the table report regressions of the share allocated to the child
(with possible discrete values of 0,0.1,0.2, ...,0.9,1) on the treatment variables “Husband
Bargaining” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining) in
Column (1), “Wife Bargaining” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife
Bargaining) in Column (2), and “Wife Dictator” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for
couples in Wife Dictator) in Column (3), the indicator variable “Husband most educated”
(indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband has obtained a higher
level of education than the wife), “Treatment X H most educated”, an interaction variable
between the treatment indicator variables and “H most educated”, and a set of explana-
tory variables. Columns (4) to (6) in the table report regressions of the share allocated to
the child on the treatment variables “Husband Bargaining”, “Wife Bargaining”, and “Wife
Dictator”, respectively, the indicator variable “Child total” (indicator variable taking the
value 1 for couples that currently care for two or more children), interaction variables be-
tween the treatment indicator variable and “Child total’, and a set of explanatory variables.
“Treatment (H most educated)”: sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator
variable and “Treatment X H most educated”. “Treatment (Child total)”: sum of estimated
parameters for the treatment indicator variable and “Treatment X Child total”. See Table
2 for definition of “Session FE”, “Child background”, “Parent background”, and “Parent
difference”.
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Table A.8: Effect of increasing the wife’s bargaining power on the allocation to the child,
extended
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Husband Bargaining 0.012 0.016 0.021 0.026 0.022
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039)
Wife Bargaining −0.103∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗ −0.079∗∗
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.039)
Wife Dictator −0.019 −0.019 −0.015 0.001 0.003
(0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032)
Male child 0.020 0.038 0.037
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Chosen child’s standard 0.001 0.006 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
More than 2 children 0.022 0.028 0.031
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
School A −0.003 −0.003 −0.004
(0.045) (0.043) (0.043)
School B 0.031 0.035 0.036
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
School C 0.000 −0.009 −0.011
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Age husband 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Age wife −0.004∗ −0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Self-employed H −0.004 0.002
(0.029) (0.029)
Self-employed W 0.017 0.014
(0.026) (0.026)
Highest level of H 0.015 0.005
(0.014) (0.020)
Highest level of W 0.018 0.028
(0.018) (0.021)
Share invested in future H 0.119∗ 0.083
(0.066) (0.079)
Share invested in future W 0.044 0.107
(0.048) (0.072)
Share invested in risky option H 0.012 0.085
(0.058) (0.066)
Share invested in risky option W 0.052 −0.026
(0.048) (0.067)
H most educated 0.032
(0.043)
H most patient 0.050
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(0.045)
H least risk averse −0.069∗
(0.042)
Constant 0.363∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.018 0.016
(0.026) (0.083) (0.097) (0.127) (0.127)
Session FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Couples 287 287 287 286 286
R2 0.031 0.115 0.123 0.196 0.208
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of the share allocated to the child (with possible discrete
values of 0,0.1,0.2, ...,0.9,1) on the treatment variables “Husband Bargaining” (indicator variable
taking the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining), “Wife Bargaining” (indicator variable
taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining), “Wife Dictator” (indicator variable taking
the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator), and a set of explanatory variables. “Session FE”:
indicator variables for each of the 11 different sessions of the experiments. See table notes of
Table 2 for definition of variables.
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Table A.9: Effect of increasing the wife’s bargaining power on the allocation to the wife
and the husband, extended
Allocation to wife Allocation to husband
Husband Bargaining −0.017 −0.007
(0.031) (0.035)
Wife Bargaining 0.066∗∗ 0.003
(0.032) (0.035)
Wife Dictator 0.091∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.030)
Male child 0.004 −0.040∗
(0.025) (0.023)
Chosen child’s standard −0.004 −0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
More than 2 children −0.021 −0.006
(0.026) (0.025)
School A 0.010 0.000
(0.047) (0.041)
School B −0.038 0.001
(0.024) (0.025)
School C −0.022 0.016
(0.046) (0.038)
Age husband −0.000 −0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Age wife 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Self-employed H −0.019 0.016
(0.024) (0.023)
Self-employed W −0.010 −0.005
(0.023) (0.022)
Highest level of H 0.001 −0.016
(0.018) (0.016)
Highest level of W −0.007 −0.014
(0.020) (0.018)
Share invested in future H −0.025 −0.075
(0.063) (0.062)
Share invested in future W −0.019 −0.068
(0.057) (0.062)
Share invested in risky option H −0.005 −0.077
(0.062) (0.061)
Share invested in risky option W 0.008 0.019
(0.063) (0.060)
H most educated 0.006 −0.028
(0.038) (0.033)
H most patient 0.038 −0.075∗
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(0.037) (0.039)
H least risk averse 0.035 0.038
(0.040) (0.039)
Constant 0.274∗∗ 0.724∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.120)
Session FE Yes Yes
Couples 286 286
R2 0.226 0.186
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports a regression of the share allocated to the wife (with
possible discrete values of 0,0.033,0.67,0.1, ...,0.933,0.967,1) in Column (1), and
a regression of the share allocated to the husband (with possible discrete values
of 0,0.033,0.67,0.1, ...,0.933,0.967,1) in Column (2), on the treatment variables
“Husband Bargaining” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Hus-
band Bargaining), “Wife Bargaining” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for
couples in Wife Bargaining), and “Wife Dictator” (indicator variable taking the
value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator), and a set of explanatory variables. See Table
2 for definition of “Session FE”, “Child background”, “Parent background”, and
“Parent difference” as well as background variables.
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Table A.10: Heterogeneity in time- and risk-preference difference, extended
Var = H most patient Var = H least risk averse
HB WB WD HB WB WD
Treatment 0.060 −0.039 0.072∗ 0.013 −0.024 −0.016
(0.101) (0.053) (0.043) (0.063) (0.068) (0.053)
Treatment X var 0.014 −0.094 −0.209∗∗∗ 0.084 −0.040 0.003
(0.113) (0.089) (0.064) (0.082) (0.079) (0.056)
H most patient 0.102∗ 0.095∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.050 0.026 0.016
(0.053) (0.050) (0.048) (0.067) (0.065) (0.055)
H least risk averse −0.027 −0.022 −0.079 −0.018 −0.005 −0.069
(0.060) (0.060) (0.048) (0.057) (0.053) (0.053)
Male child 0.069 0.074∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.079∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.066∗∗
(0.042) (0.040) (0.031) (0.040) (0.041) (0.031)
Share invested in future H 0.200∗ 0.215∗ 0.095
(0.111) (0.109) (0.099)
Share invested in future W 0.039 0.019 0.079
(0.119) (0.099) (0.089)
Chosen child’s standard 0.001 0.006 0.018∗∗ 0.004 0.005 0.018∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
More than 2 children 0.044 0.050 0.019 0.035 0.056 0.024
(0.039) (0.038) (0.030) (0.038) (0.037) (0.029)
School A −0.116 −0.035 −0.043 −0.115∗ −0.042 −0.036
(0.077) (0.060) (0.053) (0.068) (0.056) (0.052)
School B −0.015 0.004 0.048 −0.008 0.008 0.054
(0.045) (0.042) (0.039) (0.043) (0.042) (0.040)
School C 0.074 −0.004 0.049 0.026 −0.011 0.016
(0.085) (0.074) (0.075) (0.086) (0.074) (0.081)
Age husband 0.006∗∗ 0.004 0.004∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.004 0.004∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Age wife −0.006 −0.006∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.004 −0.006∗ −0.005∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Self-employed H −0.024 −0.011 −0.024 −0.030 −0.012 −0.023
(0.049) (0.044) (0.036) (0.048) (0.042) (0.037)
Self-employed W 0.014 0.077∗∗ 0.022 0.008 0.065 0.011
(0.043) (0.039) (0.030) (0.041) (0.039) (0.032)
Highest level of H 0.044 −0.037 0.022 0.028 −0.038 0.021
(0.036) (0.033) (0.026) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029)
Highest level of W −0.005 0.046 0.027 0.004 0.044 0.033
(0.032) (0.030) (0.027) (0.032) (0.031) (0.028)
Share invested in risky option H 0.090 0.123 0.099
(0.106) (0.087) (0.074)
Share invested in risky option W −0.089 0.010 0.006
(0.103) (0.075) (0.073)
H most educated 0.004 0.148∗∗ −0.011 0.032 0.144∗∗ −0.013
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(0.071) (0.068) (0.059) (0.070) (0.069) (0.060)
Constant 0.192 0.202 0.093 0.000 0.112 0.041
(0.203) (0.200) (0.151) (0.205) (0.195) (0.158)
Treatment (var) 0.073 −0.133 −0.137 0.097 −0.064 −0.013
(0.049) (0.068) (0.050) (0.054) (0.055) (0.044)
Session FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Couples 139 140 189 139 140 189
R2 0.305 0.336 0.321 0.335 0.344 0.288
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: Columns (1) to (3) in the table report regressions of the share allocated to the child (with pos-
sible discrete values of 0,0.1,0.2, ...,0.9,1) on the treatment variables “Husband Bargaining” (indicator
variable taking the value 1 for couples in Husband Bargaining) in Column (1), “Wife Bargaining”
(indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Bargaining) in Column (2), and “Wife Dic-
tator” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples in Wife Dictator) in Column (3), the indicator
variable “Husband most patient” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband
allocates more to the future than the wife), “Treatment X var”, an interaction variable between the
treatment indicator variables and “var”, and a set of explanatory variables. Columns (4) to (6) in
the table report regressions of the share allocated to the child on the treatment variables “Husband
Bargaining”, “Wife Bargaining”, and “Wife Dictator”, respectively, the indicator variable “H least
risk averse” (indicator variable taking the value 1 for couples where the husband allocates more to
the risky option than the wife), interaction variables between the treatment indicator variable and
“H least risk averse”, and a set of explanatory variables. See Table 2 for definition of “Session FE”.
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Table A.11: Heterogeneity in time- and risk-preference difference and gender preference,
extended
Var = Male child
HB WB WD WP
Treatment 0.157∗∗∗ 0.006 0.032 0.048
(0.051) (0.054) (0.044) (0.035)
Treatment X var −0.240∗∗∗ −0.126 −0.114∗ −0.131∗∗
(0.083) (0.086) (0.062) (0.056)
H most patient 0.044 0.038 0.012 0.034
(0.067) (0.061) (0.058) (0.045)
H least risk averse −0.070 −0.038 −0.075 −0.073∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.051) (0.042)
Male child 0.139∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046)
Share invested in future H 0.258∗∗ 0.180 0.083 0.143∗
(0.120) (0.110) (0.124) (0.077)
Share invested in future W 0.098 0.044 0.072 0.080
(0.114) (0.099) (0.098) (0.072)
Chosen child’s standard 0.001 0.006 0.019∗∗ 0.006
(0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
More than 2 children 0.037 0.043 0.027 0.027
(0.038) (0.037) (0.029) (0.026)
School A −0.123∗ −0.051 −0.042 −0.014
(0.071) (0.058) (0.054) (0.045)
School B −0.010 0.009 0.045 0.033
(0.044) (0.042) (0.039) (0.031)
School C 0.034 −0.011 0.014 −0.026
(0.081) (0.072) (0.082) (0.064)
Age husband 0.005∗∗ 0.004 0.004∗ 0.003∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Age wife −0.004 −0.006∗ −0.005∗ −0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Self-employed H −0.006 −0.011 −0.018 0.007
(0.046) (0.043) (0.036) (0.029)
Self-employed W 0.006 0.056 0.012 0.009
(0.040) (0.043) (0.031) (0.026)
Highest level of H 0.039 −0.034 0.023 0.003
(0.032) (0.033) (0.028) (0.019)
Highest level of W −0.011 0.043 0.027 0.024
(0.033) (0.030) (0.029) (0.020)
Share invested in risky option H 0.106 0.046 0.034 0.069
(0.097) (0.091) (0.091) (0.067)
Share invested in risky option W −0.256∗∗ −0.021 0.002 −0.021
(0.118) (0.085) (0.085) (0.069)
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H most educated 0.035 0.145∗∗ −0.022 0.034
(0.068) (0.065) (0.058) (0.041)
Constant 0.047 0.127 0.022 -0.012
(0.188) (0.191) (0.155) (0.119)
Treatment (var) −0.083 −0.120 −0.083 −0.084∗
(0.067) (0.071) (0.051) (0.046)
Session FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Couples 139 140 189 286
R2 0.394 0.361 0.304 0.20
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of the share allocated to the child on the
treatment variables “Husband Bargaining”, “Wife Bargaining”, “Wife Dictator”
and “Wife some power”, respectively, the indicator variable “Male child” (indica-
tor variable taking the value 1 if the child is a boy), interaction terms between the
treatment indicator variable and “Male child”, and a set of explanatory variables.
“Treatment (H most patient)”: sum of estimated parameters for the treatment
indicator variable and “Treatment X H most patient”. “Treatment (H least risk
averse)”: sum of estimated parameters for the treatment indicator variable and
“Treatment X H least risk averse”. “Treatment (Male child)”: sum of estimated
parameters for the treatment indicator variable and “Treatment X Male Child”.
See Table 2 for definition of “Session FE”.
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Appendix B Experimental materials
B.1 Invitation letter
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Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) 
 P. O. Box  31226 
Dar es salaam 
25th May 2015 
 
To parents of …………………………………………………………… 
REF: INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH ON HOUSEHOLD DECISION‐MAKING 
I  have  a  pleasure  to  invite  you  both  (father  and mother)  to  participate  in  a  research  project  about 
decision‐making.    Participation  in  the  research  project will  take  about  three  hours.  Each  of  you will 
receive a show up fee and some refreshments. Depending on the decisions you make during the study, 
you may receive an additional amount. The research project will take place between July 8 and August 5. 
Precise date and venue will be communicated to you later. 
Taking part in the study  is entirely your decision. You do not have to participate in this study if you do 
not want to. If you decide to participate in the study, you can still withdraw at any time. All information 
you give will be completely confidential. We will not be able to trace your answers and decisions back to 
you. 
We would highly appreciate your participation, it is very important to our research. 
Coordinator 
[Name of coordinator] 
If you would  like to participate, please  fill  in your mobile phone numbers  in the  form provided below 
and return to us through your child  in the next day so that we can call you back. For more details you 
can reach us through the following numbers: 
[Numbers removed for privacy reasons] 
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 CONTACT FORM    
 
Child’s name…………………………………………………………………………………             
 
Father’s name…………………………………………………………….Phone numbers (1)…................................................
                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                               (2)……………………………………………….
 
Mother’s name…………………………………………………………..Phone numbers (1).................................................. 
                                                                                                                               (2).………..………………………………...... 
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B.2 Instructions
This section provides the instructions for elicitation of time and risk preferences as well
as for the distributive decision for dictators and first proposers.
B.2.1 Time preferences
We will now hand out tokens that symbolize Tsh 3,000. Please use these to indicate your
allocation. At the end of the study, you will be paid in mobile money.
You have received Tsh 3,000 and you are now asked to choose the amount you want to
invest. The rest of the amount will be added to your payment that you receive today and
will be paid in mobile money.
The amount you invest will be doubled and you will receive it in 3 weeks. For example,
if you choose to invest nothing, you will receive Tsh 3,000 in mobile money today. If
you choose to invest all of the Tsh 3,000, you will receive nothing today and Tsh 6,000
in mobile money in three weeks. If you choose to invest Tsh 1,000, you will receive Tsh
2,000 in mobile money today and Tsh 2,000 in mobile money in three weeks.
After three weeks, those of you who decide to invest some of the money will then get the
mobile money. Those of you who do not invest, will not get anything after three weeks.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions
We will now come to each of you individually to verify that you have understood the task
you have been given.
We now ask you to choose the amount of tokens you want to invest. The tokens you put
in the cup with the picture of a calendar is the tokens you choose to invest. The invested
amount will be doubled and received in mobile money in 3 weeks. The tokens you choose
not to invest will be paid out to you in mobile money today after the session is completed.
Has anyone not made their choice?
My assistants will now come around to record your answers. We then move on to the
next part of the session.
B.2.2 Risk preferences
We will now hand out tokens that symbolize Tsh 3,000. Please use these to indicate your
allocation. At the end of the study, you will be paid in real money, not mobile money.
Your decision will be anonymous.
You have received Tsh 3,000 and you are now asked to choose the amount that you wish
to invest in a risky option. The amount you choose not to invest, will be added to your
payment.
In the lottery, there is an equal chance that the investment will fail or succeed. If the
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investment fails, you lose the amount you invested. If the investment succeeds, you receive
3 times the amount invested.
After you have chosen how much you wish to invest, you will draw a card from a bucket
to determine whether you win or lose. If the card is green, you win 3 times the amount
you chose to invest. If the card is red, you lose the amount you chose to invest. It is
equally likely that the card is green or red.
For example, if you choose to invest nothing, you will get the Tsh 3,000 for sure. That
is, the draw of card will not affect your payment. If you choose to invest all of the Tsh
3,000, then if you draw a green card, you receive Tsh 9,000 in payment, and if you draw
a red card you receive nothing in payment. If you chose to invest Tsh 1,500, then if you
draw a green card, you receive 6,000 (1,500 + 3*1,500) in payment, and if you draw a
red card, you receive 1,500 in payment
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
We will now come to each of you individually to verify that you have understood the task
you have been given.
We now ask you to choose the amount of tokens you want to invest. The tokens you
put in the cup with the picture of a question mark is the tokens you choose to invest and
which will triple if you draw a green card, and be reduced to zero if you draw a red card.
The tokens you choose not to invest will be paid out to you for sure after the study is
completed. The payment will be made in cash, not mobile money.
Has anyone not made their choice?
My assistants will now come around to record your answers and to draw the card. We
then move on to the next part of the study.
B.2.3 Distributive choice
Dictator treatments (Husband Dictator and Wife Dictator)
In this part of the study, you will be paired with your spouse. This means that the deci-
sions you make will affect both your own and your spouse’s payment.
Your household has received Tsh 15,000 and you have been chosen to decide how the
money should be allocated between yourself, your child and your spouse.
We will now hand out tokens that symbolize Tsh 15,000. You will use these to show how
you want to split the money between yourself, your child and your spouse. At the end of
the study, you will be paid in real money according to the decision you made.
Your spouse will be informed about the task you have been given and the decision you
make. However, he or she will not make any decision in this part of the session.
For each Tsh 1,500 you give to your child, this child will receive 1 week of tutoring. The
56
tutoring is conducted Monday through Friday from 15:00 to 17:00. It includes tuition,
a speed test each day and a weekend test. Your child will be taught in groups of 25-40
children. The tutor teaches mathematics, English and Sayansi.
The RAs will now come and tell each of you which of your children has been randomly
chosen to receive the tutoring.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
We will now come to each of you individually to verify that you have understood the task.
We now ask you to distribute the tokens between the three cups on your desk. Remember
that the choice you make here will be implemented. The tokens you put in the cup with
the picture of a woman will be paid out to your wife if you are a man and to yourself if
you are a woman. The tokens you put in the cup with the picture of a child will be paid
out as tutoring for your child. The tokens you put in the cup with the picture of a man
will be paid out to yourself if you are a man and to your husband if you are a woman,
after the completion of the session.
Has anyone not made their choice?
My assistants will now come and record your answers. They will take your decision to
your spouse, so that she can see what you decided to do.
We now move on to the next part of the session.
B.2.4 Bargaining treatments (Husband Bargaining and Wife Bargaining)
In this part of the study, you will be paired with your spouse. This means that the decisions
you make will affect both your own and your spouse’s payment.
Your household has received Tsh 15,000 and you have been chosen to propose how the
money should be allocated between yourself, your child and your spouse.
We will now hand out tokens that symbolize Tsh 15,000. You will use these to show your
proposal for how to split the money between yourself, your child and your spouse. At the
end of the study, you will be paid in real money.
When you have made your choice, we will reveal it to your spouse. He or she can either
agree or disagree with your proposal. If he or she agrees, then your choice is implemented.
If your spouse disagrees, he or she will get the opportunity to make a new proposal for
the allocation of money and you can agree or disagree with the new proposal. You can
do this as many times you like in order to get to an agreement for an allocation, but for
each time you disagree the amount is reduced by Tsh 500. For example, if your spouse
disagrees with your first proposal he or she will propose an allocation of Tsh 14,500. If
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you then disagree with him or her, you will propose a new allocation of Tsh 14,000.
For each Tsh 1,500 you give to your child, this child will receive 1 week of tutoring. The
tutoring is conducted Monday through Friday from 15:00 to 17:00. It includes tuition,
a speed test each day and a weekend test. Your child will be taught in groups of 25-40
children. The tutor teaches mathematics, English and Sayansi.
The RAs will now come and tell each of you which of your children has been randomly
chosen to receive the tutoring.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
We will now come to each of you individually to verify that you have understood the task
you and your spouse have been given.
We now ask you to propose a distribution of the tokens between the three cups on your
desk. The tokens you put in the cup with the picture of a woman is what you propose
to give to yourself if you are a woman and to your wife if you are a man. The tokens
you put in the cup with a picture of a child is what you propose to give to your child and
which will be paid out as tutoring if proposal is accepted. The tokens you put in the cup
with the picture of a man is what you propose to give to yourself if you are a man and to
your husband if you are a woman.
Has anyone not made their choice?
My assistants will now come and record your answers. They will take your proposals to
your spouses so that he or she can see what you propose to do and decide whether he or
she agrees or disagrees with you. Please wait patiently while we wait for the response of
your spouses.
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1 Introduction
A comprehensive economic and political economy literature documents the fact that
resource-rich countries often perform poorly in terms of social and economic development
compared with countries that are less abundant in natural resources (Ross 2015; Venables
2016). Natural resource wealth is associated with less democracy (Aslaksen 2007; An-
dersen and Aslaksen 2013; Ramsay 2011), more corruption (Leite and Weidmann 2002;
Arezki and Bru¨ckner 2011; Vicente 2010; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2013; Andersen
et al. 2013; Brollo et al. 2013; Caselli and Michaels 2013) and a higher likelihood of violent
conflicts (Collier and Hoeﬄer 1998; Ross 2004). These phenomena are commonly referred
to as the the resource curse, a term first proposed by Auty (1993). Although there seems
to be a consensus that a resource curse often exists, the empirical literature faces greater
challenges in establishing why natural resource wealth is often associated with undesir-
able outcomes, because cross-country comparisons are plagued with endogeneity issues
(Cust and Poelhekke 2015).
The motivation of this paper is to take an alternative approach and study one possi-
ble micro-founded mechanism for the resource curse, using a controlled field experimental
setting in which we focus on corruption, which is often considered to be a key explana-
tion of the resource curse (Torvik 2002; Svensson 2005; Serra 2006; Campos and Pradhan
2007; Kolstad and Wiig 2009; Olken 2015). The mechanism that we have in mind is
that expectations about natural resource rent in a country cause people to expect an
increase in corruption in the future, which in turn increases their willingness to engage
in corrupt activities. To study this mechanism, we take advantage of the fact that Tan-
zania has recently discovered large reservoirs of offshore natural gas, but has not yet
commenced production or revenue generation.1 In this context, we implement a con-
trolled field experiment, in which respondents are randomized to watch different versions
of an informational video to create exogenous variations in expectations about future
gas revenues, and they then respond to survey questions and take part in a behavioral
experiment. This design allows us to causally identify how expectations about natural
resource wealth shape people’s expectations about corruption and their willingness to
engage in corrupt behavior (Ross 2012; 2015).
The large-scale study, involving about 3,000 respondents, was conducted in the com-
mercial capital of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, and in the two gas regions, Mtwara and Lindi,
in the south-eastern part of the country. Our main result is that we find support for the
hypothesis that expectations about a future natural resource rent increases expectations
about future corruption. The effect is not large, about 0.07 standard deviations, but it
appears across almost all sub-groups in our sample and is robust to the inclusion of a
large set of controls. Given that our experimental manipulation is subtle and cleanly
identifies the effect of providing more information (where possible confounds are removed
by the fact that the control group watched almost the same video), we argue that the
result points to an important mechanism that may contribute to explaining the resource
curse. An interesting part of our analysis, which was not pre-specified, is that we find a
1These large reservoirs of natural gas have been discovered off the southern coast of Tanzania from
2010 (URoT 2013a). The size of the total confirmed gas reserves is currently standing at more than
57 trillion cubic feet and it is expected to increase further in the years to come. International oil
companies have already invested heavily in the exploration phase: the Tanzania Petroleum Development
Corporation estimates that overall investments amount to almost USD 5 billion so far. A final decision
about investments in extraction facilities and liquefied natural gas infrastructure to facilitate gas export
has not yet been made.
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particularly strong effect of the information on expectations about future corruption for
older respondents in Dar es Salaam. We suggest that this finding is explained by these
respondents being more likely to have experienced the mining boom and the associated
increase in corruption in Tanzania in the 1990s (Lange 2011), and therefore, they update
their beliefs about future corruption based on this personal experience, in line with the
learning mechanism identified in Malmendier and Nagel (2016).
In contrast to our pre-specified hypothesis, however, we do not find a corresponding
effect on the willingness to engage in corrupt activities, both in terms of the survey mea-
sure and the behavioral measure of the corruption norm. The survey measure involves
responses to a question on the appropriateness of engaging in corruption, the majority
of which express a strong norm against corruption. The behavioral measure is based on
an incentivized experiment where the respondent self-reports the number of tails from
six coin flips. In contrast to the survey measure, we observe extensive dishonest behav-
ior among the respondents, particularly among the males. In both cases, however, the
measures are not affected by our treatment manipulation. A possible explanation for this
finding is that it takes some time for a change in beliefs to translate into a change in
behavior, but it may also be explained by corrupt behavior being affected more by the
present level of corruption in society than by expectations about future corruption. Over-
all, therefore, we find only limited evidence for our specific hypothesis that expectations
about a natural resource rent contribute to the resource curse by increasing expectations
about corruption in society in the future, which, consequently, increases people’s present
willingness to engage in corrupt activities.
Our study relates to a growing literature that focuses on political and institutional
explanations of the resource curse. A central theme in this literature is that natural
resource booms affect the incentives and behavior of both the political elite and ordinary
citizens (Treisman 2000; Leite and Weidmann 2002; Andersen and Aslaksen 2013; Brollo
et al. 2013; Caselli and Michaels 2013; Paler 2013; Cust and Poelhekke 2015) and that
the extent to which agents can act on bad incentives depends on the quality of institu-
tions (Mehlum et al. 2006; Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2010). On the government side, the
argument is that natural resource revenues, particularly those arising from petroleum, in-
crease the value to the ruling politicians of staying in power, because it gives them direct
access to large rents. At the same time, these petroleum rents provide an opportunity
for the elite to spend money on activities that aim to increase their chances of staying
in power. Examples of such activities are increased patronage spending (for instance,
increased employment in the public sector), vote buying and reduced non-resource tax-
ation (Robinson et al. 2006; Ross 2008; 2012; Andersen and Aslaksen 2013). However,
the problem of corruption and rent-seeking is not confined to the political elite, but is
also likely to apply to ordinary citizens. When the rents available for grabbing are large,
it becomes more profitable for individuals to engage in political lobbying and corruption
to appropriate a share of the wealth (Mehlum et al. 2006; Busse and Gro¨ning 2013). We
contribute to this literature by establishing causally that expectations about a natural
resource rent, which is likely to make corruption more profitable, increase expectations
about future corruption in a society with weak institutions and a history of extensive
corruption. This finding is in line with Vicente (2010), who, in a natural experiment
comparing Sao Tome and Principe to Cabo Verde, finds that the announcement of oil
discoveries increased perceived corruption in public services.
The paper also relates to a large experimental literature studying lying in settings
without strategic interactions. In a meta-analysis of 90 studies, involving more than
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44,000 respondents from 47 countries, Abeler et al. (2017) find that on average, people are
willing to forgo 75% of a potential monetary pay-off to avoid lying. The majority of these
studies are conducted on students, or other specific population groups, and in Europe
and the US, although with some notable exceptions (Banerjee et al. 2016; Heldring 2016;
Lowes et al. 2017). Thus, the behavioral experiment we conduct as part of this study
represents the largest study of dishonest behavior in a development context, where the
respondents are largely representative of their society. We observe that our respondents
are slightly less honest than the average respondent in Abeler et al. (2017); in our sample,
the respondents forgo about 67% of a potential monetary pay-off to avoid lying. However,
comparing our results to previous studies from Tanzania, our sample is more honest
(Abeler et al. 2017; Di Falco et al. 2016). We also find large heterogeneities in dishonest
behavior between sub-groups of the sample, which highlights the importance of moving
beyond student samples in studies of dishonest behavior. Finally, the paper contributes
to a growing body of studies using variation in information provided to respondents in
surveys to identify causal effects on beliefs and preferences (Jensen 2010; Card et al. 2012;
Cruces et al. 2013; Kuziemko et al. 2015).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental
design and provides an overview of the sample and the data. Section 3 explains the
empirical strategy and Section 4 provides a descriptive analysis of the key outcomes of
interest and reports on main analysis, regarding the effect of providing information about
gas revenues on expected corruption. Finally, Section 5 discusses the results and their
policy implications and concludes the paper.
2 Sample and experimental design
In this section, we provide a discussion of the sample and the experimental design of the
survey.
2.1 Sample
The study was conducted in July and August, 2015, in three regions in Tanzania: Dar es
Salaam, Lindi and Mtwara. Dar es Salaam was chosen because it is the commercial capi-
tal. Mtwara and Lindi were chosen because they are the regions closest to the offshore gas
reservoirs, and they are also the regions where a planned liquefied natural gas processing
plant will be located. In the analysis, we refer to Dar es Salaam as the “non-gas region”
and Mtwara and Lindi as the “gas regions”.2
In each region, three districts/municipalities were selected. All municipalities in Dar
es Salaam were included, as it possesses three districts. Both Lindi and Mtwara have more
than three districts and thus, we undertook a sampling of districts in these regions. In
Lindi, we selected the only urban district in the region to ensure urban representation, and
randomly selected two of the rural districts. In Mtwara, we selected the urban district
situated along the coast because it is the closest to the gas reservoirs, and randomly
selected two rural districts.3 Within each of the nine districts, three wards were randomly
2The geographical locations of the three regions are shown in Figure A.1 in Appendix A. In Tables
A.3, A.4 and A.5, we provide the main analysis separately for each of the three regions.
3The Dar es Salaam districts at the time of the study were Ilala, Temeke and Kiniondoni. The
Mtwara districts selected were Masasi Vijijini, Mtwara Manisipaa and Newala, and the Lindi districts
were Lindi, Lindi Manisipaa and Nachingwea.
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selected using data from the 2012 Population and Household Census (URoT 2016a;c;b).
In the field, three villages/streets within each of the 27 wards were randomly selected and
within each of the approximately 81 villages/streets, between 35 and 40 households were
randomly interviewed. In total, we surveyed 3,004 households. From each household, we
randomly selected one person above 18 years of age and alternated between interviewing
a man and a woman.
Table 1 provides an overview of the respondents’ background variables for the sample
as a whole, as well as for each of the three regions, together with comparable statistics
from the 2012 Population and Household Census (URoT 2013b; 2015; 2016a;c;b). A di-
rect comparison with the national census data is difficult in relation to age, education and
marital status because our sample covers only those aged 18 years and above, whereas in
the national census, the education level is measured for all individuals above five years old,
and marital status is recorded for individuals above 15 years old. We observe, however,
that our data is comparable to the national census in terms of occupation and gender. In
the comparison between the non-gas region and the gas regions, we note that the main
differences relate to education levels and occupations: respondents in the non- gas region
are much more likely than those in the gas region to have completed higher education
and to be self-employed.
[Table 1 about here.]
2.2 Survey and experimental design
First, we provide an overview of the structure of the survey, before turning to a more
detailed discussion of the treatment variation and the main outcome variables.
General structure. The survey was conducted in Swahili, the official language of
Tanzania. It lasted approximately 15 minutes and consisted of five parts (see Appendix
B.1 for the English wording of the survey). In the first part, respondents answered back-
ground questions about their age, marital status, region of origin, region they visit most
frequently, education and occupation. The second part entailed the experimental part of
our research design: respondents were randomly assigned to watch one of two versions of
an informational video on the enumerator’s tablet, where one version contained informa-
tion about gas discoveries and revenue estimates for Tanzania, whereas the other did not
mention gas revenues at all. In the third part, we asked our pre-specified main outcome
questions on corruption, trust and taxation, and additional questions that could provide
a greater understanding of the mechanisms driving the responses to these questions.4 In
the fourth part, respondents were randomized to take part in one of two incentivized
experiments, intended to measure behaviorally their willingness to engage in corrupt
activities and their trust level. The respondents were paid upon completion of the ex-
perimental task, and the interview was then terminated. At the end, the enumerator
recorded information about the gender of the respondent, the region, district, ward and
village where the interview was conducted. The data were collected using tablets and the
Qualtrics Oﬄine Surveys app, allowing us to randomize the treatment at the enumera-
4Even though corruption, taxation and trust are related topics, we consider that they raise different
questions and relate to different literatures. Therefore, we focus on corruption in the present paper;
taxation and trust will be analyzed in separate papers.
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tor level.5 A schematic representation of the research design is provided in Figure 1 below.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The treatment. The respondents were randomly assigned to watch an informa-
tional video with or without gas information (see Figures B.1 - B.14 in Appendix B.2 for
screenshots).6 To make the comparison between the two groups as clean as possible, the
video shown to the no gas information group was also part of the version providing gas
information.
The no gas information sequence contains only general information about Tanzania.
It describes the size of the population (49 million), the number of regions (30) and
the gross national income (81 trillion Tanzanian shillings (TZS)/USD 41 billion) of the
country. Importantly, this general information features components displayed in the gas
information sequence that could affect expectations about corruption, such as a map of
Tanzania and its regions, the Tanzanian flag, a picture of a TZS 10,000 note and the
mention of a large sum of money. Because these components are shown to respondents
in both the gas and the no gas information groups, we assume that they cannot explain
any observed treatment differences.
The gas information video also contains a sequence explaining that natural gas has
been discovered in Tanzania and indicating the location of the offshore reservoirs, off the
coast of Mtwara and Lindi. Further, it describes that the gas can be extracted and sold,
and that it can yield an estimated TZS 106 trillion in total revenue.7
The videos were made in collaboration with DJPA Tanzania and contained simple
animations as well as written text and a voice-over in Swahili.8 The respondents watched
the video on the enumerator’s tablet, with a headset to hear the voice-over. Before the
main data collection, the videos were tested in focus group discussions with Dar es Salaam
residents to ensure that they were clear and understandable.
Overall, the experimental design creates exogenous variation between respondents
regarding whether they were informed about the gas revenues, before they provide answers
on the main outcome variables. The presence of a control video ensures that there is no
variation in other components. Thus, the present design provides for a clean identification
of the effect of being informed about the likelihood of natural resources yielding large
revenues to Tanzania in the future. Even though our treatment design is subtle, and
one should not expect it to generate large effects, we believe that it may trigger two
mechanisms that could affect how the respondents answer the questions that follow. First,
for respondents who are aware of the potential gas revenues, the information may cause
them to update the value of this resource rent upwards or downwards. Second, for all
5As shown in Table A.1, the sample is balanced both for all respondents and within the gas region
and non-gas regions.
6As a robustness check, we introduced four variations of this video in which we randomly varied how
we illustrated the size of the revenue estimates. Specifically, we varied whether the revenue estimates
were presented in terms of total value/annual real return and in terms of all Tanzanians/per capita. As
shown in Tables A.8, A.9 and A.10 in Appendix A, we do not find significant differences across these
sub-treatments. We aimed to allocate an equal share of the respondents to each of the five versions of
the video, but a software problem created some deviations. Overall, as shown in Table A.2, around 23%
of the respondents were in the control group with no gas information and about 77% of the respondents
were in the treatment group with gas information.
7This estimated total value is based on IMF (2014).
8DJPA webpage: http://www.djpa.co.tz/
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respondents, the information about gas revenues increases the salience of this revenue. To
shed some light on the extent to which these mechanisms shape the following responses,
immediately after the video we asked all respondents whether the information was new
to them, as follows:
• Novelty of information: How much of this information was new to you? (All of it
- most of it - some of it - almost none of it - none of it)
In addition, for the treated respondents, we asked whether the estimated total gas rev-
enues were larger than they had expected.
The main survey outcome variables. We were interested in whether information
about future gas revenues causes people to expect more corruption in society and weaken
the social norm whereby corruption is considered to be unacceptable. To study these two
dimensions, we asked the respondents two main questions on corruption after they had
seen the informational video:
• Expected future corruption: In the years to come, I expect the extent of corrupt
activities to: (Decrease a lot - decrease - stay the same - increase - increase a lot)
• Corruption norm: People should never engage in corrupt activities (Strongly agree
- agree - neither agree nor disagree - disagree - strongly agree)
Our prior expectation was that information about future gas revenues would cause
individuals to expect more corruption if they updated their estimates of the resource rent
upwards. Further, we expected this information to make the presence of a large resource
rent salient, which might remind respondents of the extensive corruption involved in
historical cases of national resource rent extraction in Tanzania (Lange 2011). Finally,
building on the prior expectation that the information video would make respondents
expect more corruption, we also expected the information to weaken the corruption norm
because, as well established in the literature, the strength of a corruption norm depends
importantly on the level of corruption in society (Andvig and Moene 1990; Treisman
2000; Paldam 2002; Fisman et al. 2007; Cameron et al. 2009; Barr and Serra 2010).
The behavioral outcome variable. To supplement the survey response on the cor-
ruption norm, we conducted an incentivized experiment to measure people’s willingness
to become involved in corrupt activities, in which we relied on the standard definition of
corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. To capture this aspect,
we conducted a standard flip-of-a-coin experiment (Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi 2013),
in which the respondent was asked to flip a coin six times without the enumerator ob-
serving the outcomes. Then, the respondent was asked to report how many heads he/she
obtained, with a payment of 1,000 TZS per tail reported. The payment scheme was
announced before the respondent flipped the coin.
The idea behind this experimental task was that the enumerator entrusted power to
the respondent to report the correct outcomes, but the respondent could, without any
fear of detection, abuse this power to benefit economically by misreporting the number
of heads and tails. Our experimental design allows us to identify whether information
about future gas revenues makes it more likely that the respondent abuses their power
and engages in corrupt activity for a private gain.
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3 Empirical strategy
We study the causal effect of providing information about gas on the respondents’ re-
sponses by estimating the following linear ordinary least squares regression, as specified
in the pre-analysis plan:9
yi = α +βGIGIi +δXi + εi, (1)
where yi is the standardized version of the relevant outcome measure for individual i
(expected corruption, corruption norm and novelty of information), GIi is a treatment
indicator variable that takes a value of one if respondent i was exposed to the gas infor-
mation version of the video and Xi is a vector of individual characteristics: age, gender,
occupation, education, marital status and type of region (gas or non-gas region). We
estimate Equation (1) with robust standard errors and control for round fixed effects.10
We also report the corresponding regressions without control variables. As respondents
were randomly assigned to watch one of the two versions of the video, βGI provides an
estimate of the causal effect of providing information about gas on expectations about
future corruption and on the corruption norm.
To investigate whether the gas information affected sub-groups of the sample differ-
ently, we also estimate regressions with interaction terms. We focus on age, education,
gender and employment status, and estimate the following regression with indicator vari-
ables for the respective dimensions:11
yi = α +βGIGIi + γVari +θGIi×Vari +δXi + εi, (2)
where Vari is an indicator variable taking a value of one if respondent i is older than the
median age, has completed lower secondary school or a higher level of education, is male,
is self-employed or is a farmer, and GIi×Vari is an interaction term between GIi and
Vari. Then, the estimated effect on respondents of providing information about gas is
given by βGI (younger, less educated, females, employed in the formal sector) and βGI +θ
(older, more educated, males, self-employed, farmers) and the estimated difference in
causal effect between the two respective sub-groups is given by θ .
4 Analysis
First, we provide some descriptive statistics of the responses of the respondents before
turning to the main analysis of the average treatment effects and heterogeneous effects
on sub-groups in our sample.
9The pre-analysis plan was registered with the American Economic Association’s registry for ran-
domized controlled trials: AEARCTR-0000768.
10The round fixed effects are included because, initially, owing to a technical problem, we allocated
too many respondents to the treatment group. To address this problem and ensure that we reached
the planned targets for the different groups, we divided the data collection into five rounds. In the
first round, 90% of respondents were allocated to the gas information video, whereas in rounds 2–5, the
corresponding share was between 69% and 72%.
11Although we did not pre-specify the age dimension in our pre-analysis plan, we included it because
we found some interesting patterns that fit well with the findings of related literature.
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4.1 Descriptive statistics
Here, we provide an overview of how the respondents answered the main questions of
interest.
First, as shown in Figure 2, we observe that the majority of respondents found that
the information video provided some new information (85% of respondents answered that
some, almost all or all information was new to them). Further, we observe that this share
is slightly larger in the gas regions than in the non-gas region (87% versus 81%, respec-
tively, p = 0.000), which is in line with expectations, given that the level of education is
higher in the non-gas region than in the gas regions.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Further, to shed light on how the gas information affected respondents in the treat-
ment group, we asked them whether the estimated total gas revenues presented in the
video were larger than expected. For the overall sample, we find that 65% of the sam-
ple did so, which provides evidence that, on average, the information caused the treated
respondents to update the natural resource rent upwards. As shown in Figure 3, the
pattern applies across all pre-specified sub-samples (with the majority in each sub-group
answering “Yes” to this question). In particular, we note that the less educated are much
more likely to find the estimated total revenues larger than expected.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 4 shows the distribution of expected future corruption in the sample. We note
that there is large variation in the respondents’ beliefs. The majority (60%) expect cor-
ruption to increase or increase a lot in the years to come, but a significant share of the
respondents (30%) expect a decrease in corruption. The patterns are not significantly
different for the gas regions and non-gas region.
[Figure 4 about here.]
In Figure 5, we present an overview of the responses on both the survey measure
and the behavioral measure of the corruption norm. In terms of the survey measure, we
observe a strong norm against engaging in corruption, with about 60% of respondents
strongly agreeing with this norm in both the gas and non-gas regions. In contrast, we
observe that a significant share of the respondents are willing to engage in a corrupt
activity in the behavioral experiment.12 In the overall sample, on average, the respon-
dents report four tails, which is significantly larger than the benchmark of three tails
that would be the expected outcome from honest reporting.13 We observe that dishonest
reporting is more prevalent in the non-gas region than in the gas regions (4.6 tails versus
3.7 tails, p = 0.000) and, in particular, we note that among males in the non-gas region,
12We also asked them the non-incentivized question of how likely they believed it was that others
would engage in corrupt behavior. The responses to this question are in line with what we observe in
the coin flipping task.
13Compared to the average in the meta analysis conducted by Abeler et al. (2017), our sample is more
dishonest (our sample was willing to forgo 67% of the potential monetary pay-off to avoid lying, whereas
the corresponding percentage in the meta-analysis was 75%). However, compared with other studies
from Tanzania (Abeler et al. 2017; Di Falco et al. 2016), we find relatively less dishonest behavior.
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the average number of reported tails is very high, at 4.8.14
[Figure 5 about here.]
4.2 Treatment analysis
In this part of the paper, we analyze how providing information about gas revenues
causally affected the respondents’ expectations about future corruption and the corrup-
tion norm.
Table 2 reports ordinary least squares regressions for which the dependent variable is
expectations about future corruption. In line with our pre-specified hypothesis, as shown
in column (1), we find a significant positive causal effect of providing information about
gas revenue on expected future corruption, equal to about 0.07 standard deviations (two-
sided test, p = 0.080). In addition, in column (2), we observe that this effect is robust to
the inclusion of control variables. In columns (3) and (4), we report the corresponding
analysis separately for the non-gas regions and the gas region. In both regressions, we
observe the same positive effect (even though the point estimates are now less precise,
owing to a smaller number of observations). In terms of control variables, we observe
systematically that males expect more corruption in the future than do females.
[Table 2 about here].
When evaluating the size of the estimated causal effect on beliefs about future cor-
ruption, it is important to keep in mind that the experimental manipulation is subtle
in order to cleanly identify the relationship between beliefs about the resource rent and
beliefs about corruption. In the informational video shown to the treatment group, we
only added information about the estimated total gas revenues. Our first main finding is
that this information caused the respondents to expect more corruption in the future.
Result 1: We find a significant causal effect of providing information about the esti-
mated size of the natural resource rent on beliefs about corruption in the future.
In Table 3, we report regressions for the estimated effect of providing information
about gas revenues on the corruption norm, as measured by the survey question and the
behavioral experiment. Surprisingly, given the positive effect on expectations about fu-
ture corruption, we do not find any effect on the corruption norm. As shown in columns
(1) and (4), we estimate a relatively precise null effect for the whole sample on both the
survey measure and the behavioral measure. This also occurs when we run the regres-
sions separately for the non-gas region and the gas regions (columns (2)–(3) and (5)–(6),
respectively).15
14Consistent with Abeler et al. (2017), we also find that, overall, men are more dishonest than women
(4.3 tails versus 3.6 tails, p = 0.000) and younger respondents are more dishonest than older respondents
(4.4 tails versus 3.6 tails, p = 0.000).
15We also observe the same finding if we consider the alternative survey measure on the corruption
norm, see Table A.11.
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[Table 3 about here.]
Result 2: We do not find a causal effect of providing information about the estimated
size of the natural resource rent on people’s willingness to endorse or engage in corrupt
activities.
The null effect on the corruption norm may reflect that the acceptance of and will-
ingness to engage in corrupt activities is related more to the present level of corruption
in society than to expectations about future corruption.
To shed further light on the underlying mechanism driving the causal effect of provid-
ing information about total revenues on expected corruption, in Table 4 we investigate
whether providing information about gas revenues affected the perceived novelty of the
informational video. Surprisingly, as shown in columns (1) and (2), although we do not
find a treatment effect on novelty for the whole sample, this null effect hides two opposing
patterns in the non-gas region and in the gas regions, as shown in columns (3) and (4).
In the non-gas region, we find the expected strong positive effect of providing information
on perceived novelty, whereas we find a significant negative effect in the gas regions. A
possible interpretation of the negative effect in the gas regions is that the local population
in this area is quite well informed about the possible revenues from the gas fields, given
their location closer to the fields and the prominence of this issue in the local debates. As
a result, the informational video may have appeared less novel when this sequence was
added to the video. In contrast, the potential for revenues from gas-field production has
figured less prominently in the non-gas region and, thus, the sequence with information
about expected total revenues may appear more novel to this population.
[Table 4 about here.]
We find very different patterns in terms of how the respondents view the novelty of
information in the non-gas regions and the gas region, but the same effect on expectations
about corruption. This suggests that providing information on total revenues not only
operates through updating the respondents’ beliefs about the natural resource rent, but
also through making gas production a salient issue before they answer the questions on
corruption in the survey.
4.3 Heterogeneity analysis
Here, we investigate whether different sub-groups of the population are affected differ-
ently by the gas information, with a focus on the effect on expectations of corruption.16
[Table 5 about here]
In Table 5, we report the heterogeneity analysis for the non-gas region and the gas
regions separately. We observe that for almost all sub-groups, the estimated causal effect
is positive, which may be seen as evidence of information about total revenues systemat-
ically causing the respondents to expect more corruption in the future. We should also
16In Table A.6 and Table A.7, we show the corresponding heterogeneity analysis for the effect on
the corruption norm. Table A.12 shows the heterogeneity analysis for an alternative measure of the
corruption norm.
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note that the point estimates are not precisely measured and, for many of the groups,
they are not statistically significant. However, we find a strong and highly significant ef-
fect among the older respondents in the non-gas region: the information about the total
revenues causes an increase in their expectations of future corruption by about 0.3 stan-
dard deviations (p = 0.002). Older respondents are more likely to have experienced the
mining boom and the associated increase in corruption in the 1990s in Tanzania (Lange
2011). This personal experience may have influenced how older respondents updated
their beliefs about future corruption, in line with the learning mechanism observed in
the context of expectations about future inflation in Malmendier and Nagel (2016). We
consider the finding for the older respondents to be explorative because we did not pre-
specify this hypothesis, and we note that it is less strong among the older respondents in
the gas regions. Nevertheless, we find it important and worthy of further investigation
because it may shed light on the persistence of corruption in many developing countries.
Result 3: We find that providing information about the estimated size of the natural
resource rent increases people’s expectations about future corruption in most sub-groups,
particularly among the older respondents in the non-gas region.
In Table 6, we report results for the heterogeneity analysis of how gas information
affected the perceived novelty of information. Interestingly, we observe systematic, but
opposite, patterns in the non-gas region and the gas regions. In almost all sub-groups
in the non-gas region, the information has a strong positive causal effect on perceived
novelty, whereas in almost all sub-groups in the gas regions, it has a strong negative
effect (although not always statistically significant). Thus, these patterns strongly suggest
that the information manipulation worked differently in the non-gas regions and the gas
regions; in the gas regions, the effect on beliefs about future corruption primarily seems
to have been driven by the natural resource issue being made salient for the respondents.
In light of Result 3, we note that the information has a strong positive effect on
perceived novelty equal to about 0.3 standard deviations for the older respondents in
the non-gas region, which is in line with the effect on future corruption for this group.
Nevertheless, the effect on perceived novelty is not significantly stronger than for most of
the other sub-groups in the non-gas region, which suggests that the particularly strong
effect on beliefs about future corruption for this group operated through the mechanism
of their beliefs being updated differently to those of other groups; in particular, this arises
because the older respondents are more likely to have experienced the mining boom and
the corresponding increase in corruption.
[Table 6 about here.]
5 Conclusions
It is highly important to gain a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms of
the resource curse, which exists in many developing countries. In this paper, we report
from a large-scale field experiment in Tanzania that offers causal evidence on how in-
formation about a natural resource rent shapes people’s beliefs about future corruption.
We introduce a clean experimental design that controls for a host of potential confounds
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by minimally manipulating an informational video also shown to the control group. We
find a significant effect of our information manipulation on the respondents’ beliefs about
future corruption, particularly among the older respondents. We believe that this result
points to a mechanism that may play an important role in generating the resource curse:
the presence of a natural resource rent makes people expect more corruption and the in-
creased expectations about corruption may become self-fulfilling by making people more
willing to engage in corrupt activity. However, in our study, we only find limited evi-
dence for this mechanism because our treatment manipulation does not change people’s
willingness to engage in corrupt behavior.
We believe that several interesting research avenues arise from the present study.
First, more research is needed to understand the mechanisms driving corrupt behavior,
and particularly how it relates to people’s beliefs about corruption in society. We do
not find evidence that beliefs about future corruption shape people’s normative views
on corruption or their behavior, which is suggestive of corrupt behavior instead being
driven by people’s beliefs about the existing level of corruption in a society. Second,
the strong effect of the information manipulation on older respondents is intriguing. We
interpret this finding in the light of the learning framework of Malmendier and Nagel
(2016), who show that belief updating is shaped by personal experiences. In our study,
this may suggest that the effect on the older respondents is driven by their knowledge
about the extensive corruption in the mining sector in Tanzania. This hypothesis was not
pre-specified and, thus, more research is needed to understand how personal experiences
of this kind shape people’s beliefs about corruption. More generally, we believe that the
learning framework represents a fruitful approach for development research because it
introduces an interesting view on how historical experiences may shape the development
process. Finally, we believe that our experimental design offers a new approach to the
study of the resource curse that can be used in a variety of settings. In particular, we
believe that it would be of great interest to study how politicians respond to information
about a natural resource rent, in terms of both their beliefs about future corruption and
their willingness to engage in corrupt behavior.
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Figures and tables
Figure 1: Research design
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Note: The figure illustrates the sequence of the survey.
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Table 1: Background characteristics by region for sample and census data
Total Non-gas region Gas regions
Sample Census Sample Census Sample Census
Median age 34 32 36
Higher education 0.26 0.19 0.53 0.34 0.13 0.10
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Male 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.53 53
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Self-employed 0.27 0.19 0.49 0.48 0.16 0.09
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Farmer 0.46 0.62 0.01 0.04 0.69 0.88
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Married 0.64 0.51 0.53 0.44 0.69 0.53
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 3004 1001 2003
Mean coefficients; standard error of the mean in parentheses
Sample definitions: “Median age” is the median age in the sample, “Higher
education” is an indicator taking a value of one if the respondent has completed
lower secondary school or a higher level of education, “Male” is an indicator
variable taking a value of one if the respondent is a male,, “Self-employed” is an
indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents who are employed are
self-employed in the non-agricultural sector, “Farmer” is an indicator variable
taking a value of one for respondents whose primary occupation is farmer, “Mar-
ried” is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the respondent is married
and zero otherwise. Census definitions: “Male” is the share of males in all
age groups, “Lower sec or more” is the share of the population above five years
of age who have completed lower secondary school or more, “Self-employed”
is the share of individuals who are 10 years or older and self-employed in the
non-agricultural sector, “Farmer” is the share of individuals 10 years or older
occupied in agriculture, “Married” is the share of individuals 15 years or older
who are married. The median age in Tanzania is 17.7 years.
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Table 2: Effect on expected future corruption of providing information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Non-gas region Gas regions
Gas info 0.077∗ 0.070∗ 0.086 0.057
(0.044) (0.041) (0.059) (0.056)
Above median age –0.024 0.020 –0.039
(0.037) (0.065) (0.045)
Higher education –0.021 –0.013 –0.016
(0.046) (0.061) (0.071)
Male 0.113∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.056) (0.043)
Self-employed 0.128∗ 0.094 0.176
(0.067) (0.078) (0.133)
Farmer 0.013 –0.090 0.036
(0.077) (0.247) (0.129)
Married –0.079∗∗ –0.076 –0.082∗
(0.038) (0.068) (0.048)
Gas regions –0.016
(0.075)
Enumerator FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2998 2984 995 1989
R2 0.010 0.180 0.201 0.175
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Dependent variable: “In the years to come, I expect the extent of cor-
rupt activities to: decrease a lot - decrease - stay the same - increase -
increase a lot”, standardization of five-point scale. Treatment variable &
background variables: “Gas info” is an indicator variable taking a value of
one for respondents who were exposed to gas information, “Male” is an
indicator variable taking a value of one if the respondent is a male, “Above
median age” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents
who are older than 34 years, “Higher education” is an indicator taking a
value of one if the respondent has completed lower secondary school or
a higher level of education, “Self-employed” is a dummy taking a value
of one for respondents who are self-employed in the non-agricultural sec-
tor (the reference category is a formal sector employee), “Farmer” is an
indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents who are farmers
(the reference category is formal sector employee), “Married” is an indica-
tor taking a value of one if the respondent is married and zero otherwise
and “Gas region” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respon-
dents residing in Mtwara and Lindi (where the reference category is Dar
es Salaam). Enumerator fixed effects (FE): indicator variables for each of
the 10 enumerators. See Table A.3 in Appendix A for separate regressions
for the Mtwara and Lindi regions. Six respondents refused to answer the
question about expected future corruption and, therefore, the number of
observations in column (1) in the table is 2998.
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Table 3: Effect on corruption norm of providing information
Survey Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Non-gas region Gas regions All Non-gas region Gas regions
Gas info –0.019 0.016 –0.043 –0.033 –0.049 –0.016
(0.037) (0.045) (0.053) (0.048) (0.070) (0.063)
Above median age 0.051 0.109∗∗ 0.032 –0.588∗∗∗ –0.431∗∗∗ –0.670∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.052) (0.043) (0.045) (0.076) (0.055)
Lower sec or more 0.061 0.053 0.057 0.011 0.028 –0.002
(0.041) (0.048) (0.070) (0.056) (0.069) (0.089)
Male –0.022 –0.024 –0.024 0.480∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.072) (0.055)
Self-employed –0.085 –0.069 –0.038 0.081 0.079 0.126
(0.053) (0.054) (0.118) (0.082) (0.095) (0.147)
Farmer –0.189∗∗∗ –0.492 –0.137 0.005 0.150 0.033
(0.065) (0.301) (0.115) (0.095) (0.231) (0.142)
Married 0.091∗∗ 0.005 0.112∗∗ 0.020 0.063 –0.040
(0.036) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.079) (0.060)
Gas regions 0.122∗∗ –0.140∗
(0.061) (0.082)
Enumerator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2984 994 1990 1469 479 990
R2 0.287 0.231 0.321 0.371 0.296 0.305
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Dependent variables: Survey = “People should never engage in corrupt activities: strongly disagree - agree -
neither nor - agree - strongly agree”, standardization of five-point scale and behavior = share of tails reported
in the coin flipping game (0, 1/6, 2/6, 3/6, 4/6, 5/6, or 1), standardized values. Treatment variable &
background variables: “Gas info” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents who were
exposed to gas information, “Male” is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the respondent is a male,
“Above median age” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents who are older than 34,
“Higher education” is an indicator taking a value of one if the respondent has completed lower secondary
school or a higher level of education, “Self-employed” is a dummy taking a value of one for respondents who
are self-employed in the non-agricultural sector (the reference category is a formal sector employee), “Farmer”
is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents who are farmers (the reference category is a
formal sector employee), “Married” is an indicator taking a value of one if the respondent is married and zero
otherwise and “Gas region” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents residing in Mtwara
and Lindi (the reference category is Dar es Salaam). Enumerator fixed effects (FE): indicator variables for
each of the 10 enumerators. See Table A.4 in Appendix A for separate regressions for the Mtwara and Lindi
regions.
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Table 4: Effect of providing gas information on perceived novelty of information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Non-gas region Gas regions
Gas info 0.049 0.028 0.224∗∗∗ –0.113∗
(0.046) (0.042) (0.056) (0.058)
Above median age –0.069∗ –0.165∗∗∗ –0.030
(0.037) (0.061) (0.045)
Higher education –0.437∗∗∗ –0.465∗∗∗ –0.430∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.055) (0.069)
Male –0.094∗∗∗ –0.040 –0.119∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.051) (0.042)
Self-employed 0.226∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗
(0.063) (0.072) (0.119)
Farmer 0.276∗∗∗ 0.235 0.318∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.217) (0.120)
Married –0.027 –0.028 –0.031
(0.038) (0.057) (0.049)
Gas regions 0.096
(0.068)
Enumerator FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3000 2986 995 1991
R2 0.014 0.189 0.359 0.142
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Dependent variable: “How much of this information was new to you? None of
it - almost none of it - some of it - almost all of it - all of it”, standardized five-
point scale. Treatment variable & background variables: “Gas info” is an indicator
variable taking a value of one for respondents who were exposed to gas informa-
tion, “Male” is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the respondent is
a male, “Above median age” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for
respondents who are older than 34, “Higher education” is an indicator taking a
value of one if the respondent has completed lower secondary school or a higher
level of education, “Self-employed” is a dummy taking a value of one for respon-
dents who are self-employed in the non-agricultural sector (the reference category
is a formal sector employee), “Farmer” is an indicator variable taking a value of
one for respondents who are farmers (the reference category is a formal sector
employee), “Married” is an indicator taking a value of one if the respondent is
married and zero otherwise and “Gas region” is an indicator variable taking a
value of one for respondents residing in Mtwara and Lindi (the reference category
is Dar es Salaam). Enumerator fixed effects (FE): indicator variables for each of
the 10 enumerators. For separate regressions for the Mtwara and Lindi regions,
see Table A.5 in Appendix A.
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Appendix A Additional figures and tables
Figure A.1: Selected regions
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Table A.1: Balance regressions
(1) (2) (3)
All Non-gas region Gas regions
Above median age 0.004 0.023 –0.005
(0.016) (0.034) (0.018)
Higher education –0.003 –0.011 0.006
(0.022) (0.033) (0.030)
Male 0.003 0.021 –0.002
(0.015) (0.030) (0.017)
Self-employed –0.014 0.002 –0.049
(0.034) (0.042) (0.057)
Farmer 0.033 –0.019 0.013
(0.037) (0.133) (0.054)
Married 0.025 0.048 0.013
(0.017) (0.034) (0.020)
Rural region –0.025
(0.039)
Enumerator FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2990 996 1994
R2 0.054 0.007 0.064
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
Notes: Regressions performed with “Gas info”, an indicator
variable taking a value of one for individuals who were exposed
to the gas information version of the video, as the dependent
variable. Background variables: “Male” is an indicator vari-
able taking a value of one if the respondent is a male, “Above
median age” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for
respondents who are older than 34, “Higher education” is an
indicator taking a value of one if the respondent has completed
lower secondary school or a higher level of education, “Self-
employed” is a dummy taking a value of one for respondents
who are self-employed in the non-agricultural sector (the ref-
erence category is a formal sector employee), “Farmer” is an
indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents who are
farmers (the reference category is a formal sector employee),
“Married” is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the
respondent is married and zero otherwise and “Gas region” is
an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents re-
siding in Mtwara and Lindi (the reference category is Dar es
Salaam). Enumerator fixed effects (FE): indicator variables for
each of the 10 enumerators.
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Table A.2: Observations by treatment
Treatment Frequency Per cent
No gas information 687 22.87
Yearly returns/per capita 714 23.77
Yearly return/population 671 22.34
Total value/per capita 519 17.28
Total value/population 413 13.75
Total 3004 100
Notes: The table illustrates the number of observa-
tions by treatment. The total/per capita and total
value/population treatments have fewer observations
because of challenges in undertaking the randomiza-
tion using the app.
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Table A.3: Effect on expected corruption of providing information with separate regres-
sions for Mtwara and Lindi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All Non-gas region Gas regions Mtwara Lindi
Gas info 0.077∗ 0.070∗ 0.086 0.057 –0.012 0.098
(0.044) (0.041) (0.059) (0.056) (0.086) (0.074)
Above median age –0.024 0.020 –0.039 –0.061 –0.031
(0.037) (0.065) (0.045) (0.064) (0.064)
Higher education –0.021 –0.013 –0.016 0.015 –0.035
(0.046) (0.061) (0.071) (0.108) (0.097)
Male 0.113∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.052 0.165∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.056) (0.043) (0.061) (0.061)
Self-employed 0.128∗ 0.094 0.176 0.131 0.213
(0.067) (0.078) (0.133) (0.189) (0.184)
Farmer 0.013 –0.090 0.036 0.012 0.062
(0.077) (0.247) (0.129) (0.188) (0.178)
Married –0.079∗∗ –0.076 –0.082∗ –0.045 –0.087
(0.038) (0.068) (0.048) (0.071) (0.067)
Rural region –0.016
(0.075)
Enumerator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2998 2984 995 1989 995 994
R2 0.010 0.180 0.201 0.175 0.184 0.180
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Dependent variable: “In the years to come, I expect the extent of corrupt activities to: decrease
a lot - decrease - stay the same - increase - increase a lot”, standardization of five-point scale.
Treatment variable, interaction & background variables: “Gas info” is an indicator variable
taking a value of one for respondents who were exposed to gas information, “Gas info x var” is
an interaction between “Gas info” and “Above median age” (H. age), “Lower sec or more” (H.
educ), “Male”, “Self-employed” (Self-empl) and “Farmer”, respectively, “Gas info (var)” is the
sum of estimated parameters for “Gas info” and the four respective indicator variables, “Male”
is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the respondent is a male, “Above median age”
is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents who are older than 34, “Lower sec
or more” is an indicator taking a value of one if the respondent has completed lower secondary
school or a higher level of education, “Self-employed” is a dummy taking a value of one for
respondents who are self-employed in the non-agricultural sector (the reference category is a
formal sector employee), “Farmer” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents
who are farmers (the reference category is a formal sector employee), “Married” is an indicator
taking a value of one if the respondent is married and zero otherwise and “Gas region” is
an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents residing in Mtwara and Lindi (the
reference category is Dar es Salaam). Enumerator fixed effects (FE): indicator variables for each
of the 10 enumerators.
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Table A.5: Effect of providing information on perceived novelty of information, with
separate regressions for Mtwara and Lindi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All Non-gas region Gas regions Mtwara Lindi
Gas info 0.049 0.028 0.224∗∗∗ –0.113∗ –0.119 –0.091
(0.046) (0.042) (0.056) (0.058) (0.092) (0.075)
Above median age –0.069∗ –0.165∗∗∗ –0.030 –0.018 –0.036
(0.037) (0.061) (0.045) (0.065) (0.062)
Higher education –0.437∗∗∗ –0.465∗∗∗ –0.430∗∗∗ –0.313∗∗∗ –0.527∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.055) (0.069) (0.113) (0.088)
Male –0.094∗∗∗ –0.040 –0.119∗∗∗ –0.143∗∗ –0.092
(0.034) (0.051) (0.042) (0.063) (0.058)
Self-employed 0.226∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗ 0.261 0.246
(0.063) (0.072) (0.119) (0.174) (0.171)
Farmer 0.276∗∗∗ 0.235 0.318∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗ 0.307∗
(0.075) (0.217) (0.120) (0.176) (0.172)
Married –0.027 –0.028 –0.031 –0.044 –0.031
(0.038) (0.057) (0.049) (0.075) (0.066)
Gas regions 0.096
(0.068)
Enumerator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3000 2986 995 1991 995 996
R2 0.014 0.189 0.359 0.142 0.132 0.171
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Dependent variable: “How much of this information was new to you? None of it - almost none of it -
some of it - almost all of it - all of it”, standardized five-point scale. Treatment variable, interaction
& background variables: “Gas info” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents
who were exposed to gas information, “Gas info x var” is an interaction between “Gas info” and
“Above median age” (H. age), “Lower sec or more” (H. educ), “Male”, “Self-employed” (Self-empl)
and “Farmer”, respectively, “Gas info (var)” is the sum of estimated parameters for “Gas info”
and the four respective indicator variables, “Male” is an indicator variable taking a value of one
if the respondent is a male, “Above median age” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for
respondents who are older than 34, “Lower sec or more” is an indicator taking a value of one if the
respondent has completed lower secondary school or a higher level of education, “Self-employed”
is a dummy taking a value of one for respondents who are self-employed in the non-agricultural
sector (the reference category is a formal sector employee), “Farmer” is an indicator variable taking
a value of one for respondents who are farmers (the reference category is a formal sector employee),
“Married” is an indicator taking a value of one if the respondent is married and zero otherwise and
“Gas region” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents residing in Mtwara and
Lindi (the reference category is Dar es Salaam). Enumerator fixed effects (FE): indicator variables
for each of the 10 enumerators.
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Table A.8: Effect on expected corruption of providing information, robustness check
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Non-gas regions Gas regions
Yearly returns/per capita 0.097∗ 0.097∗ 0.105 0.092
(0.055) (0.051) (0.082) (0.066)
Yearly return/population 0.026 0.018 0.067 –0.009
(0.056) (0.051) (0.080) (0.068)
Total value/per capita 0.035 0.034 0.024 0.030
(0.058) (0.053) (0.084) (0.070)
Total value/population 0.166∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.140∗ 0.139∗
(0.062) (0.057) (0.083) (0.079)
Above median age –0.024 0.018 –0.038
(0.037) (0.065) (0.045)
Lower sec or more –0.024 –0.017 –0.016
(0.046) (0.061) (0.071)
Male 0.114∗∗∗ 0.107∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.056) (0.043)
Self-employed 0.129∗ 0.096 0.178
(0.067) (0.078) (0.134)
Farmer 0.013 –0.086 0.036
(0.077) (0.247) (0.131)
Married –0.081∗∗ –0.081 –0.083∗
(0.038) (0.068) (0.048)
Rural region –0.011
(0.076)
p-value, F-test 0.101 0.105 0.630 0.161
Observations 2998 2984 995 1989
R2 0.012 0.182 0.202 0.177
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Dependent variable: “In the years to come, I expect the extent of corrupt activities
to: decrease a lot - decrease - stay the same - increase - increase a lot”, standard-
ization of five-point scale. Treatment variables: “Annual returns/per capita” is an
indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents exposed to the annual re-
turns/per capita formulation, “Annual returns/population” is an indicator variable
taking a value of one for respondents exposed to the annual returns/population
formulation, “Total value/per capita” is an indicator variable taking a value of
one for respondents exposed to the total value/per capita formulation, “Total
value/population” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents
exposed to the total value/population formulation.Background variables: “Male”
is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the respondent is a male, “Above
median age” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents who are
older than 34, “Lower sec or more” is an indicator taking a value of one if the
respondent has completed lower secondary school or a higher level of education,
“Self-employed” is a dummy taking a value of one for respondents who are self-
employed in the non-agricultural sector (the reference category is a formal sector
employee), “Farmer” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents
who are farmers (the reference category is a formal sector employee), “Married” is
an indicator taking a value of one if the respondent is married and zero otherwise
and “Gas regions” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents re-
siding in Mtwara and Lindi (the reference category is Dar es Salaam). Enumerator
fixed effects (FE): indicator variables for each of the 10 enumerators.
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Table A.9: Effect on corruption norm of providing information, robustness check
Survey Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Non-gas region Gas region All Non-gas region Gas region
Yearly returns/per capita –0.047 –0.015 –0.075 –0.004 0.025 –0.007
(0.047) (0.065) (0.063) (0.062) (0.096) (0.079)
Yearly return/population –0.018 0.002 –0.037 –0.086 –0.054 –0.087
(0.047) (0.059) (0.066) (0.063) (0.092) (0.081)
Total value/per capita –0.003 0.039 –0.025 –0.058 –0.093 –0.033
(0.050) (0.066) (0.068) (0.066) (0.104) (0.086)
Total value/population 0.002 0.050 –0.020 0.027 –0.094 0.109
(0.049) (0.059) (0.070) (0.067) (0.091) (0.092)
Above median age 0.053 0.112∗∗ 0.033 –0.589∗∗∗ –0.435∗∗∗ –0.670∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.052) (0.043) (0.045) (0.076) (0.055)
Lower sec or more 0.061 0.053 0.056 0.008 0.022 –0.004
(0.041) (0.048) (0.070) (0.056) (0.068) (0.089)
Male –0.022 –0.024 –0.024 0.480∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.072) (0.055)
Self-employed –0.087 –0.072 –0.039 0.081 0.081 0.123
(0.053) (0.055) (0.119) (0.083) (0.096) (0.147)
Farmer –0.191∗∗∗ –0.500∗ –0.139 0.002 0.159 0.025
(0.065) (0.303) (0.116) (0.095) (0.225) (0.142)
Married 0.091∗∗ 0.004 0.111∗∗ 0.018 0.059 –0.044
(0.036) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.078) (0.061)
Rural region 0.122∗∗ –0.135∗
(0.061) (0.082)
p-value, F-test 0.777 0.756 0.815 0.359 0.697 0.221
Observations 2984 994 1990 1469 479 990
R2 0.288 0.232 0.321 0.373 0.298 0.308
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Dependent variables: Survey = “People should never engage in corrupt activities: strongly disagree - agree - neither
nor - agree - strongly agree”, standardization of five-point scale, and behavior = share of tails reported in the coin
flipping game (0, 1/6, 2/6, 3/6, 4/6, 5/6, or 1), standardized values. Treatment variables: “Annual returns/per
capita” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents exposed to the annual returns/per capita
formulation, “Annual returns/population” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents exposed to
the annual returns/population formulation, “Total value/per capita” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for
respondents exposed to the total value/per capita formulation, “Total value/population” is an indicator variable
taking a value of one for respondents exposed to the total value/population formulation.Background variables:
“Male” is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the respondent is a male, “Above median age” is an
indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents who are older than 34, “Lower sec or more” is an indicator
taking a value of one if the respondent has completed lower secondary school or a higher level of education, “Self-
employed” is a dummy taking a value of one for respondents who are self-employed in the non-agricultural sector
(the reference category is a formal sector employee), “Farmer” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for
respondents who are farmers (the reference category is a formal sector employee), “Married” is an indicator taking
a value of one if the respondent is married and zero otherwise and “Gas regions” is an indicator variable taking a
value of one for respondents residing in Mtwara and Lindi (the reference category is Dar es Salaam). Enumerator
fixed effects (FE): indicator variables for each of the 10 enumerators.
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Table A.10: Effect on perceived novelty of providing information, robustness check
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All Non-gas region Gas regions
Yearly returns/per capita 0.049 0.050 0.257∗∗∗ –0.094
(0.056) (0.051) (0.076) (0.068)
Yearly return/population 0.128∗∗ 0.073 0.260∗∗∗ –0.064
(0.056) (0.052) (0.071) (0.070)
Total value/per capita 0.011 –0.020 0.181∗∗ –0.163∗∗
(0.061) (0.055) (0.080) (0.072)
Total value/population –0.022 –0.013 0.178∗∗ –0.156∗∗
(0.064) (0.056) (0.076) (0.079)
Above median age –0.071∗ –0.169∗∗∗ –0.032
(0.037) (0.061) (0.045)
Lower sec or more –0.435∗∗∗ –0.465∗∗∗ –0.426∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.055) (0.069)
Male –0.095∗∗∗ –0.038 –0.121∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.052) (0.042)
Self-employed 0.231∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗
(0.063) (0.073) (0.119)
Farmer 0.283∗∗∗ 0.246 0.326∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.217) (0.120)
Married –0.026 –0.026 –0.029
(0.038) (0.058) (0.049)
Rural region 0.095
(0.068)
Enumerator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-value, F-test 0.068 0.233 0.626 0.390
Observations 3000 2986 995 1991
R2 0.016 0.190 0.360 0.144
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Dependent variable: How much of this information was new to you? None of it - al-
most none of it - some of it - almost all of it - all of it”, standardized five-point scale.
Treatment variables: “Annual returns/per capita” is an indicator variable taking a
value of one for respondents exposed to the annual returns/per capita formulation,
“Annual returns/population” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for re-
spondents exposed to the annual returns/population formulation, “Total value/per
capita” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respondents exposed to the
total value/per capita formulation, “Total value/population” is an indicator vari-
able taking a value of one for respondents exposed to the total value/population
formulation. Background variables: “Male” is an indicator variable taking a value
of one if the respondent is a male, “Above median age” is an indicator variable
taking a value of one for respondents who are older than 34, “Lower sec or more” is
an indicator taking a value of one if the respondent has completed lower secondary
school or a higher level of education, “Self-employed” is a dummy taking a value
of one for respondents who are self-employed in the non-agricultural sector (the
reference category is a formal sector employee), “Farmer” is an indicator variable
taking a value of one for respondents who are farmers (the reference category is
a formal sector employee), “Married” is an indicator taking a value of one if the
respondent is married and zero otherwise and “Gas regions” is an indicator variable
taking a value of one for respondents residing in Mtwara and Lindi (the reference
category is Dar es Salaam). Enumerator fixed effects (FE): indicator variables for
each of the 10 enumerators.
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Table A.11: Effect on corruption beliefs of providing information
(1) (2) (3)
All Non-gas regions Gas regions
Gas info 0.008 0.007 0.000
(0.034) (0.052) (0.044)
Above median age –0.081∗∗∗ –0.002 –0.113∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.061) (0.034)
Lower sec or more 0.005 –0.007 –0.011
(0.039) (0.056) (0.057)
Male –0.035 0.110∗∗ –0.101∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.049) (0.033)
Self-employed 0.055 0.064 –0.022
(0.056) (0.064) (0.114)
Farmer 0.057 –0.047 0.021
(0.062) (0.140) (0.108)
Married –0.040 –0.020 –0.040
(0.031) (0.059) (0.038)
Rural region 0.062
(0.054)
Observations 2981 993 1988
R2 0.477 0.514 0.473
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Dependent variable: “I believe that my fellow citizens would en-
gage in corrupt activities if they could benefit from it: strongly
disagree - agree - neither nor - agree - strongly agree”, standard-
ization of five-point scale. Treatment variable & background vari-
ables: “Gas info” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for
respondents who were exposed to gas information, “Male” is an
indicator variable taking a value of one if the respondent is a male,
“Above median age” is an indicator variable taking a value of one
for respondents who are older than 34, “Higher education” is an in-
dicator taking a value of one if the respondent has completed lower
secondary school or a higher level of education, “Self-employed” is a
dummy taking a value of one for respondents who are self-employed
in the non-agricultural sector (the reference category is a formal
sector employee), “Farmer” is an indicator variable taking a value
of one for respondents who are farmers (the reference category is a
formal sector employee), “Married” is an indicator taking a value
of one if the respondent is married and zero otherwise and “Gas
region” is an indicator variable taking a value of one for respon-
dents residing in Mtwara and Lindi (the reference category is Dar
es Salaam). Enumerator fixed effects(FE): indicator variables for
each of the 10 enumerators.
101
T
ab
le
A
.1
2:
H
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
in
eff
ec
t
of
ga
s
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
co
rr
u
p
ti
on
b
el
ie
fs
,
fo
r
n
on
-g
as
an
d
ga
s
re
gi
on
s
N
o
n
-g
a
s
re
g
io
n
G
as
re
g
io
n
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
H
.
ag
e
H
.
ed
u
c
M
a
le
S
el
f-
em
p
l
F
a
rm
er
H
.
a
g
e
H
.
ed
u
c
M
a
le
S
el
f-
em
p
l
F
a
rm
er
G
as
in
fo
0.
03
6
–0
.0
14
0
.0
9
5
–
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
1
5
–
0
.0
1
1
–
0
.1
2
5
∗∗
–
0
.0
3
1
0
.1
3
3∗
∗
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.0
6
9
)
(0
.0
7
3
)
(0
.0
5
2
)
(0
.0
6
4
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
6
2
)
(0
.0
5
1
)
(0
.0
6
3
)
va
r
0.
05
6
–0
.0
35
0
.2
3
6∗
∗∗
0
.0
5
4
–
0
.3
7
8∗
–
0
.0
9
1
–
0
.0
6
3
–
0
.2
9
4
∗∗
∗
–
0
.1
2
8
0
.2
0
2
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.0
94
)
(0
.0
8
9
)
(0
.0
9
6
)
(0
.1
9
8
)
(0
.0
7
6
)
(0
.1
0
3
)
(0
.0
7
5
)
(0
.1
2
8
)
(0
.1
2
7
)
G
as
in
fo
x
va
r
–0
.0
81
0.
03
9
–
0
.1
8
1
∗
0
.0
1
5
0
.4
7
8
∗∗
–
0
.0
2
7
0
.0
6
8
0
.2
3
9
∗∗
∗
0
.1
4
6
–
0
.2
2
4∗
∗∗
(0
.1
05
)
(0
.1
04
)
(0
.1
0
4
)
(0
.1
0
3
)
(0
.2
3
2
)
(0
.0
8
4
)
(0
.1
1
7
)
(0
.0
8
3
)
(0
.0
9
8
)
(0
.0
8
5
)
G
as
in
fo
(v
ar
)
–0
.0
44
0.
02
5
–
0
.0
8
6
0
.0
1
5
0
.4
7
9
∗∗
–
0
.0
1
2
0
.0
5
7
0
.1
1
4
∗
0
.1
1
5
–
0
.0
9
1
(0
.0
81
)
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.0
7
7
)
(0
.0
7
3
)
(0
.2
2
6
)
(0
.0
5
9
)
(0
.1
0
8
)
(0
.0
5
9
)
(0
.0
8
4
)
(0
.0
5
9
)
E
n
u
m
er
at
or
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
B
ac
k
gr
ou
n
d
va
ri
ab
le
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
99
3
99
3
9
9
3
9
9
3
9
9
3
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
8
19
8
8
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
8
R
2
0.
51
4
0.
51
4
0
.5
1
5
0
.5
1
4
0
.5
1
4
0
.4
7
3
0
.4
7
3
0
.4
7
5
0
.4
7
3
0
.4
7
5
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
,
∗
p
<
0.
10
,
∗∗
p
<
0.
05
,
∗∗
∗
p
<
0.
01
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
bl
e:
“I
b
el
ie
v
e
th
at
m
y
fe
ll
ow
ci
ti
ze
n
s
w
o
u
ld
en
g
a
g
e
in
co
rr
u
p
t
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s
if
th
ey
co
u
ld
b
en
efi
t
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
a
ll
y
fr
o
m
it
:
st
ro
n
gl
y
d
is
ag
re
e
-
a
gr
ee
-
n
ei
th
er
n
or
-
ag
re
e
-
st
ro
n
g
ly
a
g
re
e”
,
st
a
n
d
a
rd
iz
a
ti
o
n
o
f
fi
ve
-p
o
in
t
sc
a
le
.
T
re
a
tm
en
t
va
ri
a
bl
e,
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
&
ba
ck
gr
o
u
n
d
va
ri
a
bl
es
:
“G
as
in
fo
”
is
an
in
d
ic
at
o
r
va
ri
a
b
le
ta
k
in
g
a
va
lu
e
o
f
o
n
e
fo
r
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
w
h
o
w
er
e
ex
p
o
se
d
to
g
a
s
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
,
“G
as
in
fo
x
va
r”
is
an
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
b
et
w
ee
n
“
G
a
s
in
fo
”
a
n
d
“
A
b
ov
e
m
ed
ia
n
a
g
e”
(H
.
a
g
e)
,
“
L
ow
er
se
c
o
r
m
o
re
”
(H
.
ed
u
c)
,
“
M
a
le
”
,
“S
el
f-
em
p
lo
ye
d
”
(S
el
f-
em
p
l)
an
d
“F
ar
m
er
”,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
,
“
G
a
s
in
fo
(v
a
r)
”
is
th
e
su
m
o
f
es
ti
m
a
te
d
p
a
ra
m
et
er
s
fo
r
“
G
a
s
in
fo
”
a
n
d
th
e
fo
u
r
re
sp
ec
ti
v
e
in
d
ic
at
or
va
ri
ab
le
s,
“M
al
e”
is
a
n
in
d
ic
a
to
r
va
ri
a
b
le
ta
k
in
g
a
va
lu
e
o
f
o
n
e
if
th
e
re
sp
o
n
d
en
t
is
a
m
a
le
,
“
A
b
ov
e
m
ed
ia
n
ag
e”
is
an
in
d
ic
at
or
va
ri
ab
le
ta
k
in
g
a
va
lu
e
of
o
n
e
fo
r
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
w
h
o
a
re
o
ld
er
th
a
n
3
4
,
“
H
ig
h
er
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
”
is
a
n
in
d
ic
a
to
r
va
ri
a
b
le
ta
k
in
g
a
va
lu
e
of
on
e
fo
r
re
sp
on
d
en
ts
w
h
o
h
av
e
co
m
p
le
te
d
lo
w
er
se
co
n
d
a
ry
sc
h
o
o
li
n
g
o
r
m
o
re
,
“
S
el
f-
em
p
lo
ye
d
”
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
ta
k
in
g
a
va
lu
e
of
on
e
fo
r
re
sp
on
d
en
ts
w
h
o
ar
e
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
ye
d
in
th
e
n
o
n
-a
g
ri
cu
lt
u
ra
l
se
ct
o
r
(t
h
e
re
fe
re
n
ce
ca
te
g
o
ry
is
a
fo
rm
a
l
se
ct
o
r
em
p
lo
ye
e)
,
“F
ar
m
er
”
is
an
in
d
ic
at
o
r
va
ri
ab
le
ta
k
in
g
a
va
lu
e
o
f
o
n
e
fo
r
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
w
h
o
a
re
fa
rm
er
s
(t
h
e
re
fe
re
n
ce
ca
te
g
o
ry
is
a
fo
rm
a
l
se
ct
o
r
em
p
lo
ye
e)
,
“M
ar
ri
ed
”
is
an
in
d
ic
at
or
ta
k
in
g
a
va
lu
e
o
f
o
n
e
if
th
e
re
sp
o
n
d
en
t
is
m
a
rr
ie
d
a
n
d
ze
ro
o
th
er
w
is
e
a
n
d
“
G
a
s
re
g
io
n
”
is
a
n
in
d
ic
at
or
va
ri
ab
le
ta
k
in
g
a
va
lu
e
of
on
e
fo
r
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
re
si
d
in
g
in
M
tw
a
ra
a
n
d
L
in
d
i
(t
h
e
re
fe
re
n
ce
ca
te
g
o
ry
is
D
a
r
es
S
a
la
a
m
).
E
n
u
m
er
a
to
r
fi
xe
d
eff
ec
ts
(F
E
):
in
d
ic
at
or
va
ri
a
b
le
s
fo
r
ea
ch
o
f
th
e
1
0
en
u
m
er
a
to
rs
.
102
Appendix B Supplementary materials
B.1 Survey
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Good day. My name is NN and I am from REPOA, an independent research organisation 
based in Dar es Salaam. I do not represent the government or any political party. We are 
studying the views of citizens in Tanzania. We would like to discuss these issues with a 
member of your household. The information obtained here will be treated strictly 
confidentially. The answers to these questions will be an important input when it comes to 
prescribing policies to improve the system. 
 
First, we want to know a little bit about you. 
 
Q1.3 What is your marital status? 
 Married  
 Widow/Widower  
 Unmarried  
 Divorced  
 
Q1.4 How old are you? 
 
Q1.5. What is your “home” region/region of origin?  
 
Q1.6 To which region do you go most frequently to visit relatives?  
 
Q1.7 What is the highest level of schooling you have completed? 
 No formal schooling  
 Some primary school  
 Primary school completed  
 Lower secondary (form 1-4)  
 College (after lower secondary) 
 Upper secondary (form 5-6)  
 College (after upper secondary)  
 Vocational/adult education classes  
 Some university or university completed  
 Don't know 
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 Q1.8 What is your main occupation? 
 Central government employee  
 Local government employee  
 Private company employee, international company  
 Private company employee, domestic company  
 Self-employed (non-agriculture)  
 Employed in NGO/CSO  
 Unemployed  
 Farmer  
 Student 
 Retired 
 Don't know  
 Other (specify in English) ____________________ 
 
 
[App randomizes respondent to gas info or non-gas info version of video] 
 
I will now show you a video with some information about Tanzania on my tablet.      The video 
has both pictures and sound. When the video starts playing, please let me know if you have 
problems seeing the pictures or hear the sound.     [Hand tablet and headset to respondent 
and help with adjustment of headset]. Press play when you are ready. Please pay careful 
attention. 
 
Thank you watching the video.  Let us now continue with the rest of the questions. 
 
Q2.3 Did you find the estimated gas revenues larger than expected? (Only gas information 
group) 
 Yes 
 No  
 
Q7.1 How much of this information was new to you? 
 All of it  
 Almost all of it  
 Some of it  
 Almost none of it  
 None of it  
 
Q8.1 For each of the following statements, please complete / whether you agree or disagree. 
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Q8.2 In order for Tanzania to achieve social and economic development in the years to come, 
the taxes paid by ordinary Tanzanians should 
 Decrease a lot  
 Decrease  
 Stay the same  
 Increase  
 Increase a lot  
 
Q8.3 If a political party advocates an increase in taxes paid by ordinary Tanzanian citizens my 
support for that party will 
 Decrease a lot  
 Decrease  
 Stay the same  
 Increase  
 Increase a lot  
 
Q8.4 In the years to come, I expect the provision of public services, such as schooling, health 
services and roads to 
 Worsen a lot  
 Worsen  
 Stay the same  
 Improve  
 Improve a lot  
 
Q8.5 Difference in income between rich and poor in Tanzania should 
 Decrease a lot  
 Decrease  
 Stay the same  
 Increase  
 Increase a lot  
 
Q8.6 If a political party advocates a reduction in differences in income between rich and poor 
my support for that party will 
 Decrease a lot  
 Decrease  
 Stay the same  
 Increase  
 Increase a lot  
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Q8.7 In the years to come, I expect differences in income between rich and poor to 
 Decrease a lot  
 Decrease  
 Stay the same  
 Increase  
 Increase a lot 
 
Q8.8 In the years to come, I trust the government to do what is right for Tanzania 
 Strongly disagree  
 Disagree  
 Neither Agree nor Disagree  
 Agree  
 Strongly Agree  
 
Q8.9 Generally, I trust my fellow citizens 
 Strongly disagree 
 Disagree  
 Neither Agree nor Disagree  
 Agree  
 Strongly Agree  
 
Q8.10 The well-being of my fellow citizens is important to me 
 Strongly disagree  
 Disagree  
 Neither Agree or Disagree  
 Agree  
 Strongly agree  
 
Q8.11 The well-beeing of future generations is important to me 
 Strongly disagree 
 Disagree  
 Neither Agree nor Disagree  
 Agree  
 Strongly Agree  
 
Q8.12 People should never engage in corrupt activities 
 Strongly disagree  
 Disagree  
 Neither Agree nor Disagree  
 Agree  
 Strongly Agree  
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Q8.13 I believe that my fellow citizens would engage in corrupt activities if they could benefit 
economically from it 
 Strongly disagree  
 Disagree  
 Neither Agree nor Disagree  
 Agree  
 Strongly Agree  
 
Q8.14 In the years to come, I expect the extent of corrupt activities to 
 Decrease a lot  
 Decrease  
 Stay the same  
 Increase  
 Increase a lot  
 
[App randomizes respondent to play trust OR cheating game] 
 
Trust game 
As part of this research project, we also study how Tanzanians make economic choices. We 
will therefore ask you to make an economic choice that has real consequences. In this part of 
the study, you will be paired with a randomly selected Tanzanian citizen. We have already 
asked this Tanzanian citizen what he or she would do in the situation we are now going to 
present to you and we have pre-registered his or her response. As we told this person, we will 
use his or her response to determine the payment to a number of the people we interview, but 
in the following instructions we simplify the presentation and only describe how this will work 
for you. 
 
The money paid to you in this part of the study is determined by your decsions and comes 
without any obligations or conditions. The sole purpose of the payments is to study economic 
decisions.  
 
I will now give you Tsh 5000. [Give the respondent Tsh 5000 in Tsh 500 notes]. You can 
choose between keeping the entire amount to yourself, sending the whole amount to the 
random Tanzanian citizen, or spilt the amount between the two of you in any way that you 
want (in portions of Tsh 500). If you choose to send any money to the Tanzanian citizen, the 
amount you send will be tripled in size, meaning that for every Tsh 1000 you send, your 
Tanzanian citizen will receive Tsh 3000.  
 
Just to make sure that you have understood the task, I will ask you two questions. 
 
Q58 If you send Tsh 2000 to the randomly selected Tanzanian, how much will he or she 
receive? 
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[If respondent answers Tsh 6000, please proceed to the next question]. 
 
If respondent answers anything else than Tsh 6000, please say the following:  
 
Your answer is not correct. I will explain one more time. The amount you send will be tripled 
in size, meaning that for every Tsh 1000 you send to your Tanzanian citizen, he or she will 
receive Tsh 3000. I will ask the question once again. If you send Tsh 2000 to the randomly 
selected Tanzanian you have been paired with, how much will he or she receive?  Repeat this 
until the respondent answer correctly, Tsh 6000. Then proceed to the second question] 
 
That is correct. Let me ask you the question in a different way.  
 
For every Tsh 1000 you send to the randomly selected Tanzanian, how much will he or she 
receive? 
 
[If the respondent answers Tsh 3000, please proceed to the allocation decision] 
 
[If respondent answers anything else than Tsh 3000, say the following: Your answer is not 
correct. I will explain one more time. The amount you send will be tripled in size, meaning 
that for every Tsh 1000 you send, your Tanzanian citizen will receive Tsh 3000. I will ask the 
question once again. For every Tsh 1000 you send to the randomly selected Tanzanian you 
have been paired with, how much will he or she receive? Repeat this until the respondent 
answer correctly, Tsh 3000. Then proceed to the allocation decision]  
 
Q60 I would now like you to tell me how much, if anything, you would like to send to your 
Tanzanian citizen. Please take this amount from the Tsh 5000 and give it to me. 
 
[Respondent hands money over to you. Write down the amount given to you and check the 
payment table to determine the amount you should give to the respondent] 
 
Thank you for your decision. The randomly selected Tanzanian citizen has told us that if 
receiving this amount of money, he or she returns Tsh XXX back to you. 
 
[Hand Tsh XXX to the respondent and note down the amount in the box below. Amount sent 
and sent back should also be noted down on your separate payment sheet] 
 
Cheating game 
As part of this research project, we also study some economic situations that have real 
consequences. I now invite you to perform a task. First, I will demonstrate what I want you to 
do. 
 
[Show respondent a Tsh 200 coin] 
 
This coin has two sides. One with the picture of KARUME and one with the picture of a 
LION. I would like you to flip the coin like this 
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 [Flip the coin, grab it and put it on top of your wrist. Holding the other hand on top of the 
coin. Then lift your upper hand to look at which side of the coin is up, but make sure that the 
coin is only visible to you, and not to the respondent] and to repeat this 6 times. I will ask you 
to do the flipping of the coin in privacy, and then come back and report the number of times 
the LION side was up. When you have completed the task, I will pay you Tsh 1000 for each 
LION.  
 
The money paid to you in this part of the study is determined by the way you toss the coin and 
comes without any obligations or conditions. The sole purpose of the payments is to study 
economic situations.  
 
Just to make sure that the task is understood, I will ask you two questions: 
 
Q63 If you get LION 5 times, how much will I pay you?  
 
[If respondent answers Tsh 5000, proceed to second question.] 
 
[If respondent answers anything else than Tsh 5000, say the following: 
 
Your answer is not correct. Let me explain again. For every LION you get, I will pay you 
1000 Tsh. Let me ask the question again. If you get LION 5 times, how much will I pay you? 
Repeat this until the respondent answer correctly, Tsh 5000. Then proceed to the second 
question]  
 
Q64 That is correct. Let me ask you in a different way.  How much will I pay you for each 
LION?  
 
[If respondent answers Tsh 1000, proceed to second demonstration.] 
 
[If respondent answers anything else than Tsh 1000, say the following: 
Your answer is not correct. Let me explain again. For every LION you get, I will pay you 
1000]  
 
[Proceed to second demonstration] 
 
 
I will demonstrate once more before you can proceed to flip the coin. 
 
[Repeat demonstration of coin flipping, and hand the coin over to the respondent] 
 
Please flip the coin 6 times and count how many times the LIONS side is up. You will do the 
coin flips in privacy. Please step away while you complete the task and return to me when you 
are done. 
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 [Wait for the respondent to complete and call him/her back] 
 
Q66 Thank you for completing this task for me. How many LIONS did you get? 
 
[Note down the number of LIONS in the box below. Also note the amount paid to the 
respondent on the separate payment sheet. Complete the survey by saying:] 
 
All participants 
This was the final part of the interview. Thank you for completing this task for me and for 
answering my questions. Your input is of great value to our research!  
 
[Fill in the next section after the interview has been completed] 
 
Q9.2 Gender of respondent 
 Man  
 Woman 
 
Q9.3 District 
1. Ilala (Dar es Salaam) (1) 
2. Temeke (Dar es Salaam) (2) 
3. Kiniodoni (Dar es Salaam) (3) 
4. Lindi (Lindi) (4) 
5. Lindi Manispaa (Lindi) (5) 
6. Nachingwea (Lindi) (7) 
7. Masasi Vijijini (Mtwara) (10) 
8. Mtwara Manispaa (Mtwara) (12) 
9. Newala (Mtwara) (15) 
 
Q9.4 County/ward (specify) 
 
Q9.5 Local / Village (specify) 
 
Q10.1 Name of interviewer 
 
Q10.2 Age of interviewer 
 
Q10.3 Sex of interviewer 
 Man  
 Woman  
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B.2 Videos
Figure B.1: Slide 1 of video, general information (all respondents)
Note: The figure illustrates the first slide in the general information part of the video. The text (and
sound) translates to: “This video will give you some information about Tanzania”.
Figure B.2: Slide 2 of video, general information (all respondents)
Note: The figure illustrates the second slide in the general information part of the video. The text (and
sound) translates to: “Tanzania has a population of 49 million”.
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Figure B.3: Slide 3 of video, general information (all respondents)
Note: The figure illustrates the third slide in the general information part of the video. The text (and
sound) translates to: “Tanzania is divided into 30 regions”.
Figure B.4: Slide 4 of video, general information (all respondents)
Note: The figure illustrates the fourth slide in the general information part of the video. The text (and
sound) translates to: “Total revenue for all Tanzanians was estimated to be 81 trillion Tanzania shillings
in 2013”.
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Figure B.5: Slide 5 of video, gas information (gas information group only, all formulations)
Note: The figure illustrates the first slide in the gas information part of the video. The text (and sound)
translates to: “Since the year 2010, natural gas has been discovered in the ocean offshore of the Tanzania
coast”.
Figure B.6: Slide 6 of video, gas information (gas information group only, all formulations)
Note: The figure illustrates the second slide in the gas information part of the video. The text (and
sound) translates to: “This gas can be sold and yield Tanzania a total revenue of TZS 106 trillion”.
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Figure B.7: Slide 7 of video, gas information (Total value/per capita, yearly return/per
capita and yearly return/population formulations)
Note: The figure illustrates the second slide in the gas information part of the video. The text (and
sound) translates to: “Now, let us look at this revenue in a different way”.
Figure B.8: Slide 8 of video, gas information, total value/per capita formulation
Note: The figure illustrates the first slide in the total value/per capita formulation version of the gas
information. The text (and sound) translates to: “The expected revenue amounts to TZS 2.4 million
per Tanzanian (considering the population today)”.
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Figure B.9: Slide 9 of video, gas information, total value/per capita formulation
Note: The figure illustrates the second slide in the total value/per capita formulation version of the gas
information. The text (and sound) translates to: “The extraction of natural gas can yield Tanzania a
revenue equal to TZS 2.4 million to each Tanzanian”.
Figure B.10: Slide 8 of video, gas information, yearly return/population formulation
Note: The figure illustrates the first slide in the yearly return/population formulation version of the gas
information. The text (and sound) translates to: “If we, as a nation, take the revenues expected from
the sale of natural gas; and deposit them at an interest rate of 4%, the interest obtained will amount to
TZS 4.3 trillion each year for the present and future generations”.
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Figure B.11: Slide 9 of video, gas information, yearly return/population formulation
Note: The figure illustrates the second slide in the yearly return/population formulation version of the
gas information. The text (and sound) translates to: “The extraction of natural gas can yield Tanzania
revenue equal to TZS 4.3 trillion each year, forever”.
Figure B.12: Slide 8 of video, gas information, yearly return/per capita formulation
Note: The figure illustrates the first slide in the yearly return/population formulation version of the gas
information. The text (and sound) translates to: “If we take these revenues expected from the sale of
natural gas; and deposit them at an interest rate of 4%, the interest obtained will amount to TZS 95,000
for each Tanzanian each year for the present and future generations, considering the present population”.
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Figure B.13: Slide 9 of video, gas information, yearly return/per capita formulation
Note: The figure illustrates the second slide in the yearly return/population formulation version of the
gas information. The text (and sound) translates to: “The extraction of natural gas can give Tanzania
the revenue equal to TZS 95,000 for each Tanzanian, each year for ever”.
Figure B.14: Last slide of video (all respondents)
Note: The figure illustrates the last slides of all videos. The text (and sound) translates to: “Thank you
for listening carefully, we would now like to ask you some questions” .
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Accountability and taxation:
Experimental evidence∗
Ingrid Hoem Sjursen†
Abstract
The Rentier State Hypothesis states that taxation promotes government ac-
countability. The argument is that citizens demand more accountability for spend-
ing of tax revenue than for spending of windfall revenue (e.g., natural resource
revenue). This paper presents evidence from a between-subject experiment that
tests the effect of taxation on demand for accountability and the underlying mech-
anisms explaining this effect. The design focuses on two main features that dis-
tinguish tax from windfall revenue: Tax revenue is produced by citizens’ work and
has been in their possession before being collected as tax. These features are theo-
rized to increase the salience of fairness considerations in public service provision,
and this increased salience of fairness is in turn hypothesized to increase demand
for accountability. The main finding is that taxation causes a higher demand for
accountability when both features of taxation are present. This result is evidence
in support of the Rentier State Hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
Corruption and mismanagement of public revenue are a widespread and serious obstacle
to social and economic development in many poor countries (Ferraz and Finan, 2011;
Lederman et al., 2005; UNDP, 2008). The so called Rentier State Hypothesis, coined
by Borge et al. (2015), states that when governments are financed through taxation, as
opposed to through windfalls such as natural resources revenue or aid, citizens demand
more accountability in government spending. This, in turn, is argued to make politicians
more accountable to citizens’ demands (Borge et al., 2015; Bra¨utigam et al., 2008; Karl,
2007; Mahdavy, 1970; Paler, 2013; Ross, 2001). Thus, the Rentier State Hypothesis
suggests that financing public revenue through taxing citizens may promote political
accountability and development.
Despite the popularity of the Rentier State Hypothesis, we lack causal evidence for
the positive effect of taxation on accountability, and for the underlying mechanisms ex-
plaining this relationship. The focus of this paper is on the first part of the Rentier State
Hypothesis: The effect of taxation on citizens’ demand for accountability.1 Account-
ability can be defined as “The quality of being accountable; liability to account for and
answer for one’s conduct, performance of duties, etc. (...); responsibility.”(OED, 2017).
Demand for accountability is typically thought to consist of willingness to i) monitor the
behavior of the government and ii) impose a cost on the government when its behavior is
not accountable, i.e., when the government’s actions are not responsible and in the best
interest of the citizen, possibly at a cost. The focus of this paper is on the willingness
to impose a cost on the government. As an example, citizens may sacrifice time and
transportation costs to participate in a demonstration calling on politicians to be more
accountable, imposing a political cost on the government as punishment for not being
accountable.
The present paper reports results from a between-subjects experiment where the par-
ticipants are randomly assigned to a group with another participant and to the role as a
“leader” or a “citizen”. It is the task of the leader to decide how much of an endowment
given to the group to invest in a common pool and how much to keep for him or herself.
The citizen can costly punish the leader’s decision by reducing his or her payoff, but has
no monetary incentives to do so. The citizen’s willingness to punish the leader thus cap-
tures the main features of, and is used as a proxy for, demand for accountability in the
experiment. The experiment exogenously varies how the group endowment is financed
in order to capture two major differences between tax and windfall revenue. First, the
money on which citizens are taxed is earned by their work, whereas windfall revenue is
not related to citizens’ effort and is unearned. Second, tax revenue initially accrues to
citizens and is subsequently collected as tax, whereas windfall revenue accrues directly
to the government. These two distinguishing features of tax revenue are theorized to in-
crease the salience of fairness considerations to citizens, because the features entail that
citizens actively contribute to the financing of revenue. Increased salience of fairness is,
in turn, hypothesized to make citizens care more about how resources are distributed and
increase their willingness to punish the government for unfair behavior.
The experiment has two treatments designed to capture these differences between tax
and windfall revenue. In the “Rentier State” treatment, the group endowment is windfall
and non-tax. In the “Tax State” treatment, the group endowment is produced by the work
1From now on, the term “Rentier State Hypothesis” will be used to refer to the effect of taxation on
demand for accountability.
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of the citizen and the leader, and financed through a tax on earnings. The Rentier State
treatment can be thought of as a stylization of the situation in a Rentier State, where
government revenue is windfall revenue and taxation is low, and the Tax State treatment
can be thought of as a stylization of a situation in a Tax State, where government revenue
is produced by citizens’ work and collected through taxation. Comparing punishment
behavior in the two treatments provides a causal test of the effect of taxation on demand
for accountability, and thus of the Rentier State Hypothesis.
The experiment also includes two treatments designed to shed light on the underlying
mechanisms explaining the Rentier State Hypothesis. In the “Hard Earned & Non-Tax”
treatment, the group endowment is produced by the work of the citizen and the leader,
but is not collected as tax, and in the “Windfall & Tax” treatment, the group endowment
is windfall, but is financed through taxation. Together with the main treatments, these
additional treatments enable causal tests of the separate effect of the revenues i) being
hard earned (“Hard Earned mechanism”) and ii) having been in the possession of the
citizen before being collected as tax (“Possession mechanism”).
The paper offers three main findings. First, taxation causes a significant increase in
citizens’ demand for accountability. Demand for accountability is proxied by citizens’
willingness to punish, and is measured as the highest investment for which the citizens
punish the leader. Figure 1 shows the means and standard errors for citizens’ willingness
to punish in the two main treatments. It shows that when the group endowment is pro-
duced by the citizens’ work and financed through taxation (Tax State treatment), citizens
have a 0.19 standard deviation higher willingness to punish than when the group endow-
ment is windfall and non-tax. This result provides evidence in support of the Rentier
State Hypothesis. The finding is robust across different subgroups of the sample (gen-
der, age, education, employment status, income, political view and political engagement).
[Figure 1 about here.]
Second, while the Hard Earned and the Possession mechanism increase citizens’ will-
ingness to punish when working in combination, neither has a separate significant effect.
Thus, both the Hard Earned and the Possession mechanism are important in explaining
the effect of taxation on willingness to punish. Third, the effect of taxation on willingness
to punish can be partly explained by taxation causing citizens to have stronger negative
emotions when the leader is unfair. Citizens in the Tax State treatment report that they
would be more upset than citizens in the Rentier State treatment do if the leader invests
less than what they perceive to be fair, and willingness to punish is strongly correlated
with negative emotions.
The paper also investigates the effect of taxation on the leaders’ decisions. The results
show that leaders invest more in the common pool (i.e., are more accountable) when the
group endowment is produced by work than when it is windfall revenue.
Overall, the results suggest that taxation is not only a means to generate govern-
ment revenue, but may also increase citizens’ demand for accountability, which is often
assumed to enhance social and economic development through more accountable gov-
ernment spending. The results also imply that, if the government’s goal is to increase
demand for accountability, the tax system should: i) focus on taxing earned revenues
such as labor income rather than unearned income such as prize money from lotteries or
inheritance, and ii) collect taxes in arrears, not as withholding, because this increases the
salience of fairness considerations.
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The paper relates to the empirical literature investigating how the source of public
revenue affects the political behavior of citizens and governments. A large strand of this
literature uses cross- and within-country variation in observational data to investigate the
relationship between reliance on tax or windfall revenue and governance indicators such as
democratization, provision of public goods, and corruption (Andersen and Aslaksen, 2013;
Aslaksen, 2007; Arezki and Bru¨ckner, 2011; Besley and Persson, 2013; 2014; Brollo et al.,
2013; Caselli and Michaels, 2013; Gadenne, 2017; Leite and Weidmann, 2002; Mart´ınez,
2016; Prichard et al., 2014; Ross, 2004; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2013). The
studies largely show that good governance is positively associated with reliance on tax
revenues and negatively associated with reliance on windfall revenues, with some notable
exceptions (Haber and Menaldo, 2011; Herb, 2005). However, most of these studies do
not identify a causal relationship between tax or windfall revenue and accountability,
and do not provide evidence for the underlying mechanisms explaining it. The present
study contributes to this literature by providing a test of the first part of the suggested
causal chain of the Rentier State Hypothesis, namely the effect of taxation on demand for
accountability. Another contribution of the paper is to propose and test a new mechanism
for the effect of taxation on demand for accountability, namely that it increases the
salience of fairness considerations in government spending. This, in turn, is hypothesized
to increase citizens’ willingness to punish unfair spending.
The paper also relates to a handful of experimental studies that show mixed results
for the effect of taxation on demand for accountability. In a lab experiment in Uganda,
Martin (2016) finds that individuals have a higher willingness to punish a dictator when
the group endowment is collected as tax from them, compared to when it is given directly
to the dictator. Bosman et al. (2005) report results from lab experiments in the Nether-
lands and Austria and find that individuals are less willing to punish a second party
appropriating some of their endowment when this endowment is hard earned compared
to when it is windfall. Paler (2013) uses games to prime citizens to think about local
government revenues as tax or windfall revenues in a field experiment in Indonesia. She
finds that the tax priming leads to a higher stated willingness to monitor the government,
but does not significantly affect participatory behavior. Finally, Weigel (2017) random-
izes tax collection in a field experiment in D.R. Congo and finds that citizens residing in
taxed areas have a higher demand for accountability, measured as attendance in town hall
meetings about taxation and likelihood of submitting a suggestion card to the govern-
ment. The present experiment contributes to this experimental literature in three ways.
First, the present design rules out information as an alternative explanation, by holding
it constant across treatments. Other papers have argued that taxation increases demand
for accountability through information because the citizen is typically aware of how much
he or she pays in tax, but not of how much the government earns from natural resource
exports or receives in aid (see for instance Gadenne (2017), Paler (2013) and Sandbu
(2006)). Second, the present study implements an experimental design that allows for
the identification of the interaction effect between the Hard Earned and the Possession
mechanism. Third, the experiment cleanly identifies the effect of taxation on how much
citizens care about the leader investing a fair share by keeping the level of investment
that is perceived as fair constant.
Finally, the paper relates to the large literature on social norms and human coop-
eration. Using public good and ultimatum games, this literature has established that
individuals are willing to punish norm violators, even when such punishment is costly
and yields no material gains (de Quervain et al., 2004; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; 2002;
124
Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; 2004a;b; Henrich et al., 2006; Henrich and
Henrich, 2007; Jordan et al., 2016; Rand and Nowak, 2013; Xiao and Houser, 2005). The
present paper contributes to this literature by investigating whether and why costly pun-
ishment of an investment decision depends on the source of income, and, thus, shedding
more light on motivations behind punishment.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design, the
sample, and the setting, Section 3 presents the theoretical framework, Section 4 explains
the empirical strategy and Section 5 reports the results. Finally, Section 6 provides a
discussion of the results and their implications.
2 Experimental design and sample
This section explains the sequence of events, the structure of the experimental task, the
treatments, and the setting and sample.2
2.1 Sequence of events
In the experiment, the participants play a two-player investment game where the citizen
has the opportunity to costly punish the leader for his or her investment decision. The
sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 2 and can be described as follows. In the first
stage (uppermost panel, Figure 2), the participants are randomly assigned to a treatment,
to a pair, and to the role as a either a citizen or a leader. The randomization is done at
the individual level.
In the second stage (upper middle panel), the citizen and the leader in each pair inde-
pendently choose whether they would like to work to earn a reward or not. The payment
scheme is announced before the participants make their decisions. Only pairs where both
participants choose to work are included in the empirical analysis and the remaining ex-
planation will focus on these. The work consists of a five-minute picture categorization
task. In the third stage (middle panel), the group receives a group endowment. How
the endowment is financed varies between the experimental treatments and is explained
in Subsection 2.2 below. In the Rentier State treatment, the group endowment is made
up of unearned revenue that does not accrue to the citizen before the leader makes the
investment decision for it (non-tax). The size of the group endowment is constant and
equal to $2 in all treatments.
In the fourth stage (lower middle panel), the leader decides how much of the group
endowment to invest in a common pool. The amount invested is multiplied by a factor
of 1.5 and subsequently divided equally between the citizen and the leader. The amount
not invested in the common pool is kept by the leader. The leader can invest any share
of the group endowment he or she likes in the common pool, in portions of 0.1.
In the fifth stage (lowermost panel), the strategy method is used to elicit the citizen’s
willingness to punish. For every possible investment decision the leader can make, the
citizen decides whether to reduce the payoff to the leader by $0.50 at the cost of $0.05.
The citizen’s punishment decisions constitute the main outcome of the experiment. The
willingness to punish is defined as the largest investment share the citizen punishes and
proxies demand for accountability: The more willing the citizen is to punish, the higher
2The instructions for the main parts of the study are provided in Appendix G.
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is his or her demand for accountability.
[Figure 2 about here.]
In the sixth and last stage (not illustrated in the figure), participants answer a set of
non-incentivized questions intended to capture individual preferences and socioeconomic
background. The purpose of collecting this information is to investigate heterogeneity
in treatment effects and the underlying mechanisms for the effect of taxation on the
willingness to punish. After completion of the experiment, the participants receive their
$1 participation fee within three days. To determine bonus earnings from decisions made
in the experiment, citizens and leaders are randomly matched in pairs. The earnings are
paid to the participants within three weeks of the completion of the experiment.
2.2 Experimental treatments
The experimental treatments exogenously vary the way in which the group endowment
is financed based on two main differences between tax and windfall revenue. First, tax
revenue is produced by the citizens’ work and is thus hard earned, whereas windfall
revenue is not related to the citizens’ effort at all. Second, the revenue collected through
taxation has been in the citizens’ possession, whereas windfall revenue accrues directly
to the government. The financing of the group endowment is varied along these two
dimensions in a 2×2 design, giving rise to four treatments. An important feature of the
design is that the (post-tax) reward for performing the task and the size of the group
endowment are constant across treatments.
The structures of the four treatments are illustrated in Figure 3 and can be described
as follows. In the first treatment, the citizen and the leader each earns $1 from their work.
In addition, they receive a $2 windfall as group endowment. The group endowment can
be considered windfall revenue because the group receives it independently of the citizen
and the leader’s work. In the second treatment, the citizen and the leader each earns
$1 from their work. In addition, their work produces a $2 ($1 each) group endowment.
The group endowment can be considered hard earned revenue because it is dependent on
the citizen and the leader’s work. In the third treatment, the citizen and the leader each
earns $1 from their work. In addition, each receives a $1 windfall. The citizen and the
leader’s total earnings are taxed at 50 percent and the tax collected finances the $2 group
endowment. The group endowment can be considered tax revenue because it is collected
from the citizen and the leader’s earnings. In the fourth treatment, the citizen and the
leader each earns $2 from their work. Their earnings are taxed at 50 percent and the
tax collected finances a $2 group endowment. The group endowment can be considered
hard earned revenue because it is produced by the work of the citizen and the leader, as
well as financed by tax revenue because it is collected from the citizen and the leader’s
earnings.3 The four treatments can be summarized as follows:
Rentier State (T1): Citizen and leader each earn $1. A windfall finances the $2
3Please see Appendix A for a description of a robustness treatment. This treatment resembles the
Tax State treatment, but manipulates the Hard Earned Mechanism by making the citizen and the leader
work longer (ten minutes instead of five) rather than by making work a more productive activity (pay
$2 instead of $1). As the regressions in Table A.1 show, manipulating duration does not yield results
different from the main manipulation (productivity). The two treatments are therefore pooled in all the
analyses presented in the paper unless otherwise specified.
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group endowment.
Hard Earned & Non-Tax (T2): Citizen and leader each earn $1. Their work
additionally produces $1 each, financing the $2 group endowment.
Windfall & Tax (T3): Citizen and leader each earn $1. In addition, they each
receive a windfall of $1. Their total earnings are taxed at 50 percent. The $1 tax
collected from each finances the $2 group endowment.
Tax State (T4): Citizen and leader each earn $2. Their earnings are taxed at 50
percent. The $1 tax collected from each finances the $2 group endowment.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The Rentier State treatment can be thought of as a stylization of the situation in a
Rentier State where the government is mainly financed by windfall revenue (aid, natural
resource revenue) that is not collected through the tax system. The Tax State treatment
can be thought of as a stylization of the situation in a tax state, where government
revenues are mainly financed through taxing hard earned income produced by the citizens’
work and the tax is paid in arrears. Comparing the willingness to punish in these two
treatments provides a causal test of the Rentier State Hypothesis. Comparing the Rentier
State to the Hard Earned & Non-Tax treatment, and the Windfall & Tax to the Tax State
treatment provides causal tests for the effect of the group endowment being produced by
work when it is not financed through taxation and when it is financed through taxation,
respectively. These comparisons test the importance of the Hard Earned mechanism in
explaining the Rentier State effect. Similarly, comparing the Rentier State to the Windfall
& Tax treatment and the Hard Earned & Non-Tax to the Tax State treatment provides
causal tests for the effect of the group endowment being financed through taxation when
the money is not produced by work and when the money is produced by work, respectively.
These comparisons test the importance of the Possession mechanism in explaining the
Rentier State effect.
The treatments are designed to keep what is perceived as a fair investment constant:
because the citizen and the leader contribute equally much tax and work in all treatments,
the fair thing for the leader to do is always to invest the entire group endowment in the
common pool (because this ensures equal pay). The post-experimental survey confirms
that this is also how the citizens perceive the situation. When asked how much they
think it is fair that the leader invests, the citizens on average answer a share of 0.95 or
higher in all treatments.
2.3 Sample and setting
The participants in the experiment were recruited from the online labor market platform,
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). In total, 1996 workers (983 citizens and 1013 lead-
ers) participated in the study. Of these, 110 (54 citizens and 56 leaders) chose not to
perform the task and were therefore excluded from the sample. Of the 929 citizens that
chose to work, 190 answered the punishment question inconsistently and were therefore
dropped from the sample.4 Thus, the main analyses in this paper are based on a sample
4A citizen’s punishment behavior is defined as inconsistent if, for any level of leader investment, the
citizen does not punish that investment, but does punish at least one higher level of investment. There
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of 739 citizens. Descriptive statistics for these are reported in Table 1. Columns (1)
- (5) show means for background variables for each of the four treatments and for the
pooled sample, respectively. Column (5) shows the p-value for testing the hypothesis
that there is no difference in the background characteristics between each of treatments
T2-T4 and the Rentier State treatment. The table shows that the share of males, and
the share of respondents that are more politically conservative than the median of the
sample, are significantly different between treatments.5 The sample is otherwise balanced.
[Table 1 about here.]
Tables B.5 and B.6 in Appendix B show that there are some significant differences in
the share of citizens that choose not to work and the share of citizens that are inconsistent
punishers between treatments. However, the balance regressions for all the 983 citizens
recruited in Table B.2 in Appendix B show that the identified imbalances are not due
to non-workers and inconsistent punishers being significantly different from workers and
consistent punishers in terms of observable variables. This mitigates the concern that
differential selection of consistent punishers between treatments is driving the treatment
effects.
3 Theoretical framework
This section describes the theoretical framework guiding the experimental design. First,
the citizen’s punishment decision is considered. His or her monetary payoff can be for-
mulated as:
yc = R+
3
4
I− (p× c), (1)
where R is the reward for performing the real effort task, I is the leader’s investment in
the common pool, p ∈ {0,1} is an indicator variable for the citizen’s binary punishment
decision that is taking the value of one if the citizen punishes the leader and zero otherwise,
and c is the cost of punishing the leader. As Equation (1) shows, there are no monetary
incentives to punish in the experiment. Furthermore, the one-shot structure and the
anonymity of the participants entail that there are no strategic incentives for punishment.
However, a large empirical literature has documented that people are willing to sacrifice
monetary payoff to punish unfair behavior, even when they get no monetary or strategic
benefits from doing so (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; 2004a;b; Henrich et al., 2006; Henrich
and Henrich, 2007; Xiao and Houser, 2005). Fehr et al. (2002) refer to such behavior as
strong negative reciprocity.6
To capture strong negative reciprocity, this paper assumes that the citizen derives
utility from punishing the leader when the leader is perceived to be unfair. Negative
are no good theoretical reasons for why citizens should not punish low, but punish higher investments,
and it is difficult to know how to analyze the data from inconsistent punishers.
5Table B.1 in Appendix B provides a more detailed balance check.
6Evolutionary theory posits that the existence of strong negative reciprocity is due to cooperative
behavior increasing the likelihood for survival, and that natural selection therefore has favored individuals
that are intuitively cooperative and trustworthy (Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a; Jordan
et al., 2016; Rand and Nowak, 2013).
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emotions are one possible mechanism through which this effect might work. Unfair in-
vestments may upset citizens, and punishing the leader is a way for them to express their
anger to the leaders (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009; Nelissen
and Zeelenberg, 2009; Xiao and Houser, 2005). Based on this, the citizen’s punishment
decision can be modeled as a tradeoff between monetary payoff and utility from punishing
the leader for unfair investments.7 To formalize ideas, the following simple model of the
citizen’s utility, inspired by Cappelen et al. (2007), is introduced:
Vc = R+
3
4
I− (p× c)− γc
(
mc− I
)2
+(p×β )[min{0,mc− I}2]. (2)
mc is the citizen’s fairness norm and specifies the investment share that he or she per-
ceives to be fair. Thus, mc− I indicates how much the leader’s investment deviates from
the amount the citizen perceives as fair. γc is a parameter determining the citizen’s
non-monetary unconditional utility loss from unfair investments, and β is a parameter
determining the citizen’s utility from punishing unfair investments. The rest of the pa-
rameters are as defined for Equation (1) above. Equation (2) shows that the citizen’s
utility from punishment depends positively on how much the leader’s investment deviates
from the fairness norm, mc− I, and on the individual parameter β , and negatively on the
cost of punishment, c. It is assumed that the citizen derives negative unconditional util-
ity from both positive and negative deviations from the fairness norm, but only derives
utility from punishment of negative deviations. Both the unconditional disutility and the
utility from punishment are assumed to be increasing in the size of the deviation from
the fairness norm. The citizen’s punishment behavior is characterized by:
c< β
[
min{0,mc− I}2
]
Punish (3a)
c = β
[
min{0,mc− I}2
]
Indifferent, randomize (3b)
c> β
[
min{0,mc− I}2
]
Not punish (3c)
Next, the leader’s investment decision is considered. It is modeled as a trade-off
between expected monetary payoff and non-monetary disutility from deviations from
fairness:
Vl = R+GE− 14 I− (φ(I)×θ)− γl(ml− I)
2, (4)
where GE is the group endowment, φ(I) (φ ′(I) < 0) is the leader’s subjective probability
for being punished by the citizen as a function of investment, θ is the cost of being
punished by the citizen, ml is the leader’s fairness norm for investment, γl is a parameter
determining the leader’s disutility from deviating from fairness, and the other parameters
are as defined for Equation (1). ml−I indicates how much the leader’s investment deviates
from what he or she perceives as fair. It is assumed that the leader experiences a utility
loss from both negative and positive deviations from the fairness norm, and that the
disutility is increasing in the size of the deviation. For simplicity, it is also assumed that
the leader is risk neutral. Given an interior solution, the leader’s optimal investment in
the common pool is given by:
I∗ = ml− 12γl
[1
4
+φ ′(I)×θ]. (5)
7An alternative theoretical approach is to model the citizen’s non-monetary utility from punishing the
leader’s investment as reference dependent, i.e., determined by his or her reference point for investment.
This approach is discussed in more detail in Subsection E.2 in Appendix E.
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Thus, the leader’s investment depends positively on his or her fairness norm for in-
vestment, ml, the parameter determining disutility from unfair investment, γl, and the
subjective belief about how sensitive the probability of punishment by the citizen is to a
change in investment, φ ′(I).
The theoretical model can now be used to illustrate the effect of taxation on the citi-
zen’s punishment behavior. As Equations (3a)-(3c) show, for any given investment level
(I), two parameters influence the citizen’s punishment in the model; the level of invest-
ment the citizen perceives as fair (mc), and the utility he or she derives from punishment
of unfair investments (β ). Since we assume that the fairness norms, mc and ml, are the
same and equal to GE in all treatments, the effects of treatments must work through
changes in the utility derived from punishing unfair investments, β .
The basic idea behind the design is that taxation increases the salience of fairness
considerations to the citizens. The hypothesis is that, under taxation, citizens actively
contribute to the group endowment in two ways; they have worked hard to earn the
money that finances it, and they have had the tax money in their possession before
it was collected. This active contribution is thought to attract the citizens’ attention
to the fairness norm, i.e., that the leader should invest everything, which in turn is
hypothesized to increase the citizen’s utility from punishment (β ), leading to higher
willingness to punish.8 In the absence of taxation (Rentier State treatment), neither the
citizen nor the leader actively contributes to the group endowment. Even though the
citizen’s fairness norm is the same as under taxation, the lack of active contribution to
the group endowment is hypothesized to make this fairness norm less salient and citizens
less willing to punish unfair investments. Accordingly, the theory predicts willingness to
punish and investment levels to be higher in the Hard Earned & Non-Tax, Windfall &
Tax and Tax State treatments than in the Rentier State treatment.
Next, the model is used to illustrate the effect of taxation on the leader’s investment
decision. Equation (5) shows that the investment decision is determined by the level of
investment the leader perceives as fair (ml), his or her disutility from unfair investments
(γl) and the subjective belief about how sensitive the probability of punishment by the
citizen is to a change in investment (φ ′(I)) for any given level of investment (I). As
before, the fairness norm, ml, is assumed to be constant across treatments, so the effect
of treatments must go through disutility from unfair investments (γl) and the subjective
belief about how sensitive the probability of punishment by the citizen is to a change in
investment (φ ′(I)). Corresponding to the effect of taxation on the citizen’s willingness to
punish, the idea is that the leader’s active contribution to the group endowment under
taxation makes fairness considerations more salient and increases the disutility the leader
derives from unfair investments, γl. This, in turn, is hypothesized to increase investments
8This idea is related to a series of recent theoretical papers showing that alternatives that are more
salient, i.e., that stand out more because they are different or unusual, receive more of the decision
maker’s attention and thus influence their decisions more relative to less salient alternatives. Bordalo
et al. (2012) theorize that lotteries with payoffs that stand out are overweighed relative to their objective
probabilities in decision-making. Bordalo et al. (2013a) extend this model to demand for risky assets and
Bordalo et al. (2013b; 2016) and Ko¨szegi and Szeidl (2013) formulate more general models for salience
and choice. These models generally focus on the salience of different alternatives in one particular choice
setting. The present argument is slightly different and focuses on how the salience of one particular
feature of the choice situation differs between different settings (with and without taxation). The basic
mechanism should be the same: When our attention is drawn to a particular product or feature of the
choice situation, we care about that product or feature, and put more emphasis on it, compared to when
our attention is not drawn to it.
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in the common pool. Taxation might also affect the leader’s subjective belief about how
sensitive the probability of the citizen punishing is to a change in investment, but it is
difficult to formulate a theoretical prediction for this effect without further assumptions.
Based on this, the theory predicts the leader’s investments to be higher in the Hard
Earned & Non-Tax, Windfall & Tax and Tax State treatments than in the Rentier State
treatment.
To summarize, the theoretical framework predicts that taxation increases the citizen’s
willingness to punish deviations from the fairness norm through increasing the salience of
this norm, and thus increases the utility from punishment of deviations from it. Corre-
spondingly, taxation is predicted to increase the leader’s investment in the common pool
because it increases the salience of the fairness norm and thus increases the disutility
derived from deviating.
4 Empirical strategy
This section describes the empirical strategy for the analysis.9
4.1 Main analysis
To investigate the effect of taxation on willingness to punish, the following specification
is estimated:
yi = α +βHHi +βTTi +θH×THi×Ti +βXXi +βZZi + εi. (6)
yi is the standardized willingness to punish for the citizen in pair i. α is a constant,
Hi is an indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals in the Hard Earned
treatments, T2 and T4. Ti is an indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals
in the Tax treatments, T3 and T4, and Hi×Ti is and interaction term between Hi and
Ti. Hi×Ti takes the value of one for individuals in the Tax State treatment (T4). Xi is a
vector of the background variables of the citizen (indicator variables for male, age above
median, education above median level, full-time employee and income above median),
Zi is a vector of political view and engagement (indicator variable for above median
politically conservative and for above median engaged in political activities) and εi is an
error term. Three versions of Equation (6) are estimated; one including the treatment
variables and their interaction term only; one including the treatment variables, their
interaction term and Xi; and one with treatment variables, their interaction term, Xi
and Zi, all OLS regressions with robust standard errors. The Rentier State treatment
is the reference category, and the estimation of Equation (6) gives the following main
parameters of interest:
βT +βH +θH×T: causal effect of going from the Rentier State treatment to the Tax
State treatment. This tests the Rentier State Hypothesis.
9This, and the hypotheses to be tested, were specified in the pre-analysis plan submitted to
the American Economic Association Randomized Control Trials Registry before the data collection.
https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2233, registration number AEARCTR-0002233. The paper
mainly follows the pre-analysis plan, with some minor deviations and a few additional specifications.
Please see Appendix C for an overview.
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βT , βT + θH×T: causal effect of going from the Rentier State to the Windfall
& Tax treatment, and the causal effect of going from the Hard Earned & Non-
Tax treatment to the Tax State treatment, respectively. These test the Possession
mechanism.
βH , βH + θH×T: causal effect of going from the Rentier State treatment to the
Hard Earned & Non-Tax treatment, and from the Windfall & Tax treatment to the
Tax State treatment, respectively. These test the Hard Earned mechanism.
θH×T: the difference in causal effect of going from Windfall to Hard Earned treat-
ments between Non-Tax and Tax treatments.
To investigate whether the treatments affect willingness to punish on the intensive or
extensive margin, Equation (6) is also estimated for two indicator variables; one for high
punishment, taking the value of one for citizens that always punish, or punish investment
shares of 0.9, and zero otherwise (intensive margin); and one for positive punishment,
taking the value of one for citizens that punish at least one investment share and zero for
those who never punish (extensive margin).
To check the robustness of the main results Equation (6) is estimated for an alternative
definition of the dependent variable, namely the lowest share invested for which the citizen
does not punish the leader.
4.2 Heterogeneity analysis
To investigate whether different subgroups of the sample respond differently to the treat-
ments, the following specification is estimated:
yi = α +βHHi +βTTi +θH×THi×Ti +βVarVari +θHHi×Vari+
θTTi×Vari + γHi×Ti×Vari +βXXi +βZZi + εi.
(7)
Where Vari are indicator variables for the subgroups of respondents that are of interest
(male, above median age, above median education, full-time employee, above median
income, conservative, more than median engaged in political activities, and above median
upset). Hi×Vari is an interaction term between Hi and Vari, Ti×Vari is an interaction
term between Ti and Vari, and Hi×Ti×Vari is a term for the triple interaction between
Hi, Ti and Vari.
The reference category is the subgroup for which Vari takes the value of zero in the
Rentier State treatment. To illustrate, if Vari is the indicator variable for male, the
reference category is female (male = 0) in the Rentier State treatment. Then βH is
the effect of going from the Rentier State to the Hard Earned & Non-Tax treatment for
females, βT is the effect of going from the Rentier State to the Windfall & Tax treatment
for females, and so on. Estimating Equation (7) for each background variable gives the
following parameters of interest:
βT + βH + θH×T: causal effect of going from the Rentier State to the Tax State
treatment for subgroup Vari = 0 (for instance females).
βT +βH +θH×T+θH+θT+γ: causal effect of going from the Rentier State to the
Tax State treatment for subgroup Vari = 1 (for instance females).
θH+θT+ γ: difference in effect of going from the Rentier State to the Tax State
treatment between Vari = 0 and Vari = 1 (for instance between females and males).
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4.3 Leader decisions
To investigate the effect of treatments on leaders’ investment decisions, Equation (6) is
estimated using the standardized share invested in the common pool as the dependent
variable.
5 Results
This section reports the results. The first part reports descriptive findings for the citizens’
punishment behavior and for self-reported negative emotions. The second part presents
the main analysis of the effect of taxation on the willingness to punish and on negative
emotions. The third part presents the heterogeneity analysis. Finally, results from the
leaders’ investment behavior are described in the fourth part.
5.1 Descriptive statistics
The main outcome of interest is the citizens’ willingness to pay a cost to punish the leaders’
investment decisions by reducing their payoff. The willingness to punish is measured
using the strategy method: For every possible investment decision the leader can make,
the citizen decides whether he or she would like to punish that decision. The leader can
invest as much of the group endowment as he or she likes, in portions of 0.1. Thus,
the citizen decides whether to punish an investment share of 0.1, an investment share
of 0.2, an investment share of 0.3 and so on up until an investment share of 1. These
decisions are used to identify the highest investment level for which the citizen punishes
the leader, which is used as a measure for the willingness to punish. The punishment
decision that the citizen makes for the leader’s actual investment decision is implemented.
To illustrate, imagine that a citizen decides to punish the leader if he or she invests a
share of 0.5 or less in the common pool. Then the highest investment share for which
the citizen punishes, and the measure for his or her willingness to punish (i.e. his or her
demand for accountability), is 0.5.
Figure 4 divides citizens into four categories according to their punishment behav-
ior. It shows that a significant share, about 45 percent, never punish the leader. The
remaining 55 percent have a positive willingness to punish for at least one level of leader
investment, most of whom (about 37 percent of the sample) are willing to punish high
investments, meaning that the highest investment share they punish is between 60 and
90 percent. A small share (about 15 percent of the sample) are only willing to punish low
investments, meaning that the highest investment share they punish is between 0 and 50
percent. A minority of three percent always punish the leader, even in the case when he
or she invests 100 percent of the group endowment. Figure D.1 in Appendix D gives a
more detailed description of punishment behavior by illustrating the entire distribution
of willingness to punish.
[Figure 4 about here]
To shed more light on why citizens punish, they answer the unincentivized question
“How upset would you be if the leader invests less than the fair share, when both of you
completed the assignment?” Figure 5 illustrates their answers measured on an 11-point
scale from “Not upset at all” to “Very upset”. It shows that there is a large variation in
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negative emotions associated with unfair leader investments. The figure also shows that
the distribution of negative emotions is skewed to the right of the mean upsetness level,
indicating that the majority of citizens report that they would be somewhat or more
upset if the leader is unfair.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 6 investigates the relationship between negative emotions and punishment
behavior. The left panel divides the sample of citizens into two groups according to
self-reported emotions; those who report to be less than or equal to the median level of
upset (six), and those who report to be more than median upset if the leader is unfair. It
illustrates the willingness to punish in these two groups and shows that the more upset
punish significantly higher investment shares than the less upset. The magnitude of this
difference is equivalent to 0.6 standard deviation and is highly significant (p = 0.000).
The right panel of the figure illustrates the same relationship for all possible outcomes of
the upsetness variable. Each bar illustrates the mean willingness to punish for that level
of upsetness and shows that willingness to punish is linearly increasing in the strength
of negative emotions reported. These results strongly suggest that negative emotions are
an important driver of punishment behavior.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Table 2 reports regressions of willingness to punish on an indicator variable taking the
value of one for citizens that are more than median upset if the leader is unfair in Columns
(1)-(3) and on the 11-point scale measure of upsetness in columns (4-6). The table shows
that the positive correlation between negative emotions and punishment replicates in a
regression framework for both measures of upsetness.
[Table 2 about here.]
5.2 Main analysis
As illustrated in Figure 1, the Tax State treatment causes a significant increase in citizens’
willingness to punish. Going from a situation where the group endowment is windfall
and non-tax to a situation where it is produced by the citizen and the leader’s work and
financed through taxation, increases the willingness to punish from 0.30 to 0.37 (p =
0.060). The magnitude of the effect is equivalent to a 0.19 standard deviation increase in
the willingness to punish.
Table 3 investigates how willingness to punish is affected by the Tax and Hard Earned
manipulations, their interaction, and background variables, in a regression framework.
Columns (1)-(3) report results for willingness to punish measured by a standardized
version of the 11-point punishment scale. Column (1) reports estimates of Equation (6)
with treatment variables and the interaction term only, Column (2) reports estimates for
a specification that includes background variables (gender, age, education, income and
occupation) and Column (3) reports results for the full specification where indicators for
political view and political engagement are also included. The Rentier State treatment
is the reference category in all columns. Focusing on the full specification in Column (3),
the table shows that the descriptive finding is replicated in the regression analysis. Going
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from the Rentier State to the Tax State treatment significantly increases the willingness
to punish (as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient of “Hard Earned +
Tax + Hard Earned x Tax”, p = 0.058). The table also shows the estimated separate
effects of the Hard Earned and Tax manipulations. The coefficients of “Hard Earned”
and “Hard Earned + Hard Earned x Tax” test the separate effect of the Hard Earned
manipulation when the group endowment is non-tax and when it is collected through
taxation, respectively. They show that the Hard Earned effects are positive, but not
statistically significant. Similarly, the coefficients of “Tax” and “Tax + Hard Earned
+ Tax” test the separate effect of the Tax manipulation when the group endowment is
windfall and when it is produced by work, respectively. They show that the effects are
positive, but not significant. The small and non-significant coefficient of “Hard Earned
x Tax” suggests that there is no interaction effect between the two mechanisms on the
willingness to punish.
In terms of background variables, only employment status is significantly correlated
with punishment; citizens that are employed full-time have a significantly higher willing-
ness to punish than those who are not employed full-time.
[Table 3 about here.]
Columns (4)-(6) report estimates of Equation (6) where the dependent variable is
a standardized version of an indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals
that punish very high shares invested (0.9 or 1): Column (4) reports estimates from the
specification with treatment variables and the interaction only, and Columns (5) and (6)
sequentially add the background political variables. The main result from Column (3)
holds, and is slightly strengthened, when investigating the effect on the indicator for high
willingness to punish in Column (6). For this specification, a significant effect of the Tax
manipulation is also identified for the Hard Earned treatments; citizens are more likely to
punish high investment shares when the group endowment is hard earned and collected
through taxation than when it is hard earned and given directly to the leader.
Based on the regressions in Table 3, the following main results can be formulated:
Result 1 (Rentier State Hypothesis): The Tax State treatment significantly in-
creases the willingness to punish compared to the Rentier State treatment (βH + βT +
θH×T = 0.186, p = 0.058, Column (3)).
Result 2 (Mechanisms): The positive effect of the Tax State Treatment on the
willingness to punish is explained by a combination of the Hard Earned and Possession
mechanism. Both the Tax and the Hard Earned manipulations have a positive separate
effect on the willingness to punish, but they are not statistically significant (Hard Earned
mechanism: βH = 0.040, p = 0.715, βH +θH×T = 0.057, p = 0.595, Possession mecha-
nism: βT = 0.129, p = 0.269, βT +θH×T = 0.147, p = 0.134, Column (3)). There is no
interaction effect between the Hard Earned and the Possession mechanism (θ = 0.018, p
= 0.907).
Result 1 provides evidence in support of the Rentier State Hypothesis. When the
financing of the group fund is characterized by the two distinguishing factors of tax
revenue; (i) the money has been in the citizens’ possession and then been collected through
taxation and (ii) the money is earned income, the citizens have a higher willingness to
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punish.10
Result 2 shows that both the Hard Earned and the Possession mechanism are needed
in order to generate the Rentier State effect. These mechanisms significantly affect the
willingness to punish only when working in combination.
To further investigate the effect of taxation on the willingness to punish, Table D.3
in Appendix D reports regression results for an indicator variable taking the value of
one if the citizen punishes some investment share. It shows that the treatments have no
significant effects on the likelihood of a citizen punishing the leader. Thus, the results in
Tables 3 and D.3 indicate that the Tax State treatment increases citizens’ willingness to
punish very high investments, but does not increase the likelihood of the citizen punishing
the leader. Table D.3 also reports the results for a sample that includes the inconsistent
punishers in Columns (4)-(6). These regressions show that the two samples give very
similar results.
Finally, the treatment effect on negative emotions is investigated in Figure 7. It shows
that, on average, citizens in the Tax State treatment report to be more upset than the
citizens in the Rentier state treatment do (6.3 vs. 5.9 on a scale from 1 to 11), indicating
that the Tax State treatment increases the citizens’ negative emotions. The difference
in negative emotions reported is equivalent of 0.15 standard deviation, but is not signifi-
cant at conventional levels of significance (p = 0.131). Table 4 reports the corresponding
regression analysis where negative emotions are regressed on indicator variables for treat-
ments and their interaction. The table replicates the positive effect of the Tax State
treatment on negative emotions. Additionally, it shows that the point estimates of the
separate effects of the Hard Earned and the Tax manipulation on negative emotions go
in opposite directions.
[Figure 7 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
The results show that willingness to punish is highly correlated with negative emo-
tions. They also provide suggestive evidence in support of negative emotions being a
mechanism for the effect of taxation on the willingness to punish: Taxation makes the
citizen more upset by, and therefore more willing to punish, unfair leader investments.
5.3 Heterogeneity analysis
This section investigates whether subgroups of citizens respond differently to taxation.
Figure 8 illustrates the difference in mean willingness to punish between the Rentier State
and the Tax State treatment for the different subgroups of respondents. To illustrate,
the left bars in the top left panel of the figure show the mean willingness to punish
for women in the Rentier State treatment (dark gray) and women in the Tax State
treatment (light gray), respectively. The two right bars of the panel show the mean
willingness to punish for men in the Rentier State (dark gray) and Tax State (light gray)
treatment. The panel illustrates that going from the Rentier State to the Tax State
treatment causes men to have a significantly higher willingness to punish, but does not
10The estimated regressions for the robustness check of the Hard Earned mechanism are reported in
Table A.1 in Appendix A. It shows that there is no significant difference in willingness to punish between
citizens in the five- and 10-minute Hard Earned treatments.
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affect the punishment behavior of women. Overall, the figure shows that Result 1 is
robust across the different subgroups: Willingness to punish is consistently higher in
the Tax State than in the Rentier State treatment in all subgroups except non-full-time
employees (where the difference between treatments is not significant).
Table 5 reports the estimated regression coefficients for the effect on the willingness
to punish of going from the Rentier State to the Tax State treatment for the different
subgroups of the sample, as well as the difference in treatment effect between the groups.
It shows that the Tax State treatment has a significant effect on the following subgroups:
male, younger, more educated, full-time employees, richer, more politically conservative
and the more politically engaged citizens, but that the difference in treatment effect is
only significantly different between non-full-time and full-time employees. Tables D.1 and
D.2 in Appendix D report the full regressions (see Tables D.5 and D.6 for specifications
without controls.)
[Figure 8 about here.]
[Table 5 about here.]
Based on Table 5, the following main result for the heterogeneity analysis can be
formulated:
Result 3 (Rentier State Hypothesis): The positive effect of taxation on the will-
ingness to punish is robust across all subgroups of respondents, with the exception of
employment status. Across gender, age, education, income, political view, political en-
gagement and negative emotions, the Tax State treatment increases the willingness to
punish compared to the Rentier State treatment (βT +βH +θH×T and βT +βH +θH×T+
θH +θT + γ > 0, Columns (1)-(3) and (5)-(7)), though not significantly in all groups.
Result 3 shows that Result 1, the Rentier State effect, is robust across the different
subgroups. This indicates that the effect of taxation on willingness to punish is a general
one and not driven by specific subgroups.
5.4 Leader decisions
This subsection investigates the leaders’ decisions for investment in the common pool.11
Figure 9 illustrates the distribution of leader investment behavior: each bar indicates
the share of leaders that invested the given share in the common pool. It shows that
the majority of leaders, 60 percent, invest everything. About 25 percent keep the entire
group endowment to themselves and 4 percent invest half.
[Figure 9 about here.]
Next, the effect of taxation on leader investments is investigated. Figure 10 illustrates
the effect of going from the Rentier State to the Tax State treatment on the share in-
vested by the leader. It shows that the Hard Earned and the Possession mechanism do
not significantly affect the leader’s investment behavior when working in combination.
Table 6 reports the estimated results of Equation (6) taking the standardized value of
11Balance tables for leaders are reported in Tables F.1 - F.4 in Appendix F.
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the leader’s investment as the dependent variable. The regressions replicate the descrip-
tive result from Figure 10 for both the 11-point scale and the binary definition of leader
investment (the binary outcome takes the value of one for leaders that invest everything
in the common pool and zero otherwise). The regressions furthermore show that when
the group endowment is collected as tax, going from the Windfall to the Hard Earned
treatment significantly increases the investment share. This is indicative evidence of tax-
ation positively affecting leader behavior through the Hard Earned mechanism.
[Figure 10 about here.]
In terms of background variables, older and more politically engaged leaders invest
more, and full-time employees and more politically conservative leaders invest less in the
common pool. Figure F.1 in Appendix F shows that the effect of the Hard Earned treat-
ment on investment share is not driven by beliefs about citizens’ punishment, providing
suggestive evidence that the effect of taxation on provision of accountability is not driven
by beliefs about punishment.
[Table 6 about here.]
Based on the analysis of leader decisions, the following result can be formulated:
Result 4 (Leader investment): Leaders invest more in the common pool when the
group endowment is produced by work, but the effect is only statistically significant when
the group endowment is also collected through taxation (βH +θ = 0.167, p = 0.067 and
βH = 0.050, p = 0.616, Column (3)).
Result 4 provides suggestive evidence of taxation increasing the share invested by the
leader.
6 Discussion and conclusion
This paper studies the effect of taxation on demand for accountability in an economic
experiment. The experimental design focuses on two features that distinguish tax from
other sources of government revenue, as underlying mechanisms explaining why it is
perceived differently; tax revenue is produced by the citizens’ work and has been in their
possession before being collected as tax. The paper offers three main findings. First,
when revenue is tax revenue this causes a higher demand for accountability, measured
as citizens’ willingness to costly punish the leader’s investment decision for the group
endowment. Citizens have a significantly higher willingness to punish when the group
endowment is produced by work and financed through taxation compared to when it is
windfall and non-tax. This finding provides evidence in support of the Rentier State
Hypothesis. The heterogeneity analysis shows that the finding is robust across all, but
one, subgroups of the sample. Second, the two distinguishing features of tax revenue, that
it is hard earned and has been in the citizen’s possession before being collected through
taxation, do not have separate significant effects on the willingness to punish. Third, the
effect of taxation on willingness to punish can be partly explained by negative emotions.
Taxation causes citizens to have stronger negative emotions about unfair investments,
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and citizens are more willing to punish the stronger their negative emotions are. This
finding highlights the importance of emotions in decision-making.
The results provide important implications for our understanding of citizens’ account-
ability behavior and for policy. First, taxing citizens is not only an instrument for gener-
ating government revenue, it may also promote demand for accountability, which in turn
is generally assumed to increase government accountability. A tax system designed to
enhance demand for accountability should have the following features. First, tax should
be paid in arrears, not as withholding. Second, tax should mainly be levied on income
that is earned, such as employment income, not on unearned (windfall) income such as
lottery prizes and inheritance. The argument is that when paying taxes in arrears and on
earned income, citizens actively contribute to tax revenues, which increases the salience
of fairness in resource distribution and that this in turn increases demand for account-
ability. However, collecting tax in arrears might conflict with other policy goals, such as
increasing tax compliance (see for instance Dhami and al Nowaihi (2007) or Engstro¨m
et al. (2015)). Furthermore, the results imply that if the government’s aim is to improve
accountability to all groups in the population, the tax base should be broadly defined
and also include those who, from a revenue perspective, it is not worth collecting taxes
from.
This paper studies the effect of taxation on demand for accountability in an experi-
mental setting that tightly controls for factors that are not the focus of the study, but that
might affect demand for accountability. This enables a clean causal test of the effect of
taxation on demand for accountability and of the micro-founded mechanisms that might
explain it. Testing these mechanisms in a field setting is an interesting topic for future
research. Furthermore, testing the causal effect of taxation and the effect of demand
for accountability on accountability in government spending will shed more light on the
political effects of taxation.
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Figure 1: Effect of taxation on the willingness to punish
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The figure shows the mean willingness to punish for citizens in the Rentier State (group endowment
is windfall and non-tax) and Tax State (group endowment is produced by work and financed through
taxation) treatments. The estimated standard errors are also indicated.
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Figure 2: Sequence of events
Random assignment
Treatment, pair, role
STAGE 1: RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
1
Citizen
Not workWork
Leader
STAGE 2: WORK DECISION
Not workWork
1
Windfall
Group endowment
($2)
STAGE 3: GROUP ENDOWMENT
1
Leader
STAGE 4: LEADER DECISION
KeepCommon pool
($X × 1.5)
$(2 - X)$X
1
Citizen
STAGE 5: CITIZEN DECISION
Punish
-$0.05
Not
punish
1
1
The figure illustrates the sequence of events for the Rentier State treatment.
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Figure 4: Types of punishment behavior
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Note: The figure shows the share of citizens characterized by four different types of punishment behavior.
“Never”: citizens that never punish the leader. “Low investments (0%-50%)”: citizens that punish an
investment share of between 0% and 50% as the highest. “High investments (60%-90%)”: citizens that
punish an investment share between 60% and 90% as the highest. “Always”: citizens that punish all
investment decisions of the leader, even when he or she invests 100%.
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Figure 5: How upset would you be if the leader invests less than the fair share?
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Note: The figure illustrates how citizens answered the question “How upset would you be if the leader
invests less than the fair share, when both of you completed the assignment?” on a 11-point scale from
“Not upset at all” (1) to “Very upset” (11). Each bar indicates the share of citizens that answered each
of the numbers on the scale.
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Figure 6: The willingness to punish and negative emotions
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Note: Left panel: illustrates the mean willingness to punish and estimated standard error for citizens
that would be less than median and citizens that would be more than median upset if the leader invests
less than the fair share, respectively. Right panel illustrates the mean willingness to punish and
estimated standard error for citizens according to their answer to the question “How upset would you
be if the leader invests less than the fair share”. Each bar illustrates the mean willingness to punish for
that level of negative emotions.
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Figure 7: Effect of taxation on negative emotions
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Note: The figure shows the mean values for how upset the citizen would be if the leader invest less than
the fair share for the Rentier State and Tax State treatments, respectively. The variable is measured on
a scale from 1 (Not upset at all) to 11 (Very upset). The figure also indicates the estimated standard
errors.
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Figure 8: Effect of taxation on the willingness to punish by subgroup
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Note: The figure shows the mean willingness to punish and standard error for the Rentier State and Tax
Treatments, by subgroups. “Male”: indicator variable taking the value of 1 for males, “Above median
age” indicator variable taking the value of 1 if individual is older than the median age of the sample
(34 years), “Above median education”: indicator taking the value of 1 for individuals who have a 4-year
degree or higher education, “Employed full-time”: indicator variable for individuals who are full-time
employees, “Above median income”: indicator variable taking the value of 1 for individuals that have
an individual yearly income of USD 40 000 or more, “Conservative”: indicator variable taking the value
of 1 for individuals that rate themselves 6 or higher on a scale from 0 (strongly liberal) to 10 (strongly
conservative), “More politically engaged”: indicator variable taking the value of 1 for individuals that
report to have participated in more than the median number (two) of political activities during the last
year, and “More upset”: indicator variable taking the value of 1 for individuals who report that they
would be higher than median upset if the leader invests less than the fair share.
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Figure 9: Distribution of share invested by leaders
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Note: The figure shows the distribution of share the leaders invest in the common pool for the total
sample. Each bar illustrates the share of leaders that made given investment in the common pool.
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Figure 10: Effect of taxation on share invested by leaders
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Note: The figure shows the mean share invested by leader and estimated standard errors by Rentier
State and Tax State treatments.
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Table 2: Effect of negative emotions on the willingness to punish
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Above median upset 0.578∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.072) (0.072)
Upset 0.122∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Male –0.061 –0.059 –0.047 –0.046
(0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065)
Above median age 0.031 0.028 0.056 0.052
(0.072) (0.072) (0.070) (0.070)
Above median education –0.034 –0.037 –0.018 –0.021
(0.076) (0.077) (0.074) (0.075)
Employed full-time 0.114 0.116 0.111 0.113
(0.078) (0.078) (0.076) (0.076)
Above median income –0.015 –0.015 –0.007 –0.008
(0.080) (0.080) (0.077) (0.077)
Conservative 0.011 0.014
(0.074) (0.072)
More politically engaged 0.066 0.059
(0.073) (0.071)
Constant –0.282∗∗∗ –0.303∗∗∗ –0.334∗∗∗ –0.743∗∗∗ –0.793∗∗∗ –0.820∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.087) (0.099) (0.071) (0.105) (0.114)
Observations 739 739 739 739 739 739
R2 0.084 0.087 0.088 0.127 0.131 0.132
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of the standardized willingness to punish on negative emotions
and a set of explanatory variables. Columns (1)-(3) include an indicator variable for above median
negative emotions, “Above median upset” and Columns (4)-(6) includes “Upset”, measured on
a scale from 1 (not upset at all) to 11 (very upset). See Table 3 for definitions of background
variables.
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Table 3: Effect of taxation on the willingness to punish
Willingness to punish High punishment dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hard Earned 0.034 0.031 0.040 –0.006 –0.006 –0.010
(0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102)
Tax 0.121 0.133 0.129 0.076 0.077 0.071
(0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.112) (0.112) (0.113)
Hard Earned x Tax 0.033 0.019 0.018 0.126 0.118 0.131
(0.151) (0.152) (0.153) (0.148) (0.149) (0.150)
Male –0.113 –0.108 –0.046 –0.043
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.069)
Above median age 0.001 –0.003 0.007 0.013
(0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075)
Above median education –0.004 –0.013 0.077 0.070
(0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.083)
Employed full-time 0.137∗ 0.139∗ –0.023 –0.027
(0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.079)
Above median income 0.006 0.007 –0.019 –0.014
(0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085)
Conservative 0.006 –0.065
(0.077) (0.077)
More politically engaged 0.120 –0.013
(0.076) (0.075)
Constant –0.101 –0.125 –0.185 –0.088 –0.087 –0.052
(0.076) (0.109) (0.122) (0.072) (0.108) (0.122)
Hard Earned + Tax + Hard Earned x Tax 0.188∗ 0.182∗ 0.186∗ 0.195∗∗ 0.189∗ 0.192∗∗
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
Hard Earned + Hard Earned x Tax 0.066 0.050 0.057 0.120 0.112 0.121
(0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109)
Tax + Hard Earned x Tax 0.154 0.151 0.147 0.202∗∗ 0.195∗∗ 0.202∗∗
(0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
Observations 739 739 739 739 739 739
R2 0.006 0.013 0.017 0.008 0.010 0.011
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Note: The table reports regressions of the standardized value of willingness to punish on the treatment
variables “Hard Earned” (indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals in the Hard Earned
treatments (T2 and T4), “Tax” (indicator variable taking the value of 1 for individuals in the Tax
treatments (T3 and T4)) and “Hard Earned x Tax” (interaction term between “Hard Earned” and
“Tax”) and a set of explanatory variables. Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the 11-point scale
definition of willingness to punish (takes values 0.0, 0.1, 0.2,...,1). Columns (4)-(6) show the results for
a dummy taking the value of one if the individual always punish, or punishes all, but the highest level
of investment. “Male”: indicator variable taking the value of 1 for males, “Above median age” indicator
variable taking the value of 1 if individual is older than the median age of the sample (34 years), “Above
median education”: indicator taking the value of 1 for individuals who have a 4-year degree or higher
education, “Employed full-time”: indicator variables for individuals who are full-time employees, “Above
median income”: indicator variable taking the value of 1 for individuals that have an individual yearly
income of USD 40 000 or more, “Conservative”: indicator variable taking the value of 1 for individuals
that rate themselves 6 or higher on a scale from 0 (strongly liberal) to 10 (strongly conservative) and
“More politically engaged”: indicator variable taking the value of 1 for individuals that report to have
participated in more than the median number (2) of political activities during the last year. “Hard
Earned + Tax + Hard Earned x Tax” is the sum of the estimated parameters for “Hard Earned”, “Tax”
and “Hard Earned x Tax”. “Tax + Hard Earned x Tax” is the sum of the estimated parameters for
“Tax” and “Hard Earned”. “Hard Earned + Hard Earned x Tax” is the sum of estimated parameters
for “Hard Earned” and “Hard Earned x Tax”.
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Table 4: Effect of taxation on negative emotions
(1) (2)
Hard Earned –0.077 –0.082
(0.109) (0.108)
Tax 0.150 0.148
(0.113) (0.114)
Hard Earned x Tax 0.075 0.071
(0.151) (0.152)
Male –0.193∗∗∗
(0.069)
Above median age –0.162∗∗
(0.074)
Above median education 0.032
(0.080)
Employed full-time 0.070
(0.080)
Above median income 0.041
(0.083)
Conservative –0.009
(0.077)
More politically engaged 0.168∗∗
(0.074)
Constant –0.068 –0.043
(0.075) (0.116)
Hard Earned + Tax + Hard Earned x Tax 0.149 0.137
(0.096) (0.096)
Hard Earned + Hard Earned x Tax –0.002 –0.011
(0.105) (0.106)
Tax + Hard Earned x Tax 0.226∗∗ 0.219∗∗
(0.100) (0.100)
Observations 739 739
R2 0.009 0.034
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of negative emotions (“How
upset would you be if the leader invests less than the fair share?”),
measured on a standardized 11-point scale, on the treatment vari-
ables “Hard Earned & Non-Tax” (indicator variable taking the value
of one for individuals in the Hard Earned & Non-Tax treatment
(T2), “Windfall & Tax” (indicator variable taking the value of one
for individuals in the Windfall & Tax treatment (T3) and “Tax
State” (indicator variable taking the value of one for citizens in the
Tax State treatment) and a set of explanatory variables (see Table
3 for definitions).
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Table 5: Effect of going from Rentier State to Tax State treatment on the willingness to
punish for subgroups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male Older Higher educ Full time Income Conserv. Pol. eng. Upset
Total, var = 0 0.127 0.256∗ 0.024 –0.039 0.136 0.036 0.145 0.126
(0.133) (0.134) (0.149) (0.157) (0.133) (0.135) (0.138) (0.125)
Total, var = 1 0.245∗ 0.119 0.311∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.243∗ 0.352∗∗ 0.233∗ 0.174
(0.136) (0.144) (0.129) (0.124) (0.145) (0.141) (0.140) (0.147)
Difference 0.117 –0.137 0.287 0.382∗ 0.107 0.316 0.088 0.048
(0.183) (0.197) (0.197) (0.200) (0.197) (0.195) (0.197) (0.194)
Background vars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political vars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 739 739 739 739 739 739 739 739
R2 0.018 0.021 0.028 0.022 0.019 0.024 0.021 0.092
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports the estimated regression coefficients for the effect of going from the Rentier State
to the Tax State treatment on the standardized value of willingness to punish for different subgroups of the
sample. “Total, Var = 0” is the estimated effect on subgroups for which the respective variables in the column
headers take the value of zero (the sum of the estimated parameters for “Hard Earned”, “Tax” and “Hard
Earned x Tax” in Table D.1 in Appendix D), “Total, Var = 1” is the estimated effect on subgroups for which
the respective variables in the column headers take the value of one (the sum of the estimated parameters for
“Hard Earned”, “Tax”, “Hard Earned x Tax”, “Hard Earned x Var”, “Tax x Var” and “Hard Earned x Tax
x Var” in Table D.1 in Appendix D) and “Difference” is the difference in estimated effect of the Tax State
treatment between the subgroup for which “Var” takes the value of zero and subgroups for which “Var” takes
the value of one (the sum of the estimated parameters for “Hard Earned x Var”, “Tax x Var” and “Hard
Earned x Tax x Var” in Table D.1 in Appendix D). “Upset”: indicator taking the value of 1 for individuals
who state they will be more upset than the median of the sample if the leader invests less than the fair share.
See table 3 for explanation of the rest of the variables.
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Table 6: Effect of taxation on share invested in the common pool (leaders)
Share invested High investment dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hard Earned 0.033 0.043 0.050 0.114 0.119 0.124
(0.100) (0.099) (0.099) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100)
Tax –0.094 –0.099 –0.104 –0.040 –0.053 –0.059
(0.103) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.106) (0.106)
Hard Earned x Tax 0.113 0.114 0.117 0.034 0.040 0.045
(0.136) (0.135) (0.135) (0.136) (0.135) (0.135)
Male –0.028 –0.035 0.044 0.037
(0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063)
Above median age 0.227∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Above median education 0.100 0.074 0.088 0.060
(0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067)
Employed full-time –0.213∗∗∗ –0.223∗∗∗ –0.192∗∗∗ –0.203∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
Above median income –0.061 –0.053 –0.071 –0.066
(0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.071)
Conservative –0.133∗∗ –0.110∗
(0.067) (0.066)
More politically engaged 0.131∗∗ 0.161∗∗
(0.066) (0.066)
Constant –0.009 –0.019 –0.012 –0.059 –0.123 –0.136
(0.070) (0.094) (0.102) (0.073) (0.096) (0.104)
Hard Earned + Tax + Hard Earned x Tax 0.052 0.058 0.062 0.108 0.105 0.109
(0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.089) (0.088) (0.088)
Hard Earned + Hard Earned x Tax 0.145 0.157∗ 0.167∗ 0.148 0.158∗ 0.169∗
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.091) (0.091) (0.090)
Tax + Hard Earned x Tax 0.019 0.015 0.013 –0.006 –0.014 –0.014
(0.088) (0.086) (0.085) (0.086) (0.085) (0.084)
Observations 957 957 957 957 957 957
R2 0.003 0.032 0.042 0.004 0.035 0.046
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of the standardized value of share invested by the leader on the treatment
variables “Hard Earned” (indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals in the Hard Earned treatments
(T2 and T4)), “Tax” (indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals in the Tax treatments (T3 and
T4)) and “Hard Earned x Tax” (interaction term between “Hard Earned” and “Tax”) and a set of explanatory
variables (see Table 3 for definitions of variables). Columns (1)-(3) show the results for the discrete definition of
share invested (takes values 0.1, 0.2,...,1). Columns (4)-(6) show the results for a dummy taking the value of one
if the citizen invests everything in the common pool. “Hard Earned + Tax + Hard Earned x Tax” is the sum of
the estimated parameters for “Hard Earned”, “Tax” and “Hard Earned x Tax”. “Tax + Hard Earned x Tax”
is the sum of the estimated parameters for “Tax” and “Hard Earned”. “Hard Earned + Hard Earned x Tax” is
the sum of estimated parameters for “Hard Earned” and “Hard Earned x Tax”.
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Appendix A Robustness, Hard Earned mechanism
The basic idea behind the Hard Earned mechanism is that the group endowment is
generated by the citizen and the leader’s performance of the real effort task. There
are two possible ways to finance the group endowment through conduction of the real
effort task while keeping the size of the group endowment and reward constant across
treatments. First, the duration of the real effort task can be held constant and equal to
five minutes, and the productivity of the real effort task can be increased from $1 to $2
going from the Windfall to the Hard Earned treatments. Second, the productivity of the
real effort task can be held constant and equal to $1 per minute, and the duration of the
task can b increased from five to ten minutes between the Windfall and Hard Earned
treatments.
In the main treatments, the former type of manipulation of the Hard Earned mecha-
nism is used. To investigate whether the effect of taxation on the willingness to punish is
sensitive to the way the Hard Earn mechanism is manipulated, a robustness treatment,
“Tax State Extra Hard Earned” is implemented. The treatment is identical to the Ren-
tier State treatment in all respects apart from the real effort task being ten minutes long
in stead of five. The treatment can be summarized as follows:
Tax State Extra Hard Earned (Extra Hard Earned & Tax (T4)): Citizen and
leader each earn $2 from performing a 10 minute real effort task. Their earnings
are taxed at 50 percent. The $1 tax collected from each finances the $2 group
endowment.
A.1 Empirical strategy
To test whether the Hard Earned mechanism is sensitive to whether the productivity or
the duration of the task is manipulated, the following regression is estimated on a sample
restricted to the two Tax State treatments:
yi = α +βT4bT4bi +βXXi +βZZi + εi, (8)
where T4bi and an indicator variable taking the value of one for citizens in the Tax State
Extra Hard Earned treatment and zero for citizens in the Tax State treatment.
A.2 Results
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Table A.1: Robustness check for Hard Earned mechanism
(1) (2) (3)
Extra Hard Earned 0.038 0.038 0.068
(0.123) (0.123) (0.122)
Male –0.081 –0.106
(0.132) (0.131)
Above median age 0.076 0.050
(0.125) (0.124)
Above median education 0.007 0.023
(0.130) (0.130)
Employed full-time 0.354∗∗ 0.353∗∗
(0.141) (0.142)
Above median income –0.105 –0.100
(0.142) (0.142)
Conservative 0.263∗∗
(0.127)
More politically engaged 0.264∗∗
(0.127)
Constant 0.067 –0.092 –0.346∗∗
(0.088) (0.154) (0.174)
Observations 284 284 284
R2 0.000 0.024 0.047
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions for the standardized
willingness to punish variable on “Extra Hard Earned” an
indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals in
the Hard Earned treatment that worked 10 minutes instead
of 5 minutes, and a range of background variables. The
background variables are as defined in Table 1.
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Table B.5: Effect of treatments on decision to work
(1) (2)
Tax State 0.001 0.003
(0.019) (0.019)
Hard Earned & Non-Tax 0.029 0.032∗
(0.018) (0.018)
Windfall & Tax –0.062∗∗ –0.059∗∗
(0.027) (0.027)
Male –0.010
(0.014)
Above median age 0.027∗
(0.014)
Above median education 0.006
(0.017)
Employed full-time –0.011
(0.016)
Above median income 0.004
(0.018)
Conservative –0.017
(0.016)
More politically engaged 0.040∗∗∗
(0.015)
Constant 0.951∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.022)
P-value F-test 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
Observations 983 983
R2 0.017 0.033
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: Regressions showing the relationship be-
tween the decision to work (dependent variable is
indicator variable taking the value of one for cit-
izen who choose to work) and treatments. The
Rentier State treatment is is the reference cate-
gory in all regressions. “Tax State” is an indicator
variable taking the value of one for individuals in
the Tax State treatment, “Hard Earned & Non-
Tax” is an indicator variable taking the value of
one for individuals in the Hard Earned & Non-Tax
treatment and “Windfall & Tax” is an indicator
variable taking the value of one for individual in
the Windfall & Non-Tax treatment. “P-value of
F-test” reports the p-value for the test of “Tax
State” = “Hard Earned & Non-Tax” = “Windfall
& Tax”. The background variables are as defined
in Table 3.
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Table B.6: Effect of treatments on inconsistent punishment behavior
(1) (2)
Tax State 0.079∗∗ 0.073∗∗
(0.034) (0.035)
Hard Earned & Non-Tax 0.026 0.024
(0.038) (0.039)
Windfall & Tax 0.043 0.047
(0.041) (0.041)
Male –0.040
(0.025)
Above median age –0.005
(0.027)
Above median education –0.020
(0.029)
Employed full-time 0.027
(0.030)
Above median income –0.006
(0.031)
Conservative 0.036
(0.028)
More politically engaged –0.009
(0.027)
Constant 0.160∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.043)
P-value F-test 0.300 0.384
Observations 929 929
R2 0.006 0.012
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: Regressions showing the relationship be-
tween switching the wrong way (not punish low
levels of investments and punish high levels of in-
vestments) or multiple times (dependent variable
is indicator variable taking the value of one for cit-
izens who switch the wrong way) and treatments.
The Rentier State treatment is is the reference
category in all regressions. “Tax State” is an indi-
cator variable taking the value of one for individ-
uals in the Tax State treatment, “Hard Earned
& Non-Tax” is an indicator variable taking the
value of one for individuals in the Hard Earned &
Non-Tax treatment and “Windfall & Tax” is an
indicator variable taking the value of one for indi-
vidual in the Windfall & Non-Tax treatment.“P-
value of F-test” reports the p-value for the test
of “Tax State” = “Hard Earned & No-Tax” =
“Windfall & Tax”. The background variables are
as defined in Table 3.
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Appendix C Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan
C.1 Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan
Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework presented in the paper states that taxation causes a higher
demand for accountability through an increased salience of fairness. The framework pre-
sented in the pre-analysis plan included both the salience of fairness considerations and
deviations from reference payoff.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable was defined as “Highest investment share not punished” in the
pre-analysis plan, but is defined as “Highest investment share punished” in the specifi-
cations reported in the paper. The latter definition was chosen for pedagogical reasons,
but does not qualitatively change the results. The results for the original definition of
the dependent variable is reported in Table D.4.
Heterogeneity analysis
Employment status was not pre-specified as a dimension for the heterogeneity analysis
in the pre-analysis plan, but results for this are presented in the paper. This is because
the emission of employment status from the pre-analysis plan was not intentional.
In addition to socioeconomic background characteristics and negative emotions, the
pre-analysis plan specified risk preferences, altruism, positive reciprocity, negative reci-
procity and loss aversion as dimensions for the heterogeneity analysis. Table B.4 in
Appendix B tests whether the citizens’ preferences and negative emotions are affected
by treatments, by regressing the respective preference and emotion measures on indica-
tor variables for the Hard Earned & Non-Tax, the Windfall & Non-Tax and the Tax
State treatment (Rentier State is the reference category). It shows that the Tax State
treatment significantly reduces the citizens’ self-reported altruism and loss aversion, and
significantly increases negative reciprocity and there is therefore no heterogeneity anal-
ysis for these dimensions in the paper. There are no good theoretical reasons to expect
heterogeneity in effects of taxation according to positive reciprocity and altruism and the
analysis is not presented in the main paper, but can be found in Table D.7.
C.2 Additional analyses reported
Citizen behavior
The following results are reported in the paper, but were not specified in the pre-analysis
plan and should be considered exploratory.
• Regressions with binary dependent variable reported in Columns (4)-(6) in Table
3, and in Columns (1)-(3) in Table D.3
Leader behavior
The pre-analysis specified regressions to investigate the effect of the Hard Earned treat-
ments on the share invested in the common pool in the leader. The paper additionally
reports treatment effects of the Tax treatments.
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Appendix D Additional figures and tables
Figure D.1: Distribution of the willingness to punish
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Note: The figure illustrates the share of citizens that for each of the 11 possible investment levels punish
that level as the highest.
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Table D.1: Heterogeneity analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Male Older Higher educ Full-time Income Conservative Pol. engaged
Hard Earned 0.017 0.195 –0.045 –0.036 0.007 0.078 0.135
(0.150) (0.148) (0.160) (0.173) (0.149) (0.146) (0.150)
Tax 0.052 0.289∗ –0.243 –0.025 –0.004 0.105 0.078
(0.158) (0.158) (0.169) (0.180) (0.160) (0.152) (0.168)
Var –0.190 –0.005 –0.273∗ –0.081 –0.101 –0.099 0.117
(0.135) (0.075) (0.156) (0.161) (0.158) (0.153) (0.154)
HE x Tax 0.058 –0.228 0.312 0.022 0.133 –0.148 –0.068
(0.208) (0.208) (0.223) (0.237) (0.211) (0.201) (0.214)
HE x Var 0.038 –0.323 0.144 0.122 0.072 –0.105 –0.227
(0.203) (0.216) (0.216) (0.221) (0.217) (0.216) (0.217)
Tax x Var 0.140 –0.333 0.668∗∗∗ 0.260 0.287 0.035 0.099
(0.187) (0.233) (0.231) (0.237) (0.233) (0.237) (0.234)
HE x Tax x Var –0.061 0.519∗ –0.526∗ 0.000 –0.253 0.386 0.217
(0.272) (0.304) (0.304) (0.310) (0.306) (0.307) (0.307)
Constant –0.139 –0.278∗∗ –0.029 –0.058 –0.131 –0.138 –0.189
(0.140) (0.138) (0.147) (0.147) (0.139) (0.137) (0.139)
Total, var = 0 0.127 0.256∗ 0.024 –0.039 0.136 0.036 0.145
(0.133) (0.134) (0.149) (0.157) (0.133) (0.135) (0.138)
Total, var = 1 0.245∗ 0.119 0.311∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.243∗ 0.352∗∗ 0.233∗
(0.136) (0.144) (0.129) (0.124) (0.145) (0.141) (0.140)
Difference 0.117 –0.137 0.287 0.382∗ 0.107 0.316 0.088
(0.183) (0.197) (0.197) (0.200) (0.197) (0.195) (0.197)
Background vars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political vars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 739 739 739 739 739 739 739
R2 0.018 0.021 0.028 0.022 0.019 0.024 0.021
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of standardized value of the willingness to punish on the treatment
variables “Hard Earned” (indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals in the Hard Earned treat-
ments (T2 and T4), “Tax” (indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals in the Tax treatments
(T3 and T4)), “Hard Earned x Tax” (interaction term between “Hard Earned” and “Tax”), “Hard Earned
x Var” (interaction term between “Hard Earned” and “Var”), “Tax x Var” (interaction term between “Tax”
and “Var” and “Hard Earned x Tax x Var” (interaction term between “Hard Earned”, “Tax” and “Var”)
and a set of explanatory variables (defined in Table 3). “Total, Var = 0” is the sum of the estimated pa-
rameters for “Hard Earned”, “Tax” and “Hard Earned x Tax”, “Total, Var = 1” is the sum of the estimated
parameters for “Hard Earned”, “Tax”, “Hard Earned x Tax”, “Hard Earned x‘Var”, “Tax x Var” and ‘Hard
Earned x Tax x Var”, “Difference” is the sum of the estimated parameters for “Hard Earned x Var”, “Tax
x Var” and “Hard Earned x Tax x Var”.
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Table D.2: Heterogeneity, preferences and emotion
(1)
Hard Earned 0.043
(0.129)
Tax 0.025
(0.145)
Above median upset 0.516∗∗∗
(0.152)
HE x Tax 0.058
(0.192)
HE x Above median upset 0.012
(0.213)
Tax x Above median upset 0.115
(0.227)
HE x Tax x Above median upset –0.079
(0.296)
Constant –0.392∗∗∗
(0.131)
Total, Var = 0 0.126
(0.125)
Total, Var = 1 0.174
(0.147)
Difference 0.048
(0.194)
Background vars Yes
Political vars Yes
Observations 739
R2 0.092
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of stan-
dardized value of the willingness to punish on
the treatment variables (see Table D.1 for defi-
nitions of these and the interaction terms)and a
set of explanatory variables (see Table 3 for def-
initions). “Upset”: indicator taking the value of
1 for individuals who state they will be more up-
set than the median of the sample if the leader
invests less than the fair share. “Total, Var
= 0” is the sum of the estimated parameters
for “Hard Earned”, “Tax” and “Hard Earned x
Tax”, “Total, Var = 1” is the sum of the es-
timated parameters for “Hard Earned”, “Tax”,
“Hard Earned x Tax”, “Hard Earned x‘Var”,
“Tax x Var” and ‘Hard Earned x Tax x Var”,
“Difference” is the sum of the estimated param-
eters for “Hard Earned x Var”, “Tax x Var” and
“Hard Earned x Tax x Var”.
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Table D.3: Treatment effects on the willingness to punish: dummy for positive punish-
ment
Only consistent punishers Total sample of citizens who worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hard Earned 0.070 0.058 0.072 0.086 0.071 0.085
(0.112) (0.112) (0.113) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
Tax 0.086 0.098 0.098 0.102 0.106 0.117
(0.117) (0.117) (0.116) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106)
Hard Earned x Tax –0.076 –0.086 –0.097 –0.044 –0.053 –0.075
(0.153) (0.153) (0.154) (0.138) (0.138) (0.139)
Male –0.175∗∗ –0.172∗∗ –0.188∗∗∗ –0.189∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.069) (0.063) (0.063)
Above median age –0.092 –0.102 –0.083 –0.095
(0.075) (0.075) (0.066) (0.067)
Above median education –0.038 –0.043 –0.061 –0.062
(0.079) (0.079) (0.070) (0.070)
Employed full-time 0.176∗∗ 0.182∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.172∗∗
(0.082) (0.082) (0.072) (0.072)
Above median income 0.048 0.045 0.041 0.038
(0.084) (0.083) (0.072) (0.072)
Conservative 0.056 0.084
(0.077) (0.068)
More politically engaged 0.159∗∗ 0.122∗
(0.075) (0.067)
Constant –0.062 –0.030 –0.130 –0.094 –0.036 –0.132
(0.079) (0.110) (0.122) (0.073) (0.099) (0.111)
Hard Earned + Tax + Hard Earned x Tax 0.080 0.070 0.073 0.144 0.124 0.127
(0.099) (0.098) (0.098) 0.089 0.089 0.089
Hard Earned + Hard Earned x Tax –0.006 –0.027 –0.024 0.041 0.018 0.010
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.092) (0.093) (0.093)
Tax + Hard Earned x Tax 0.010 0.012 0.001 0.058 0.053 0.042
(0.099) (0.099) (0.100) 0.088 0.088 0.089
Observations 739 739 739 929 929 929
R2 0.001 0.018 0.024 0.003 0.019 0.023
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of a dummy taking the value of one for citizens that punish some investment
and zero for citizens that never punish on the treatment variables “Hard Earned” (indicator variable taking the value
of one for individuals in the Hard Earned treatments (T2 and T4)), “Tax” (indicator variable taking the value of
one for individuals in the Tax treatments (T3 and T4)) and “Hard Earned x Tax” (interaction term between “Hard
Earned” and “Tax”) and a set of explanatory variables (see Table 3 for definitions). “Hard Earned + Tax + Hard
Earned x Tax” is the sum of the estimated parameters for “Hard Earned”, “Tax” and “Hard Earned x Tax”. “Tax +
Hard Earned x Tax” is the sum of the estimated parameters for “Tax” and “Hard Earned”. “Hard Earned + Hard
Earned x Tax” is the sum of estimated parameters for “Hard Earned” and “Hard Earned x Tax”. Column (1) - (3)
shows the regressions on the sample without the inconsistent punishers, and Column (4) - (6) shows the regressions
on the sample including the inconsistent punishers.
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Table D.4: Treatment effects on lowest investment share not punished
(1) (2) (3)
Hard Earned 0.048 0.044 0.054
(0.107) (0.108) (0.108)
Tax 0.128 0.139 0.136
(0.116) (0.116) (0.117)
Hard Earned x Tax 0.002 –0.012 –0.014
(0.152) (0.152) (0.153)
Male –0.124∗ –0.119∗
(0.069) (0.069)
Above median age –0.010 –0.016
(0.074) (0.074)
Above median education –0.007 –0.015
(0.080) (0.080)
Employed full-time 0.143∗ 0.146∗
(0.081) (0.081)
Above median income 0.006 0.006
(0.084) (0.084)
Conservative 0.011
(0.077)
More politically engaged 0.130∗
(0.075)
Constant –0.102 –0.116 –0.183
(0.076) (0.108) (0.122)
Hard Earned + Tax + Hard Earned x Tax 0.178∗ 0.172∗ 0.176∗
(0.097) (0.098) (0.097)
Hard Earned + Hard Earned x Tax 0.050 0.032 0.040
(0.107) (0.108) (0.108)
Tax + Hard Earned x Tax 0.130 0.128 0.122
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098)
Observations 739 739 739
R2 0.005 0.013 0.017
Robust standard errors in parentheses,∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of standardized value of willingness to punish, mea-
sured as the lowest share invested for which the citizen does not punish, on the treatment
variables “Hard Earned” (indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals in the
Hard Earned treatments (T2 and T4), “Tax” (indicator variable taking the value of one
for individuals in the Tax treatments (T3 and T4)) and “Hard Earned x Tax” (interaction
term between “Hard Earned” and “Tax”) and a set of explanatory variables (see Table 3
for definitions). “Hard Earned + Tax + Hard Earned x Tax” is the sum of the estimated
parameters for “Hard Earned”, “Tax” and “Hard Earned x Tax”. “Tax + Hard Earned x
Tax” is the sum of the estimated parameters for “Tax” and “Hard Earned”. “Hard Earned
+ Hard Earned x Tax” is the sum of estimated parameters for “Hard Earned” and “Hard
Earned x Tax”.
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Table D.5: Heterogeneity regressions without controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Male Older Higher educ Full time Income Conservative Pol. engaged
Hard Earned –0.018 0.199 –0.047 –0.025 –0.014 0.078 0.158
(0.148) (0.147) (0.159) (0.172) (0.147) (0.144) (0.148)
Tax 0.044 0.298∗ –0.241 –0.027 –0.002 0.110 0.097
(0.157) (0.157) (0.168) (0.180) (0.158) (0.152) (0.168)
Var –0.200 0.210 –0.230 –0.092 –0.074 –0.115 0.151
(0.133) (0.151) (0.153) (0.157) (0.153) (0.152) (0.152)
HE x Tax 0.075 –0.218 0.321 0.025 0.157 –0.134 –0.088
(0.206) (0.206) (0.222) (0.235) (0.208) (0.200) (0.213)
HE x Var 0.087 –0.342 0.139 0.098 0.100 –0.121 –0.268
(0.201) (0.213) (0.215) (0.220) (0.215) (0.214) (0.215)
Tax x Var 0.151 –0.367 0.648∗∗∗ 0.259 0.267 –0.002 0.036
(0.188) (0.232) (0.229) (0.236) (0.232) (0.237) (0.232)
HE x Tax x Var –0.081 0.527∗ –0.513∗ 0.016 –0.265 0.406 0.286
(0.271) (0.303) (0.302) (0.307) (0.303) (0.307) (0.303)
Constant 0.004 –0.207∗∗ 0.027 –0.046 –0.067 –0.050 –0.176
(0.105) (0.104) (0.116) (0.125) (0.102) (0.105) (0.108)
HE + HE x Var 0.068 –0.143 0.092 0.073 0.086 –0.044 –0.110
(0.145) (0.154) (0.144) (0.137) (0.157) (0.159) (0.156)
Tax + Tax x Var 0.195 –0.068 0.407∗∗∗ 0.232 0.265 0.108 0.133
(0.142) (0.171) (0.155) (0.152) (0.170) (0.183) (0.160)
Total, var = 0 0.101 0.279∗∗ 0.034 –0.028 0.140 0.054 0.167
(0.133) (0.134) (0.149) (0.157) (0.132) (0.136) (0.136)
Total, var = 1 0.258∗ 0.098 0.308∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.242∗ 0.337∗∗ 0.221
(0.135) (0.143) (0.129) (0.125) (0.146) (0.141) (0.141)
Difference 0.157 –0.182 0.275 0.373∗ 0.102 0.282 0.054
(0.182) (0.195) (0.197) (0.200) (0.197) (0.196) (0.196)
Observations 739 739 739 739 739 739 739
R2 0.010 0.011 0.018 0.015 0.008 0.013 0.014
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of standardized value of the willingness to punish on the treatment
variables “Hard Earned” (indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals in the Hard Earned
treatments (T2 and T4), “Tax” (indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals in the Tax treatments
(T3 and T4)), “Hard Earned x Tax” (interaction term between “Hard Earned” and “Tax”), “Hard Earned
x Var” (interaction term between “Hard Earned” and “Var”), “Tax x Var” (interaction term between “Tax”
and “Var” and “Hard Earned x Tax x Var” (interaction term between “Hard Earned”, “Tax” and “Var”).
“HE + HE x Var” is the sum of the estimated parameters for “Hard Earned” and “Hard Earned x Var”,
“Tax + Tax x Var” is the sum of the estimated parameters for “tax” and “Tax x Var”, “Total, Var = 0” is
the sum of the estimated parameters for “Hard Earned”, “Tax” and “Hard Earned x Tax”, “Total, Var =
1” is the sum of the estimated parameters for “Hard Earned”, “Tax”, “Hard Earned x Tax”, “Hard Earned
x‘Var”, “Tax x Var” and ‘Hard Earned x Tax x Var”, “Difference” is the sum of the estimated parameters
for “Hard Earned x Var”, “Tax x Var” and “Hard Earned x Tax x Var”.
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Table D.6: Heterogeneity regressions for negative emotions, without controls
(1)
Hard Earned 0.047
(0.128)
Tax 0.016
(0.141)
Above median upset 0.535∗∗∗
(0.151)
HE x Tax 0.062
(0.189)
HE x Above median upset –0.011
(0.211)
Tax x Above median upset 0.116
(0.223)
HE x Tax x Above median upset –0.061
(0.293)
Constant –0.341∗∗∗
(0.089)
HE + HE x Above median upset 0.037
0.168
Tax + Tax x Above median upset 0.132
0.172
Total, var = 0 0.126
0.123
Total, var = 1 0.169
0.147
Difference 0.044
0.192
Observations 739
R2 0.088
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Note: The table reports regressions of stan-
dardized value of the willingness to punish on
the treatment variables “Hard Earned” (indica-
tor variable taking the value of one for individu-
als in the Hard Earned treatments (T2 and T4)),
“Tax” (indicator variable taking the value of one
for individuals in the Tax treatments (T3 and
T4)), “Hard Earned x Tax” (interaction term be-
tween “Hard Earned” and “Tax”), “Hard Earned
x Var” (interaction term between “Hard Earned”
and “Var”), “Tax x Var” (interaction term be-
tween “Tax” and “Var”) and “Hard Earned x Tax
x Var” (interaction term between “Hard Earned”,
“Tax” and “Var”). “HE + HE x Var” is the sum
of the estimated parameters for “Hard Earned”
and “Hard Earned x Var”, “Tax + Tax x Var”
is the sum of the estimated parameters for “tax”
and “Tax x Var”, “Total, Var = 0” is the sum
of the estimated parameters for “Hard Earned”,
“Tax” and “Hard Earned x Tax”, “Total, Var
= 1” is the sum of the estimated parameters for
“Hard Earned”, “Tax”, “Hard Earned x Tax”,
“Hard Earned x‘Var”, “Tax x Var” and ‘Hard
Earned x Tax x Var”, “Difference” is the sum
of the estimated parameters for “Hard Earned x
Var”, “Tax x Var” and “Hard Earned x Tax x
Var”.
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Table D.7: Heterogeneity, preferences
(1) (2)
Risk averse Positive reciprocity
Hard Earned –0.037 0.255∗
(0.160) (0.150)
Tax 0.207 0.309∗
(0.176) (0.163)
Var –0.135 0.237
(0.153) (0.155)
HE x Tax –0.003 –0.297
(0.226) (0.215)
HE x Var 0.149 –0.442∗∗
(0.216) (0.217)
Tax x Var –0.143 –0.349
(0.233) (0.232)
HE x Tax x Var 0.032 0.625∗∗
(0.305) (0.304)
Constant –0.110 –0.297∗∗
(0.152) (0.142)
HE + HE x Var 0.111 –0.187
(0.146) (0.157)
Tax + Tax x Var 0.064 –0.040
(0.154) (0.166)
Total, Var = 0 0.167 0.267∗∗
(0.147) (0.133)
Total, Var = 1 0.206 0.102
(0.131) (0.144)
Difference 0.038 –0.165
(0.197) (0.197)
Background vars Yes Yes
Political vars Yes Yes
Observations 739 739
R2 0.022 0.023
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Note: The table reports regressions of the standard-
ized value of the willingness to punish on the treatment
variables “Hard Earned” (indicator variable taking the
value of one for individuals in the Hard Earned treat-
ments (T2 and T4), “Tax” (indicator variable taking the
value of one for individuals in the Tax treatments (T3
and T4)), “Hard Earned x Tax” (interaction term be-
tween “Hard Earned” and “Tax”), “Hard Earned x Var”
(interaction term between “Hard Earned” and “Var”),
“Tax x Var” (interaction term between “Tax” and “Var”
and “Hard Earned x Tax x Var” (interaction term be-
tween “Hard Earned”, “Tax” and “Var”) and a set of
explanatory variables. “Risk averse”: indicator variable
taking the value of 1 for individuals that are more than
median risk averse, “Positive reciprocity” indicator vari-
able taking the value of 1 if individual is more than me-
dian risk averse, “Upset”: indicator taking the value of
1 for individuals who state they will be more upset than
the median of the sample if the leader invests less than
the fair share. “Total, Var = 0” is the sum of the esti-
mated parameters for “Hard Earned”, “Tax” and “Hard
Earned x Tax”, “Total, Var = 1” is the sum of the es-
timated parameters for “Hard Earned”, “Tax”, “Hard
Earned x Tax”, “Hard Earned x‘Var”, “Tax x Var” and
‘Hard Earned x Tax x Var”, “Difference” is the sum of
the estimated parameters for “Hard Earned x Var”, “Tax
x Var” and “Hard Earned x Tax x Var”.
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Table D.8: Heterogeneity regressions with dummy as dependent variable with controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Male Older Higher educ Full time Income Conservative Pol. engaged
Hard Earned –0.019 0.072 0.048 –0.091 0.002 –0.042 0.047
(0.145) (0.141) (0.156) (0.171) (0.144) (0.143) (0.146)
Tax 0.110 0.178 –0.025 –0.135 0.142 0.046 0.112
(0.155) (0.156) (0.157) (0.174) (0.157) (0.151) (0.166)
Male –0.049 0.097 0.019 –0.187 0.006 –0.151 –0.047
(0.125) (0.143) (0.150) (0.156) (0.150) (0.143) (0.142)
HE x Tax 0.074 –0.049 0.106 0.318 0.032 0.110 –0.061
(0.206) (0.209) (0.215) (0.233) (0.210) (0.203) (0.213)
HE x Var 0.019 –0.170 –0.112 0.136 –0.025 0.071 –0.139
(0.191) (0.204) (0.205) (0.213) (0.207) (0.201) (0.202)
Tax x Var –0.068 –0.226 0.173 0.356 –0.155 0.044 –0.075
(0.169) (0.223) (0.223) (0.229) (0.224) (0.221) (0.223)
HE x Tax x Var 0.111 0.382 0.050 –0.325 0.215 0.050 0.415
(0.258) (0.296) (0.297) (0.304) (0.301) (0.294) (0.298)
Constant –0.045 –0.095 –0.027 0.033 –0.062 –0.013 –0.040
(0.138) (0.135) (0.140) (0.150) (0.138) (0.137) (0.136)
Total, var = 0 0.164 0.201 0.129 0.092 0.176 0.115 0.097
(0.136) (0.130) (0.144) (0.163) (0.133) (0.139) (0.132)
Total, var = 1 0.226∗ 0.186 0.240∗ 0.259∗∗ 0.211 0.280∗∗ 0.298∗∗
(0.132) (0.144) (0.132) (0.120) (0.144) (0.133) (0.142)
Difference 0.062 –0.015 0.111 0.167 0.035 0.165 0.201
(0.183) (0.193) (0.195) (0.202) (0.196) (0.191) (0.193)
Background vars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 739. 739 739 739 739 739 739
R2 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.016
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of standardized value of the high punishment indicator variable (takes
the value of one for individuals that punish shares invested of 0.9 or 1) on the treatment variables “Hard
Earned” (indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals in the Hard Earned treatments (T2
and T4), “Tax” (indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals in the Tax treatments (T3 and
T4)), “Hard Earned x Tax” (interaction term between “Hard Earned” and “Tax”), “Hard Earned x Var”
(interaction term between “Hard Earned” and “Var”), “Tax x Var” (interaction term between “Tax” and
“Var” and “Hard Earned x Tax x Var” (interaction term between “Hard Earned”, “Tax” and “Var”) and
a set of explanatory variables (see Table 3 for definitions). “Total, Var = 0” is the sum of the estimated
parameters for “Hard Earned”, “Tax” and “Hard Earned x Tax”, “Total, Var = 1” is the sum of the
estimated parameters for “Hard Earned”, “Tax”, “Hard Earned x Tax”, “Hard Earned x‘Var”, “Tax x Var”
and ‘Hard Earned x Tax x Var”, “Difference” is the sum of the estimated parameters for “Hard Earned x
Var”, “Tax x Var” and “Hard Earned x Tax x Var”.
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Appendix E Testing the theoretical framework
E.1 Empirical specification
To further investigate the Possession mechanism, the effect of citizens having had the
money in their possession is scrutinized in the loss and in the gain domain for leader
investments separately. Two dependent variables are defined. First, yi,loss is the highest
level of investments in the loss domain (a share of 0 - 0.6 of group endowment is invested)
that the citizen punishes. This variable takes the value of 0.6 for both individuals that
punish investments of 0.6 and higher and individuals that punish 0.6, but not higher.
Second, yi,gain is the lowest investment in the gain domain (0.7 - 1 of group endowment
invested) for which the citizen does not punish higher investments. This variable takes
the value of 0.7 for both individuals that do not punish investments of 0.7 and individuals
that punish investments of 0.7, but do no punish higher investments.
Different versions of the following equation are estimated:
yi = α +βTTreatmenti +βXXi +βZZi + εi. (9)
The first four take yi,loss as the dependent variable. The first estimates Equation (9) for a
sample limited to T1 and T3, where Treatmenti is an indicator variable taking the value
of one for individuals in T3. The second estimates the equation for a sample limited to T2
and T4, where Treatmenti is an indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals
in T4. The third estimates the equation for the total sample, where Treatmenti is an
indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals in the two tax treatments, T3
and T4. The fourth estimates the equation for a sample restricted to T1 and T4, where
Treatmenti is an indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals in T4. The last
four versions take yi,gain as the dependent variable, but are otherwise similar to the first
four.
E.2 Results
The paper theorizes that the effect of taxation on demand for accountability can be
explained by taxation causing fairness considerations to be more salient, which in turn
makes citizens care more about, and more willing to punish, unfair government behav-
ior. An alternative explanation is that citizens’ willingness to punish the government
is reference dependent, meaning that it is determined by their reference point for the
government’s behavior (Martin, 2016; Paler, 2013; Sandbu, 2006). More specifically, it
could be theorized that citizens get a higher utility from punishing negative deviations
from their reference point than from punishing positive deviations from their reference
point, because negative deviations are perceived as losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Recent research argues that reference points are expectations-based (Ko¨szegi and Rabin,
2006; 2007; 2009; Abeler et al., 2011; Marzilli Ericson and Fuster, 2011; Gill and Prowse,
2012; Banerji and Gupta, 2014), and the citizens’ reference point can thus be modeled as
expectations about what the government will do. Martin (2016) argues that the natural
reference point for the citizens’ expectations is their pre-tax income. Simplifying this
theory, taxed citizens can be assumed to expect to receive benefits from the government
equal to the tax they pay, whereas non-taxed citizens can be assumed to expect nothing.
Thus, taxation causes a higher demand for accountability through increasing the citizens’
expectations about the benefits the government will provide.
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The present data can shed light on how well this simplified theory predicts willingness
to punish by comparing behavior in Non-Tax to Tax-treatments. The theory predicts
that citizens in the Tax treatments expect to get a monetary payoff equal to their pre-tax
income, $2. Their post-tax income is $1, and the leader therefore has to invest a share of
at least 0.7 of the $2 group endowment in order for the citizen to get his pre-tax reference
payoff. Citizens in the Non-Tax treatments, on the other hand, do not pay any tax,
and their “pre-tax” income is $1, which they get regardless of the leaders’ investments.
Thus, the leaders do not have to invest anything in order for the citizens to get their
reference payoffs in the Non-Tax treatments. If the citizens’ utility from punishment is
higher for investments below the reference point, citizens in the Tax treatments should
have a higher willingness to punish investment shares between 0 and 0.6 than citizens in
the Non-Tax treatments, but there should be no difference in punishment behavior for
investment shares of 0.7 and higher. This is because investment shares between 0 and 0.6
are below the reference point for citizens in the Tax treatments but above the reference
point for citizens in the Non-tax treatments, whereas investments shares of 0.7 or higher
are above the reference point for citizens in both Non-Tax and Tax treatments.
Figure E.1 illustrates the effect of going from a Non-Tax treatment to a Tax treatment
on punishment of investments shares for which citizens in the Tax treatments are below
their reference point (upper panel) and on punishment of investment shares for which all
citizens are above their reference point (lower panel), respectively. Both panels show the
effect for Windfall treatments only, for Hard Earned treatments only, and for the pooled
sample of Windfall and Hard Earned treatments. The upper panel illustrates that going
from a Non-Tax to Tax treatment increases willingness to punish investment shares that
leave citizens in the Tax treatments below their reference point for Windfall treatments,
but that the effect is not significant for any of the three comparisons. The lower panel
shows that going from Non-Tax to Tax treatments increases punishment of investment
shares that leave citizens in all treatments above their reference point and that the effect
is significant for both the Hard Earned treatment and the pooled sample of Windfall
and Hard Earned treatments. Tables E.1 and E.2 show that these results replicate in a
regression framework. The finding that the Tax manipulation increases punishment of
investments that leave citizens in both Tax and Non-Tax treatments above their reference
point, but does not significantly affect punishment of investment levels that leave the cit-
izens in the Tax treatments below their reference point does not support the reference
dependent model. There are several possible interpretations of this result. For instance,
the citizens’ reference point may not be defined by their pre-tax income, punishment
may not solely be determined by the reference point, but can also be influenced by other
factors such as fairness and the utility from punishment may be not be zero, for positive
deviations from the reference point.
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Figure E.1: Effect of Tax treatments below and above reference point
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Note: Upper panel: The figure shows the means and estimated standard errors for the willingness
to punish investments where citizens in the tax treatments are below their reference point. The left
panel illustrates the effect of taxation when the group endowment is windfall (p-value of t-test = 0.39),
the middle panel illustrates the effect of taxation when the group endowment is hard earned (p-value
of t-test = 0.51) and the right panel illustrates the effect of taxation for windfall and hard earned
group endowments combined (p-value of t-test = 0.12). Lower panel: The figure shows the mean and
estimated standard errors for the willingness to punish for levels of investments where citizens in all
treatments are above their reference point. The left panel illustrates the effect of taxation when the
group endowment is windfall (p-value of t-test = 0.37), the middle panel illustrates the effect of taxation
when the group endowment is hard earned (p-value of t-test = 0.015), and the right panel illustrates the
effect of taxation for windfall and hard earned group endowments combined.
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E.3 Main analysis
Table E.1: Effect of Tax treatments for investment levels below reference point
Windfall Hard Earned All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax 0.099 0.094 0.075 0.071 0.115 0.114
(0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.115) (0.074) (0.074)
Male –0.112 –0.298∗∗ –0.124∗
(0.100) (0.119) (0.069)
Above median age –0.004 –0.156 –0.020
(0.117) (0.117) (0.074)
Above median education –0.014 –0.032 –0.031
(0.126) (0.127) (0.079)
Employed full-time 0.047 0.319∗∗ 0.187∗∗
(0.125) (0.138) (0.082)
Above median income 0.064 –0.021 –0.007
(0.130) (0.139) (0.084)
Conservative –0.053 0.026 0.023
(0.122) (0.119) (0.077)
More politically engaged 0.199∗ 0.022 0.138∗
(0.120) (0.117) (0.075)
Constant –0.095 –0.159 –0.034 0.002 –0.065 –0.156
(0.077) (0.173) (0.079) (0.155) (0.055) (0.106)
Observations 297 297 301 301 739 739
R2 0.002 0.021 0.001 0.041 0.003 0.018
Note: The table reports regressions where the dependent variable is the standardized
value of the willingness to punish for investment levels that leaves the citizen below his or
her reference point in the Tax treatment. Columns (1)-(6) present results for the discrete
punishment variable . Columns (1)-(2) present results for a sample restricted to the
Windfall treatments, Columns (3)-(4) present results for a sample restricted to the Hard
Earned treatments and Columns (5)-(6) present results for the whole sample. “Tax”
is an indicator variable taking the value of one for individuals in the tax treatments,
Windfall & Tax and Hard Earned & Tax. See Table 3 for definitions of background
variables.
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Table F.4: Effect of treatment on preferences, leaders
Risk averse More altruistic High pos. reci. High neg. reci. Loss averse
Hard Earned & Non-Tax –0.037 –0.106∗∗ 0.014 –0.049 –0.079
(0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Windfall & Tax 0.035 –0.078 –0.011 0.016 –0.099∗
(0.052) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Tax State –0.041 –0.113∗∗∗ –0.015 –0.079∗ –0.043
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Constant 0.490∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
P-value of F-test 0.213 0.714 0.795 0.103 0.415
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table displays coefficients from estimated regressions of each of the preference indicator variables
for leaders as the dependent variable on indicator variables for the treatments. The Rentier State treatment is
the reference category. See Table B.3 for definition of the variables. The reported p-value tests the hypothesis
that all the treatments have the same effect on the preference indicator variables.
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Figure F.1: Effect of treatments on leaders’ beliefs about punishment
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Note: The figure shows the mean and error bars for the lowest share invested invested the leader thinks
the citizen does not punish. Upper panel: The left panel illustrates the effect of the Hard Earned
treatment when the group endowment is given directly to the leader, the middle panel illustrates the
effect of Hard Earned treatment when the group endowment is collected through tax, and the right panel
illustrates the pooled effect of the Hard Earned treatment. Lower panel: The left panel illustrates the
effect of the tax treatment when the group endowment is windfall, the middle panel illustrates the effect
of the tax treatment when the group endowment is earned, and the right panel illustrates the pooled
effect of the Tax treatment.
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Appendix G Instructions
G.1 Introduction
Figure G.1: Introduction (all participants)
192
G.2 Role assignment
Figure G.2: Role assignment (all citizens)
Figure G.3: Role assignment (all leaders)
193
G.3 Task description (citizens)
Figure G.4: Task description, Rentier State
194
Figure G.5: Task description, Hard Earned & Non-Tax
195
Figure G.6: Task description, Windfall & Tax
196
Figure G.7: Task description, Tax State
[Control questions]
197
G.4 Punishment decision
Figure G.8: Punishment decision, Rentier State
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